Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

MEMBER (SUBPOENA)

Mr. Speaker: I have a communication which it is my duty to make to the House. On Friday last, after the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen) had made a personal statement, I was asked to look into the matter, and I undertook to do so.
After due consideration, I wrote to the learned judge in whose court the hon. Member for Leyton has been summoned as a witness. I have now received from the learned judge a letter which I have his permission to read to the House:

The Honourable Mr. Justice Harman,

Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, W.C.I,

17th April, 1951.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER,

The Reverend R. W. Sorensen, M.P.

I have considered your letter of the 13th April on the subject of this gentleman's complaint. I, of course, agree with you that, during the Session of Parliament, Members of the House are exempt, or at any rate can be exempted, from attending as witnesses. In the circumstances I am entitled to say to you, as I do, that I propose to dispense with the attendance of Mr. Sorensen at my court on Monday, 23rd April next.

When the case comes on I shall make it my business to inquire into the allegations, in connection with which the applicant desires to oblige Mr. Sorensen to give evidence. If as a result, I come to the conclusion that it is necessary or desirable that such evidence should be given. I shall communicate with you again, and seek to arrange that Mr. Sorensen's testimony may be given at some time which will not conflict with his Parliamentary duties.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: In view of what you have said, Mr. Speaker, I think it is right to inform you that this gentleman, Mr. Wicks, is also making efforts to serve me with a subpæna and that I may also have to ask for your protection.

Mr. Speaker: That is a matter for the judge and not for me now, of course.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE

Utility Clothing Prices

Mr. Osborne: asked the President of the Board of Trade what has been the average percentage rise in utility clothing ceiling prices between August, 1945, and February, 1951; and what are the respective figures for the most important half dozen items.

The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Harold Wilson): There are many thousands of ceiling prices for utility clothing and there have been substantial changes in the various utility schemes during the last five and a half years. Many new utility cloths have been introduced, and the austerity regulations which were generally in force in 1945 have long since disappeared. These factors make it impossible to compare maximum prices even for one group of articles over the years, much less to make a comparison for the utility clothing scheme as a whole. As far as changes in actual retail prices are concerned, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour gave to a question by the hon. Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Digby) on 3rd April.

Mr. Osborne: May I ask the President of the Board of Trade two questions? First, does he think that the rise in utility clothing prices has, on the average, been greater than is shown by the fall in the cost-of-living index of between 20s. and 15s. 9d. for the same period? Second, since raw materials are still costed at a very much lower rate than replacement costs, does he think that the present prices can be held for any length of time?

Mr. Wilson: I have made it clear to the House on a number of occasions that further increases will be necessary as the dearer raw material works its way through to the production stage. As to the first part of the question, I have no reason to suppose that the clothing component of the retail price index, which would be a proper comparison, does not reflect accurately the changes in utility and other clothing prices.

Mrs. Jean Mann: Is my right hon. Friend wearing his monkey-nut suit?

Mr. Wilson: I am not sure that that arises out of this Question, but the answer is "Yes."

Mr. Rankin: Is my right hon. Friend aware that utility cloths are being withheld by manufacturers from retailers, pending the expected increase in the price? Can he take any action in that matter?

Mr. Wilson: I have no evidence on that question, but there is always the danger that this may happen if we postpone price increases, as it is reasonable to do.

Mr. Hamilton: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that the pending increases in the price of utility clothing cannot be minimised by further reductions in the profit margin?

Mr. Wilson: We are keeping a very close watch on the utility profit margin, and I can assure my hon. Friend that the ceiling prices are not unreasonable.

Sulphur

Mr. Shepherd: asked the President of the Board of Trade when his Department gave warning to the trade of the possibilities of a shortage of sulphur.

Mr. H. Wilson: Warning of the shortage of sulphur for sulphuric acid manufacture was first given to the trade by my Department in April, 1949. No information was available as to a shortage of sulphur for purposes other than acid making until the allocation for the first quarter of this year was announced by the United States on 18th December last.

Mr. Shepherd: If the right hon. Gentleman was aware of the shortage as long ago as the first month he mentioned, why did he allow the Treasury to compel him to run down the stocks and put us in the present position?

Mr. Wilson: There was no question at all of the Treasury running down the stocks. I have made it clear on a number of occasions that dollars were made available for all the sulphur the trade felt it desirable to have, in so far as supplies were available in the United States.

Mr. Assheton: Has the right hon. Gentleman any further information to

give the House about this very important matter?

Mr. Wilson: No, Sir. I am sorry that we have not received any further information from the United States since I spoke on Monday.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a further statement about the supply of sulphur to this country during the current year.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has yet received any reply from the United States Government to his request for an allocation from their reserves of sulphur.

Mr. H. Wilson: I am unable at present to add anything to the statement I made about the supplies and allocation of sulphur and sulphuric acid in the course of the debate on the Budget proposals on Monday last.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: From Monday's speech, is it to be assumed that the 19,000 tons received on account now form a charge against the second quarter and cannot be considered as an extra allocation for the first quarter? Second, can any further supplies or final allocation be considered probable until the Raw Materials Committee has finished its deliberations in Washington? If so, when does he expect to get the report of that Committee?

Mr. Wilson: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is quite right: the 19,000 tons is in addition to whatever will be the final allocation for the second quarter and not the first quarter. I certainly hope that we shall receive an allocation before the Raw Materials Committee ends its deliberations and, as far as I know, they have not been considering the second quarter allocation.

Mr. A. Lewis: If the President does not receive an allocation, can he say to what extent the re-armament programme will fall short of the target that the Prime Minister has announced for the next year?

Mr. Wilson: I do not think I have anything to add to the statement I made on Monday on that subject.

Mr. Niall Macpherson: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any supplies


we have succeeded in obtaining from countries other than the United States of America are deducted from the supplies that the U.S.A. will send us?

Mr. Wilson: There has been no suggestion of that so far.

Mr. Edelman: Will my right hon. Friend say to what extent the Sulphur Commodity Group is functioning, and who is the British representative of that group?

Mr. Wilson: It is functioning very actively at the present time, but, as I have said, we are not expecting it to produce any results in terms of the second quarter allocation, which is the subject of direct negotiation. Our representative is Mr. Fennelly, the Under-Secretary in charge of sulphur and chemical supplies at the Board of Trade.

Mr. Keeling: Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that any reluctance on the part of America to increase supplies of sulphur to this country is not due, and could not be due, to our having supplied sulphur to Communist countries?

Mr. Wilson: It could not be due to that because sulphur has been on strict export licensing since 18th October and none has been exported to those countries. In fact, none has been exported to those countries during the whole of 1950.

Tortoises (Import)

Mr. H. Hynd: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the high rate of mortality of tortoises if subjected to transport during their hibernating season, he will consider the desirability of introducing an order prohibiting their importation into this country between 1st September and 30th April.

Mr. H. Wilson: The import licensing powers conferred on the Board of Trade under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, are intended primarily to safeguard the balance of payments, and I do not think it would be appropriate to use these powers for such a purpose.

Mr. Hynd: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this is a serious matter? Has his attention been called to the recent incident at Plaistow involving over 200 tortoises and the one in October, 1950,

at Peckham, involving some 6,000 tortoises? Is he aware that the Zoological Society of London strongly supports the efforts to get a close season, as suggested in my Question?

Mr. Wilson: I am sure that the whole House will share the regret of my hon. Friend about these incidents, but I must reiterate that this is not a question which can be dealt with by import licensing powers. If it were to be dealt with at all, it would require special legislation.

Lieut.-Commander Curacy Braithwaite: Are not the tortoises likely to arrive at their destination more rapidly if they travel under their own steam, rather than by nationalised transport?

Sir William Darling: Why does not the right hon. Gentleman stop the importation of tortoises altogether? Surely they are not indispensable.

Mr. Wilson: I do not see why such a control should be applied. If the people of this country require tortoises I do not see why they should not be imported. The matter raised by my hon. Friend could be dealt with in other ways.

Waste Paper (Collection)

Mr. Awbery: asked the President of the Board of Trade what information he has as to how many local authorities have discontinued the practice of collecting waste paper salvage; what reasons were given; what effect this discontinuance has upon the tonnage of salvage collected; and what action he now proposed to take in this matter.

Wing Commander Bullus: asked the President of the Board of Trade what progress is being made in the salvage of waste paper by local authorities and other public bodies.

Mr. H. Wilson: As a result of the salvage drive, more than 1,200 local authorities are now collecting, or have decided to collect, waste paper separately, as compared with the 1,767 authorities who were at one time obliged to make separate collections under the Defence Regulations. The direction was withdrawn in 1949 and the number fell to about 700 at the end of that year. Almost all of those which are still not collecting are in districts of scattered population where it is difficult to organise collections on an economic basis.
The average weekly tonnage of all waste paper received by the mills was greater in February this year than any figure previously recorded. Receipts reached the rate of 987,000 tons per annum, as compared with the target of 1,000,000 tons which the Waste Paper Recovery Association had originally set for 1951. The Waste Paper Recovery Association, with my support, is now planning an intensified publicity campaign for increased collections.

Mr. Awbery: In view of the urgent need for waste paper and scrap iron, will my right hon. Friend make it incumbent upon all local authorities to collect this waste, especially those who have discontinued the practice during the past year or so?

Mr. Wilson: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Local Government and Planning and I have been taking this matter up with the local authorities who have not come back into the picture, and I think that the increase in the number now collecting from 700 to over 1,200 is a rather good achievement.

Wing Commander Bullus: When stimulating the collection of salvage, will the Minister emphasise the value of cartons and cards in addition to newspapers? It is generally accepted by the public that newspapers and old correspondence are the salvage which is required, but cartons and cardboard have their value, too.

Mr. Wilson: I am sure that the Waste Paper Recovery Association will be glad to follow the advice of the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

Mr. E. Fletcher: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that one way to increase the supply of waste paper would be to give the newspapers more newsprint?

Mr. Wilson: The newspapers are, as they have been for some time, perfectly free to bring in all the newsprint they can from Europe, and for some time past there has been a very big allocation of dollars if the newsprint is available in North America.

Major Guy Lloyd: Does the authority of the right hon. Gentleman in this

respect extend to Scotland? If it does, is he aware that a great many local authorities there are doing absolutely nothing at all about it?

Mr. Wilson: I should be very glad to look into that.

Mr. Nabarro: Has the right hon. Gentleman yet formed an opinion whether the target, set tentatively some months ago, of one million tons of waste paper salvage per year will prove adequate in view of the increased demands of the defence programme?

Mr. Wilson: I understand from the trade that it is considered adequate, but we shall review the position from time to time.

Paper Supplies (Elections)

Wing Commander Bullus: asked the President of the Board of Trade what were the arrangements made with the paper trade for preferential treatment to be given to the requirements of all political parties for both national and local elections; and when were these arrangements made.

Mr. H. Wilson: The voluntary priority scheme for paper and board was discussed with the various trade associations concerned at a series of meetings commencing last November and ranging over a period of some weeks. Attention was directed in suitable cases to the importance of seeing that supplies of paper were made available to all political parties for elections. On 12th March the associations in question were specifically reminded of the importance of this matter.

Wing Commander Bullus: Is the Minister entirely satisfied with these rather loose arrangements? Would it not be better to earmark supplies of paper for the forthcoming General Election, which must surely be imminent?

Mr. Wilson: What the hon. and gallant Gentleman is suggesting is that I should reimpose full control on paper supplies. As he has said, the present arrangement is a rather looser one, but all the cases which have been referred to my Department or to the special trade committee concerned with this matter have been dealt with successfully.

Mrs. Middleton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in the south-west of England there is very great concern about the supply of newsprint for the forthcoming municipal elections? Will he look into the matter of supplies for that purpose?

Mr. Wilson: If my hon. Friend will give me particulars, I will certainly look into the matter, but all cases reported to me have been dealt with successfully.

Mr. Hargreaves: Has my right hon. Friend taken notice of the position in Carlisle, which has been brought to his attention, where the whole of the city council will seek re-election at the municipal elections and there is an acute shortage of paper for those elections?

Mr. Wilson: I will certainly look into that matter.

Mr. Awbery: Is my right hon. Friend aware that two or three printers in Bristol have exhausted their supply of paper in meeting the needs of the political parties for the municipal elections? Will he see that the printers have sufficient paper for their normal requirements?

Mr. Wilson: If that is the case, there are arrangements in the trade to see that that is done.

Newsprint

Mr. Deedes: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the progress of negotiations with Canada for future supplies of newsprint.

Mr. H. Wilson: I understand from the Newsprint Supply Company that the arrangements for 1951 have now been settled and that the Company expect to obtain 100,000 tons from Canada this year, which includes a small quantity shipped at the end of 1950. I am informed that negotiations for deliveries in later years are proceeding satisfactorily, but that it is too early yet to make any statement.

Mr. Deedes: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that these arrangements will ensure that we shall at least get to the end of this year without any reduction in the size of newspapers and without the uncertainty which prevailed during the latter part of last year? Can he say anything about the arrangements which the Canadians are reported to be making to

include newsprint with strategic raw materials as a matter for international discussion?

Mr. Wilson: I should like notice of the question about the report, which I have seen. As to the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, Canadian supplies should certainly remove a great deal of uncertainty from the newsprint situation, but a lot will depend on the time they arrive. I have already informed the House that if there is any further danger to newsprint supplies I shall be prepared to consider the question of a reduction of exports.

Mr. Marlowe: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has yet come to a decision on the question of convening an Empire and United States of America Conference to consider the distribution of the available supplies of newsprint.

Mr. H. Wilson: As I informed my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) in reply to his Question on 11th April, a decision has already been taken to set up a Pulp and Paper Committee in Washington. Newsprint will be one of the subjects considered by that body.

Mr. Marlowe: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that this important topic deserves a conference to itself. As the right hon. Gentleman must take a large share of the blame for this situation, has he not also some responsibility for finding a remedy?

Mr. Wilson: I do not accept the suggestion in the concluding part of that supplementary question. But I think I can claim a large share of the credit for the fact that there is to be an international conference to discuss newsprint. It was not possible to get a separate conference.

Film Finance Corporation (Report)

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the recent report of the Film Finance Corporation, he will make a statement on their request for further funds.

Mr. H. Wilson: I am not yet in a position to make any statement.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Is the President aware that according to the


report of the Film Finance Corporation their moneys will be exhausted by this summer? Is he prepared to see this Corporation, whether one likes it or not, jeopardised? If not, surely he should produce legislation now to see that their moneys do not run out before Parliament has made further provision?

Mr. Wilson: The report was received by me only on 11th April. Surely the hon. and gallant Gentleman will agree that this is a matter of great importance, which requires careful study before I can give an answer.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: When does the right hon. Gentleman expect to be able to give an answer?

Mr. Wilson: Quite soon.

Cotton Yarn Exports

Mr. Erroll: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the Government's present policy regarding the exports of cotton yarn.

Mr. H. Wilson: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) on 12th April.

Mr. Erroll: In view of the fact that many of our weaving sheds are on short time owing to lack of yarn, is it not ironic that we should be sending it to those countries which are receiving a larger allowance of cotton from America than ourselves?

Mr. Wilson: I have discussed this fully with the cotton trade and they are most anxious that I should not do anything to reduce too much the export of yarn. They have given an assurance that they will reduce it, and that supplies to home weaving sheds will not be endangered.

Industry (Committees)

Mr. Erroll: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will publish the list of the committees that act as a link between his Department and industry.

Mr. H. Wilson: As the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson) was informed on 12th April, the list is too long to publish in the OFFICAL REPORT, but, for the information of hon. Members, I am placing a copy in the Library.

Mr. Erroll: While it thus becomes possible for hon. Members to look at the copy, it is still not possible for the public or the Press to see a copy? Will the right hon. Gentleman make a copy or copies available to the Press and the public?

Mr. Wilson: I will consider that, but I thought hon. Gentlemen opposite wanted the maximum degree of consultation with these trade bodies. I thought also, in a recent debate on clothing, that they were very severe on my proposal to centralise arrangements for discussion with the clothing trade.

Mr. Erroll: But would not consultation be improved if the public knew of the existence of this committee?

Mr. Snow: Is my right hon. Friend aware that regional officers of his Ministry provide all this information and in all cases are helpful to inquirers?

Mr. Wilson: I am quite prepared to see that information is given to the Press and anyone who wants it.

Sir Waldron Smithers: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that every one of these committees is an added hindrance to our economic recovery?

Mr. Wilson: Practically every one of them was set up at the request of the trade or trade association concerned.

War Damage Claims (Interest)

Mr. Marlowe: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the continued postponement of payment of claims under the War Damage (Business Scheme) Act, 1941, he will now at least authorise payment of the 2½ per cent. per annum interest promised on such sums; and if he will give an estimate of the cost of paying such interest.

Mr. H. Wilson: There is no power under the War Damage Acts to pay interest except in those cases in which a claim is fully discharged on grounds either of public interest or of undue hardship. The aggregate amount of accrued interest now outstanding is approximately £10 million.

Mr. Marlowe: But those are not the cases I was referring to. Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that it savours of sharp practice to keep money, on the plea that interest is to be paid, and then to default on the interest?

Mr. Wilson: If the hon. and learned Gentleman is referring to interest paid when the capital sum is due, it is, of course, the policy of His Majesty's Government to pay it.

Mr. Assheton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these claimants all paid premiums and that they have not received the insurance money which was due to them? It is a very serious state of affairs.

Protein Fibre

Mr. Dodds: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that, by the end of 1951, the Imperial Chemical Industries output of test tube fibre made from the waste product of monkeynuts is estimated to be about 8 million pounds and, if mixed with wool, sufficient for 4 million suits; and if he will make a further statement on this matter.

Mr. H. Wilson: I understand the output of protein fibre in 1951 will be of the order mentioned by my hon. Friend. As he was informed in answer to his Question on 12th April, only a small proportion of this fibre will, I understand, be made into suitings. The number of suits which this will make must, of course, depend upon what blend of wool and protein fibre is found to be technically satisfactory for suitings. This is a new fibre and its development continues.

Mr. Dodds: Would my right hon. Friend agree that this is a discovery with a great future, and would he state whether or not he is wearing today his famous monkeynut wool suit?

Mr. Wilson: Yes, I have already said I am, and I have not changed it since I gave that answer. I believe that this development, and a number of others, in synthetic fibres have great hopes of future development.

Mr. Shepherd: Is it true that the right hon. Gentleman was the centre of attraction in Paris when he went out arrayed in his suit?

Squadron Leader Burden: Will the Minister give an undertaking that this monkeynut fibre will not be described as animal fibre when used alone or in conjunction with wool or other fibres?

Mr. William Ross: Can the President tell us how the cost of this fibre compares

with the present cost of wool, and also the percentage of this fibre that is now being produced in Scotland?

Mr. Wilson: Until it is in full production I do not think it will be possible to get exact costings, but I understand from Imperial Chemical Industries that it will be very cheap in relation to natural wool production.

Export Goods (Conversion Value)

Mr. Nabarro: asked the President of the Board of Trade what groups and classes of goods for export he now proposes to discourage on account of their low conversion value; and what raw material content qualifies goods for inclusion in the group referred to as low conversion value.

Mr. H. Wilson: As I explained to the House on Monday last during the debate on the Budget proposals, there is no suggestion of a total ban on exports from the United Kingdom of semi-manufactured goods of low conversion value. But it is not possible in our present circumstances of raw material shortages to allow the shipment of large quantities of materials in raw or semi-fabricated form which are essential to our own industrial production. The factors to be borne in mind in fixing the conversion value will, obviously, vary from commodity to commodity and it is not possible to specify a figure for the raw material content likely to qualify any range of goods for export purposes.

Mr. Nabarro: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the conversion value of exports or re-exports depends to a large degree upon the cost of the constituent raw materials? In view of his statement last Monday, which seemed to indicate a change of policy in regard to textile exports, can he amplify that statement?

Mr. Wilson: I agree that it should depend on both the cost and the scarcity of the materials. So far as textiles are concerned, we have to put in a certain figure for exports of yarn and we have not planned the textile exports on a conversion value basis. We have on non-ferrous metals.

Mr. Watkinson: Can the President give an undertaking that he will try to give information to the trade as early as


possible on the position, which, I appreciate, must change from month to month, and as to what classes of semi-finished materials will be banned?

Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir.

Softwood Imports

Mr. Nabarro: asked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent soft woods imported on private account during the year 1951 are to be stockpiled; and to what extent stockpiling of soft woods will be restricted to supplies bought on public account by the Timber Control Department of his Department.

Mr. H. Wilson: It is my intention to allow all privately imported timber to go into consumption and to use Government imports partly to bridge the gap between total consumption and private imports and partly for the stockpile.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL DEFENCE

Training

Mr. Watkinson: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will now provide more equipment and facilities for use in the training of Civil Defence volunteers.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas): Adequate supplies of training equipment have been issued to local authorities, but if the hon. Member has any particular items of equipment or training facilities in mind and will let me know, I shall be glad to look into the matter.

Mr. Watkinson: Are adequate supplies available of the new devices and techniques which will be necessary for training, such as, for example, radiation detectors?

Mr. de Freitas: Not long ago I answered a Question on that point. I will communicate with the hon. Member and bring that information up to date.

Strength

Mr. Key: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the strength of the Civil Defence Corps and of the Auxiliary Fire Service in England and Wales on 31st March.

Mr. de Freitas: The figures are 131,000 and 9,700 respectively. I will circulate the detailed figures in HANSARD.

Following are the figures:


CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS


Region
Increase during March 1951
Total strength at 31st March 1951
Strength per thousand of population


Eastern
1,515
15,230
4·91


Southern
1,281
12,707
4·80


South-Western
994
12,796
4·25


South-Eastern
439
10,369
4·05


Northern
785
9,156
2·91


Wales
562
7,007
2·69


Midland
838
11,881
2·68


North-Western
1,069
16,879
2·64


North-Midland
650
8,804
2·55


London
704
18,730
2·23


North-Eastern…
351
7,810
1·90



9,1881
131,369
Average for England and Wales 3·00




AUXILIARY FIRE SERVICE


Increase during March, 1951
Total at 31st March, 1951


320
…
…
…
9,744

Radio Amateurs

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware of recent developments in the United States of America regarding the use of radio amateurs in connection with Civil Defence communications; and whether he will give an assurance that the potential value of radio amateurs in this country for similar purposes is not being overlooked.

Mr. de Freitas: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that among the 14,000 amateurs there are many with war-time experience who, at little or no cost to the country, have played a most valuable part in providing communications without calling upon the technical manpower which is needed for other purposes?

Mr. de Freitas: I recognise that. This question, of course, refers to the United States, where geographical conditions are very different from those prevailing here.

Oral Answers to Questions — FIRE ALARM TEST, ENSTONE

Mr. Dodds-Parker: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department for what reason an official test fire alarm was made during working hours on Tuesday, 3rd April, at Heythorp College, near Enstone, Oxfordshire.

Mr. de Freitas: This was a test of the speed and efficiency of the response of the fire brigade to a call. It was made at the request of H.M. Inspector of Fire Services during an inspection of the brigade.

Mr. Dodds-Parker: As the majority of those concerned had to travel a long distance, and were volunteers, would it not be possible to conduct future tests at the end of normal working hours?

Mr. de Freitas: No, Sir. These tests are not held often, but when they are held, they are expressly held during working hours, because, unfortunately, fires do not occur only after hours.

Oral Answers to Questions — CRIME INVESTIGATION (PRESS INFORMATION)

Mrs. Middleton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware of the disquiet among the public concerning the extent and character of the information made available by the police to the Press about the investigation of crime; what control is exercised over such Press statements; and what category of persons is authorised by his Department to make such statements.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): It is for the responsible chief officer of police to decide what information about a crime investigation should be given to the Press, and no authority from the Home Office is required. In the Metropolitan Police, statements about crime are issued by the Public Information Officer on the authority of the Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the

Criminal Investigation Department. I am not aware of any undue public disquiet on this subject.

Mrs. Middleton: Is my right hon. Friend not aware that, contrary to his information, there is a considerable body of opinion which holds that some of the police communiques which are issued in such cases tend to help the criminal rather than lead to his apprehension? Will my right hon. Friend cause an inquiry to be made into this matter?

Mr. Ede: I will certainly look at what is done, but my impression is that most of these communiques are very carefully worded and are certainly not designed to help the criminal.

Oral Answers to Questions — CRIMES (ARRESTS)

Mrs. Middleton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department in how many cases of major crime occurring during 1950 no arrest has yet been made.

Mr. Ede: The number of crimes cleared up by arrest alone in England and Wales is not recorded, and figures of crimes known to the police and cleared up during 1950 are not yet available. Figures for 1949 were published in Criminal Statistics (England and Wales), 1949, (Cmd. 7993).

Mrs. Middleton: When will the comparable figures for 1950 be available?

Mr. Ede: About mid-summer.

Mr. Malcolm MacMillan: Do these figures include anticipation of the reply to Question No. 28?

Oral Answers to Questions — FESTIVAL GARDENS (PARKING ACCOMMODATION)

Commander Noble: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what regulations and arrangements he is making to deal with the traffic and parking of cars and other vehicles in Chelsea during the period the Festival Gardens are open.

Mr. Ede: There will be a specially signposted ring road and approach routes: for the Festival Gardens traffic avoiding, although their use will not be compulsory; the more congested areas and, except in the case of one route across Battersea


Bridge approaching the Gardens from the south, cars will be parked on special car parks established south of the river and coaches on Clapham Common. The Commissioner will also be in a position to impose, where experience shows it to be necessary, suitable waiting restrictions in streets in Chelsea and elsewhere not at present so restricted and, in imposing and enforcing such restrictions, all possible regard will be paid to the legitimate needs of frontages and commercial traffic.

Commander Noble: While thanking the Minister for that answer may I ask him to bear in mind that some visitors may be tempted to avoid these official car parks and find it easier to park their cars in some of the smaller streets on the other side of the river and walk across to Battersea? Will the right hon. Gentleman give ample consideration to the point he has raised about the legitimate use of frontages of both shops and houses?

Mr. Ede: The police will do all that they can to see that people do not fall into temptation, but if they do, adequate steps will be taken to deal with them.

Mr. Vane: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what is the approximate capacity of the special car parks south of the river which he has mentioned?

Mr. Ede: Yes, if the hon. Member will put a Question on the Paper.

Oral Answers to Questions — CHILD NEGLECT CASE, KIDDERMINSTER

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been drawn to the case of Randolph Clive Oakes, aged four years, Corndon Close, Birchen Coppice, Kiddermister, who lost four toes on one foot and will be crippled for life and who was found to be suffering from gangrene, rickets and scurvy as a result of being kept by his parents in a bare, un-heated room; whether he is aware that the Chairman of the Kidderminster magistrates stated that this is the worst case of child neglect ever to come before him; and whether, in view of the cruelty displayed in this case and many similar cases of child cruelty, His Majesty's Government will now consider strengthening the law and penalties for such offences.

Mr. Ede: I am informed that on the application of the prosecution, the justices decided to deal with this case summarily and imposed the maximum term of imprisonment of six months together with a fine of £10. Had the case been dealt with on indictment, a maximum sentence of two years' imprisonment could have been imposed. This case affords no ground for thinking that the existing maximum penalties are inadequate.

Mr. Nabarro: Were not the circumstances of this child's home well known for several months before the prosecution took place? Can the right hon. Gentleman say why earlier action was not taken which would have avoided this disaster in the life of a four-year-old child?

Mr. Ede: I have no information on the point which the hon. Member has just put to me, but I would point out that the prosecution was conducted by the N.S.P.C.C, who had had the case in hand.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: As this was an indictable offence, could not the magistrates, had they been so minded, have sent the case to a higher court, where very much heavier penalties could have been imposed?

Mr. Ede: Yes, but I understand that the first thing which the N.S.P.C.C. said in presenting the case was that they desired to have it dealt with summarily.

Mr. Nabarro: Is it not a trifle incongruous that the House should at present be considering legislation to prevent cruelty to pet animals while these hideous crimes against children are allowed to be perpetrated?

Mr. Ede: I am not responsible for the House considering pet animals. I stand by the view that the existing penalties are adequate. I was not responsible for the prosecution in this case.

Mr. Profumo: Is not this only one among a whole host of other cases where bestial cruelty to children has been displayed? Will the Home Secretary consider the advisability of increasing the maximum penalty in this year of 1951?

Mr. Ede: No, Sir. I think that had this case been tried on indictment, the penalty provided might then have proved adequate.

Mr. George Thomas: In view of the earlier statement of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro), who raised this matter, is my right hon. Friend satisfied that there is no undue delay in the bringing of proceedings once there is a sense of anxiety about the child?

Mr. Ede: The view of the Society, which I share in a good many cases, is that it is desirable to secure reform, if at all possible, rather than to lead to the possible break-up of a home. It may be that in this case too long a period was allowed to elapse. As I say, however, the Society have a very great experience in these matters and generally, I think, are to be supported.

Oral Answers to Questions — CORONATION STONE

Mr. Henderson Stewart: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a further statement about the Coronation Stone.

The Attorney-General (Sir Hartley Shawcross): I have been asked to answer this Question. The police conducted very full and, if I may say so, very able inquiries into this deplorable affair and I have now considered their report. The report included statements by three out of the four persons who are believed to have been concerned in removing the Stone from Westminster Abbey in which each admitted the part he himself had played but did not implicate others, or indicate the then whereabouts of the Stone. The clandestine removal of the Stone from Westminster Abbey, the manner of its taking and the manifest disregard for the sanctity of the Abbey were vulgar acts of vandalism which have caused great distress and offence both in England and Scotland and have brought the individuals concerned in them into great disrepute. I do not think, however, that the public interest requires that I should direct criminal proceedings to be taken.

Mr. Stewart: As the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not mention it, are we to take it that the Stone, having now been returned to Westminster Abbey, it is the view of the Government that it ought to be allowed to remain there?

The Attorney-General: That is another question for the answer to which I cannot be responsible.

Mr. Grimond: In view of the anxiety in Scotland over this matter and the criticism of the handling of the Stone since it was returned to Arbroath, can the right hon. and learned Gentleman assure us that if he makes recommendations about its future, public opinion and the opinion of the Secretary of State for Scotland will fully be taken into account?

The Attorney-General: That is another matter, quite outside my jurisdiction.

Mr. Rankin: Has my right hon. and learned Friend been made aware of the proposal of the Church and Nation Committee of the Church Assembly of the Church of Scotland that the Stone should be returned to Scotland and placed in the custody of the Church of Scotland? Would he give consideration to that proposal?

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that if, in this case, a crime of sacrilege has been committed, it is a crime which the law of this country recognises as one of the most serious and that the law is supported in this important matter by the great majority of the people in this country?

The Attorney-General: I hope no one will think from the answer I have given that the crime of sacrilege is not a very grave one and one which is deplored by the mass of the people of this country, and, I am sure, of Scotland, as well.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that apart from regarding this act as an act of vandalism, a lot of people in Scotland regard it as an attempt to recover stolen property? Is he aware that if he had prosecuted, the defendants would have been admirably defended by the hon. Member for Nelson and Scone—[Laughter.]—and the lady K.C.?

The Attorney-General: I confess that these considerations were not absent from my mind. It is certainly impossible to forecast the decisions of juries in cases where no actual dishonesty in the ordinary sense is involved and I have no desire to provide these individuals with the


opportunity either of being regarded by their followers as martyrs if convicted, or as heroes if they are not convicted.

Oral Answers to Questions — ARREST, BOW STREET (ERROR)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why Mr. Arnold Johnson Ross, after discovery that he was innocent of the charge on which he had been convicted to three months' imprisonment, was nevertheless remanded on bail; what amount of bail was required; and by whom it was provided or guaranteed.

Mr. Ede: I have no responsibility in this matter.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the only way of liberating an innocent man from gaol is to issue another warrant remanding him on bail and, in effect, putting him on trial for the same offence before the same magistrate?

Mr. Ede: I have made some inquiries into this matter and, although I have no responsibility, I would like, as a matter of courtesy to the House, to say that the chief magistrate tells me that on hearing by telephone from the prosecutor's father that the wallet had been found, he was most anxious to secure the immediate release of Mr. Ross until the matter could be dealt with by him on the following day, after the hearing of fresh evidence on oath. To do this, a remand was necessary to secure Mr. Ross's attendance in court. He was accordingly released on his own bail, with no surety on the direction of the chief magistrate to appear next day at Bow Street.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I beg to give notice that in view of what I regard as an ugly stain on the administration of justice I will endeavour to raise this matter again.

Oral Answers to Questions — FESTIVAL SITES (ALLEGATIONS)

Sir W. Smithers: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, he will state the reasons for the investigation by Scotland Yard of allegations of swindling at London's festival sites; and what are the results of these investigations.

Mr. Ede: I am informed by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that no special investigation of this character has been undertaken.

Oral Answers to Questions — BROADMOOR INSTITUTION (DISCHARGED PATIENTS)

Mr. Touche: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many patients have been released from Broad-moor Institution as cured during the last 10 years.

Mr. Ede: In the period of 10 years up to the end of 1950, the number of patients discharged from Broadmoor Institution was 148 males and 61 females, giving a total of 209.

Oral Answers to Questions — FIRE STATION, COVENTRY

Mr. Edelman: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what arrangements he is making to return the Broad Heath School Fire Station, Coventry, to the education authority; and to accede to the request of the Fire Brigade Committee that a new station for Coventry should be built.

Mr. de Freitas: I regret that I cannot usefully add anything to the information which I gave to my hon. Friend on this subject in February last.

Mr. Edelman: While I am obliged to my hon. Friend for his letters, which were completely unsatisfactory, may I ask him to explain why, for the small sum of £13,000, he cannot add both a school and fire station to Coventry's completely inadequate facilities? Will he not reconsider the matter?

Mr. de Freitas: I am obliged to my hon. Friend for being so obliged for my unsatisfactory letters, but it is impossible to allow money and materials to be spent on a fire station in Coventry.

Miss Burton: May I press my hon. Friend—[Laughter]—verbally, of course, to consider if, in view of the fact that Coventry suffered so much during the war, and has since then played an outstanding part in the recovery of the country, an exception could be made in this case?

Mr. de Freitas: Coventry, of course, played a gallant part in the war and it has played a magnificent part in our recovery. But the fact remains that from the fire service point of view there are many communities which have a better claim to money and materials being expended on a fire station, than has Coventry. I am sorry.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGED PEOPLE (WINDOW CARD)

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Health whether he will provide local authorities with a distinctive card for distribution to aged people living alone, so that they may be able to display the card in their window when they are in need of help.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Blenkinsop): No, Sir. This is a suggestion that should be left to the local authorities together with the voluntary organisation to consider.

Mr. Turton: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that it is very valuable to have a window card which is uniform in all local authority areas, so that such a card can easily be recognised and many deaths prevented? Will he look into the matter, which is of great importance to old people living alone?

Mr. Blenkinsop: This matter has been looked into and some authorities run such a scheme, but there is doubt whether it is an advisable scheme.

Mrs. Mann: Would it not be rather a dangerous suggestion to carry out, as it might leave the house open to any suspicious characters who may be in the neighbourhood?

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind, particularly arising from the debate in another place yesterday, that there is very widespread concern about the number of old people who are left alone in very difficult circumstances? If this is not the best way to solve the problem will he consider something similar, but more suitable?

Mr. Blenkinsop: We have been encouraging local authorities to get together with voluntary organisations to work out schemes for their areas, and this is going forward rapidly.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

Aged Sick (Hospital Treatment)

Captain Ryder: asked the Minister of Health whether he has considered the representation sent to him from the Surrey County Council regarding the need for hospital treatment for aged sick persons in welfare establishments and voluntary homes; and what action he proposes to take.

The Minister of Health (Mr. Marquand): Yes, Sir. But the trouble is one of shortage of staffed beds and is bound to take time to put right.

Captain Ryder: Can the Minister hold out any encouragement that he will take action in these matters?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, Sir, action to, increase the number of beds available is going on all the time.

Maternity Cases, Surrey

Mr. Michael Astor: asked the Minister of Health what improvements in the facilities for maternity cases can be expected this summer in the Surrey area covered by the Redhill Group Hospital Management Committee.

Mr. Marquand: There is already adequate provision, both hospital and domiciliary, in this area and no immediate increase is necessary.

Mr. Astor: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is a very real hardship, due to lack of midwives, beds and trained personnel for maternity cases in this area, and that my constituents feel that there is a lack of sense of urgency on the part of those responsible for these matters at a higher level? Will he please look into the matter again and accept the facts from me?

Mr. Marquand: My advice is that of births in 1950 in this area 63 per cent. took place in hospital, 10 per cent. in nursing homes and only 27 per cent. were domiciliary, which is regarded as a rather high proportion of births in establishments of that kind.

Mr. Snow: Is it not a fact that Tory-led local authorities have been agitating against increased maternity facilities?

Dentures and Spectacles

Commander Noble: asked the Minister of Health what would have been the total saving if charge for dentures and spectacles had been made from the start of the National Health Service.

Mr. Marquand: An exact calculation cannot be made, but I estimate that the saving in England and Wales would have been of the order of £50 million.

Foreign Workers, Bradford (Tuberculosis)

Mr. W. J. Taylor: asked the Minister of Health (1) whether he is aware of the prevalence of pulmonary tuberculosis amongst foreign workers in Bradford; and whether he will now cause a much stricter medical examination to be made of foreign workers entering this, country by the immigration authorities:
(2) how many cases of pulmonary tuberculosis among foreign workers in Bradford were notified in each of the years, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950; and what percentage these figures represent of the total number of cases notified in the same years;
(3) if he will make a statement on the inquiry he has recently caused to be made about the incidence of pulmonary tuberculosis among foreign workers in Bradford.

Mr. Marquand: Notifications of respiratory tuberculosis among foreign workers in Bradford in the years 1947 to 1950 were respectively nil, 6, 15 and 26. The last three figures represented 2.9, 5.4 and 10.4 per cent. of the total notifications in that city. Over half the cases were European volunteer workers, who are medically examined for tuberculosis before being brought to this country, and most of the others were ex-prisoners of war or members of the Polish Armed Forces. I am examining with other Ministers concerned whether anything more can be done to prevent immigration of foreign workers with tuberculosis.

Mr. Taylor: Will the Minister take note of the fact that out of 225 cases among European volunteer workers examined by the tuberculosis officer for Bradford, 52 were found to be positive and 21 suspect? Does he not think, having regard to those very serious figures, that a more strict examination

should be made of those people when they enter the country?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, Sir. But I do not think I can deal any more effectively with these points than I have already done in answer to the Question.

Oral Answers to Questions — POPULATION STATISTICS, WALES

Mr. Grenfell: asked the Minister of Health whether he will give the population statistics for the Llwchwr-Pontardawe and Gower District Councils, respectively, with the appropriate division into the wards of each district, respectively, for the census years 1911, 1921 and 1931.

Mr. Marquand: As the answer necessarily contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the answer:


Llwchwr Urban District (created in 1930)—1931 Census figures:


Wards:





Brin Lliw
…
…
3,567


Dulais
…
…
3,161


Gorseinon
…
…
4,546


Gowerton
…
…
3,075


Llangyfelach
…
…
1,763


Loughor
…
…
4,469


Pont y Brenin
…
…
2,823


Tal y Bont
…
…
3,222


Total
…
…
26,626

Pontardawe Rural District:


1911 Census figure:
Total
31,498


1921 Census figure:
Total
34,619


1931 Census figure:
Total
36,569

Gower Rural District:


1911 Census figure:
Total
8,622


1921 Census figure:
Total
9,567


1931 Census figure:
Total
9,676


Rural districts are not divided into wards.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

Mr. Watkins: asked the Prime Minister if he has considered a resolution, a copy of which has been sent him, approved by 32 well known ministers of religion in South Wales, calling upon the Government to use its power at the United Nations organisation to persuade Western Governments to divert to the bettering of economic and social conditions in Europe and Asia the present expenditure on war preparations; and what was the nature of his reply.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Herbert Morrison): I have been asked to reply. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has received and acknowledged a copy of such a resolution. The House is fully aware, as a consequence of frequent debates on the subject, of the reasons which compel us and other Western nations to increase our defence expenditure. Our proposals in the United Nations for the regulation and reduction of armaments have of course been designed to apply equitably to all countries and not merely to the Western Powers.

Mr. Llewellyn: Should not this resotion have been more appropriately sent to the Kremlin, in respect of the Eastern Governments of Europe under its control?

Mr. Morrison: I am all for impartiality. I think that it might have been sent to both.

Oral Answers to Questions — FISHING INDUSTRY

Nets (Mesh)

Mr. Osborne: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that whilst British fishermen, in observation of the international agreement, are using 2½-inch mesh nets in the North Sea, foreign fishermen are using 1-inch mesh nets; and if he will make a statement on the steps he is taking to obtain general observation of the international agreement.

The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Thomas Williams): The International Convention of 1946 which, among other things, prescribes a minimum size of mesh for nets to be used in the North Sea, is not yet in force. Meanwhile, British fishermen are required under an Order made in 1938 to use nets with a minimum mesh of approximately 2½ inches. Two of the signatory countries to the 1946 Convention have not yet ratified it, and one has agreed to do so subject to a reservation which has not so far been accepted by some others. His Majesty's Government are taking all possible steps to secure the implementation of this Convention as early as possible.

Mr. Osborne: Is the Minister aware that both skippers and crew feel that they

are having to meet unjust and unfair competition through the use of the one-inch mesh? Cannot the right hon. Gentleman use his powers to prevent these people landing their fish in this country until they ratify this Convention?

Mr. Williams: As I have previously told the hon. Member, I have done all in my power, and the Foreign Secretary is doing the same.

Mr. Osborne: Will the right hon. Gentleman keep at it?

Mr. Williams: Yes, Sir, certainly.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: When does the Minister anticipate that this Convention will be ratified by all the countries concerned, and that we shall be able to get satisfaction for our people?

Mr. Williams: Having waited since 1946, I do not intend to begin anticipating at this moment.

White Fish Authority, Welsh Port Representative

Mr. Llewellyn: asked the Minister of Agriculture in which Welsh port the representative of the authority set up under the Sea Fish Industry Bill will have his office.

Mr. T. Williams: The White Fish Authority have not yet reached a conclusion in this matter. They are, of course, only a body-designate until the Sea Fish Industry Bill becomes law.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE

Pig Keeping (Defence Regulation)

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in view of the present meat shortage, he will extend Regulation 62B so far as it affects pig keeping for a further period of 12 months.

Mr. T. Williams: No, Sir. On 21st June last I gave notice that after June, 1951, Defence Regulation 62B would be replaced by what is now Section 12 of the Allotments Act, 1950, and I see no reason to alter this decision now.

Mr. Turton: Surely, at that time the meat ration was not quite so small as it is at present. Does the Minister realise that unless something is done these council


tenants will, after 1st July, be at a grave disadvantage because they will no longer be able to purchase pig meat in order to supplement the meat supply?

Mr. Williams: As I explained on the Report stage of the Act referred to, I did not think that there should be any ban on pig keeping. Indeed I appealed then, and I think that local authorities and private landlords are responding to the appeal, for people to be allowed to keep pigs whenever it is reasonable for them to do so.

Waste Wood (Stockfeed)

Mr. Vane: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been drawn to the experiments carried out in the United States of America, Germany and Finland in the development of molasses and yeast from waste wood for use as stockfeed; and whether he has considered instituting similar experiments in this country.

Mr. T. Williams: These processes are known in this country but supplies of waste softwood are insufficient at any time to give promise of economic development here. Experiments were carried out here during the war and I do not propose to conduct more.

Wheat

Mr. Baldwin: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether the order which compels farmers to sell 75 per cent. of the wheat which they grow to the Minister of Food at a price lower than that which they have to pay for animal feedingstuff can now be lifted, so that home pig and poultry production can be increased.

Mr. T. Williams: No, Sir. Our need of wheat for human consumption will not permit of this change. I am, however, able to announce one small relaxation. Growers of up to two acres of wheat are allowed at present to retain the whole of their wheat. To encourage such growers to increase their wheat acreage those who grow more than two acres may after 30th June next retain two tons or 25 per cent. of their production, whichever is the greater.

Mr. Baldwin: Is the Minister aware that the compulsory order means that

the farmers have to sell their raw material at a lower price than they had to pay for similar raw material from abroad? Will he convey to the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans) and those who think like him that that does not sound very much like a feather bed for farmers?

Mr. Williams: The hon. Member must know that we have just had the February Price Review, in the preparation of which all these factors were taken into account.

Major Legge-Bourke: asked the Minister of Agriculture what acreage of wheat, both winter and spring, had been sown at the latest convenient date; and how this compares with the average over the last five years.

Mr. T. Williams: The agricultural returns of 4th December last gave an England and Wales acreage of wheat sown by that date of 1,530,000 acres compared with a corresponding average of 1,833,000 acres over the previous five years. The five-year average for all wheat sown, including spring wheat, was 2,065,000 acres. This year, for reasons well known to the hon. and gallant Member, I am afraid that the final area sown will not be anything like the 1950 figure.

Major Legge-Bourke: Has the right hon. Gentleman looked into the position so far as spring varieties of wheat for sowing are concerned? Is he satisfied that there is a sufficient supply of spring varieties for sowing this month and early next month?

Mr. Williams: I am satisfied that sufficient spring wheat was available to have provided even up to the equivalent of last year's sowing if the weather conditions had been favourable.

Sugar Beet

Major Legge-Bourke: asked the Minister of Agriculture what acreage of sugar beet had been sown at the latest convenient date; and how this compares with the average over the last five years.

Mr. T. Williams: The British Sugar Corporation estimate that on 14th April, 1951, some 12,500 acres had been planted. Normally, sowings by that date exceed 250,000 acres. In 1947, however, the weather conditions during the spring were


very unfavourable as they are this year, and the acreage sown by mid-April probably did not much exceed the 1951 figure; nevertheless, the acreage finally sown in 1947 was 395,000 acres.

Cartridges

Mr. Hurd: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that farmers cannot now buy shot-gun cartridges needed for the destruction of rabbits, wood pigeons and other vermin; and if he will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that cartridges are available for essential purposes.

Mr. T. Williams: Owing to the shortage of non-ferrous metals supplies of shotgun cartridges to retailers have had to be reduced during the last few months. Allocations of these metals to cartridge manufacturers are now being increased and supplies should shortly improve. Provided retailers distribute equitably amongst their customers there is no reason why farmers should not be able to get reasonable supplies of cartridges for shooting pests.

Mr. Hurd: Can we expect that supplies in the shops will be equal to those of last year?

Mr. Williams: I cannot guarantee that but there will be an increase. I hope there will be approximately as many as last year.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: Is not the real difficulty the present high price of cartridges? Could not the right hon. Gentleman persuade the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reduce the Purchase Tax on these cartridges?

Mr. Williams: The real explanation is the shortage of non-ferrous metals.

Garden Produce Committees

Mr. Crouch: asked the Minister of Agriculture under what statutory authority grants were paid to county garden produce committees during the years 1946 to 1951 inclusive.

Mr. T. Williams: Statutory authority was given by the Annual Appropriation Act.

Mr. Crouch: If I had not asked this Question, would the Minister have elucidated the answer he gave a fortnight ago, when he said that these associations receive no aid?

Mr. Williams: My answer a fortnight ago was transparently clear. Village associations did not receive any grants.

Poultry

Mr. Bossom: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is satisfied that the arrangements concluded with the poultry keepers will result in an increase in the number of birds kept in Great Britain.

Mr. T. Williams: While I do not know what are the arrangements with poultry keepers to which the hon. Member refers, I believe that present and prospective conditions are such as to enable efficient poultry keepers to increase the scale of their operations.

Mr. Bossom: Is the Minister aware that his own representative called me up the other day to ask what I meant, and I told him? Is he also aware that the farmers in Kent are very disappointed and do not believe that they will get the result which the right hon. Gentleman anticipates?

Mr. Williams: Too pessimistic.

Mr. De la Bère: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his answer is nonsense?

Ryan Committee (Report)

Mr. Hurd: asked the Minister of Agriculture when he will publish the report of the Ryan Committee which inquired into the relation of his Department to the county agricultural executive committees and the Agricultural Advisory Service; and if any decision on the Committee's recommendations has been reached by the Government.

Mr. T. Williams: It is expected that the report will be published by His Majesty's Stationery Office on 25th April. Before taking decisions on the recommendations I propose to seek the views of those who would be affected by them particularly the members of the county agricultural executive committees and the district committees and this consultation will inevitably take some considerable time.

Mr. Turton: Will there be an opportunity for the House to debate this report?

Mr. Williams: The House had better wait to see what the report contains.

Oral Answers to Questions — PACIFIC DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

Mr. Eden (by Private Notice): asked the Prime Minister whether he has a statement to make with reference to President Truman's announcement about defence arrangements in the Pacific.

Mr. H. Morrison: I have been asked to reply. The House will have seen the statement made by President Truman yesterday regarding the arrangement proposed between the Governments of the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand to strengthen the security of these countries in the Pacific area. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who have throughout been in the closest consultation with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, warmly welcome this development. They consider that such an arrangement will be a most valuable contribution to the security of the Commonwealth and to the safeguarding of the vital interests of the democratic countries in the whole Pacific area.
The United Kingdom Government regard the arrangement as complementary to the understandings of mutual support and co-operation between our own country, Australia and New Zealand. We are confident that it will serve to strengthen still further the close and special relationship which exists between our three countries.

Mr. Eden: While I imagine that the House would welcome any arrangement which leads to greater security in the Pacific, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman about our own position; whether the question of our joining in this arrangement was considered, more particularly since we are, of course, a Pacific Power with heavy responsibilities there, and since any threat to either Australia or New Zealand must always be calculated as a threat to our own country?

Mr. Morrison: We are most certainly a Pacific Power and it would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh"]—I said it would not have been unwelcome. But the discussions did not so work out and it is quite clear that they will not so work out. I would like to add that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are,

nevertheless, entirely satisfied that Australia and New Zealand should represent the interests of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth as a whole. After all, this is in accordance with the modern principle of Commonwealth co-operation, in which Commonwealth countries take the lead in the area in which they are situated on behalf of the Commonwealth as a whole. In the same way, for example, the United Kingdom and Canada represent the interests of the Commonwealth in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The House will recall that the Australian and New Zealand Governments made an announcement welcoming this situation when the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements were first made public.

Mr. Eden: While, obviously, we welcome the initiative taken by Australia and New Zealand, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will see whether an opportunity can be created for us to be associated with this, more particularly since our Malayan interests make us essentially a Pacific Power?

Mr. Morrison: The House should be under no misapprehension. This does not in any way prejudice the close relationship between the United Kingdom and Australia and New Zealand, or our desire to be mutually helpful to each other in the case of trouble. I will bear in mind the view of the right hon. Gentleman, but we are, of course, dealing not only with the United States of America, which is an independent nation; we have to face the fact that Australia and New Zealand are independent nations as well, associated with the Commonwealth.

Brigadier Head: In view of this pact, will the Foreign Secretary say whether it means that, regarding defence, Australia and New Zealand will have discussions with America? Will it also mean an increased share in the defence of Malaya and their participation in Far East defence?

Mr. Morrison: With regard to Malaya, it is not yet clear what the final effect of the proposed arrangements may be. I understand that the intention is that this should be a Pacific defence arrangement, and as such it would have an oceanic character and exclude the general area of South-East Asia. Our hope is that one day it may be possible to arrange for


Malaya to be covered by appropriate security arrangements interlocking with the Pacific defence system now under discussion, but Malaya is not actually within the field of the present discussion.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the right hon. Gentleman assure us that this will not involve us in a war over Formosa?

Mr. Morrison: I think that sometimes the imagination of my hon. Friend goes a bit far.

Mr. Duncan Sandys: Can the Foreign Secretary say whether His Majesty's Government specifically asked that Great Britain should be included in this arrangement, or whether we merely waited to be invited and have accepted the fact that we have not been invited to this important organisation?

Mr. Morrison: That does not represent the true Commonwealth spirit—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I have indicated what His Majesty's Government would have been willing and pleased to do, and I am not going to be tempted into the field of perfectly needless controversy between ourselves and Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Sandys: The right hon. Gentleman said he has "indicated." What does he mean? Did he ask or did he not ask?

Hon. Members: Answer!

Commander Noble: The Foreign Secretary has told us that the Government would like to have been in this pact. Could he amplify that a little more and say why we are not?

Mr. Morrison: I say again that it would not have been unwelcome to us, but I am not going to take a course, in answering supplementary questions, that will involve us in friction with Commonwealth countries.

Mr. Somerset de Chair: In view of the fact that the United Kingdom has the preponderant part of the naval power of the British Commonwealth, and has direct control over the Singapore base and Hong Kong, with the Colonial Office, would it not be quite impracticable for the United Kingdom to be omitted from any defence pact in the Pacific?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: In view of the astonishing statement made by the right hon. Gentleman, may I ask whether he

recollects the recent words of the Australian Minister of Defence: that if the United Kingdom is not prepared to take the lead, the Dominions must do it for her? Is this, in fact, what has happened?

Mr. Morrison: That and other supplementary questions betray a complete lack of understanding of modern Commonwealth relationships. I can only say again that I am not going to be provoked by Members of the Opposition into observations calculated to impair the relationship between ourselves and Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Paton: May I ask, my right hon. Friend if, in view of the enormously far-reaching and long-term implications of the arrangement now being made, we are still in consultation with the three Powers concerned, and if there is a possibility that in the end we shall be associated in a general consultation?

Mr. Morrison: We are always in consultation with the three Powers concerned, but I say to my hon. Friend, as I say to the Opposition, that our conception of the Commonwealth is—

Mr. Steward: That it ought to be liquidated. [Laughter.]

Mr. Morrison: —distinct from that of some hon. Members opposite—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—as can be heard. Some of their conception is part of the old imperialist colonial spirit. I must make it absolutely clear that our conception—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—I suppose the House will listen to me—is that each Commonwealth country is an equal and must be so dealt with.

Mr. Eden: While there is no dispute about the right of any Commonwealth country to act as it wills or desires, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will consider whether, in view of the fact that no Pacific pact can really be effective that does not include South-East Asia, it would not be possible to see if the conversations cannot be reopened to cover South-East Asia so that Britain can have her place in it?

Mr. Morrison: All these points have been considered. I am bound to reply to the right hon. Gentleman that that is' not a practical course at this stage.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: We have a lot of business before us and we have not nearly got through the Private Notice Questions yet. Then we have an important debate.

Oral Answers to Questions — H.M. SUBMARINE "AFFRAY"

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas (by Private Notice): asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether he has any further statement to make about H.M. Submarine "Affray."

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. James Callaghan): I règret to inform the House that although full-scale air and sea searches have continued during the past 24 hours, including search sweeping on the sea bed, the Submarine "Affray" has not yet been found. Hopes that any lives will now be saved are dwindling. The search is continuing.

Mr. Thomas: I am sure that the whole House is grieved that the Parliamentary Secretary cannot give us a more hopeful statement. Will it be possible in the remaining hours of daylight today for the divers to go down, and can the hon. Gentleman say whether he is likely to be able to make a further statement this evening.

Mr. Callaghan: It is the intention that a diver should go down from the "Reclaim," one of the ships on the spot, at four o'clock today, which is slack water, to investigate a contact. The policy at the moment is to find every contact and to establish that it is not a submarine; but the House will realise that that is a very long process indeed. As regards making a further statement, I think that is a matter for the Leader of the House.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Eden: Will the Leader of the House tell us the business for next week?

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 23RD APRIL—Committee and remaining stages of the Fire Services Bill.

As it is not expected that this business will occupy any appreciable time, there

will be an opportunity to move the three Opposition Prayers against the Regulations relating to the British Transport Commission's Railway Freight, Dock and Canal Charges at an early hour.

Motion to approve the Purchase Tax (No. 4) Order.

TUESDAY, 24TH APRIL—Second Reading of the National Health Service Bill and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.

WEDNESDAY, 25TH APRIL—Supply (13th Allotted Day), Committee.

Debate on the White Paper on a Programme of Highland Development (Cmd. 7976).

THURSDAY, 26TH APRIL—Second Reading of the National Insurance Bill.

Consideration of Motion to approve the British Wool (Guaranteed Prices) Order.

FRIDAY, 27TH APRIL—Consideration of Private Members' Motions.

Mr. Eden: Can the Leader of the House tell us when the Festival of Britain (Additional Loans) Bill is to be taken? The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that at present the Government are spending money without Parliamentary sanction. Why could not that Bill have been taken next week instead of the Bill to deal with dentures and spectacles?

Mr. Ede: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Works is to make a statement in a few moments which will deal with the report that he promised to make to the House. Perhaps after the House has heard what he has to say, we may be able, through the usual channels, to fix an appropriate date for the Second Reading of the Bill.

Air Commodore Harvey: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what are the intentions of the Government about a debate on the question of those who were British prisoners in the hands of the Japanese during the war? Will he bear in mind that, if such a debate is to be of any value, it ought to take place before Whitsun?

Mr. Ede: The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) last week indicated that that the Opposition would arrange for a Motion on that subject to be taken on


one of their Supply days. There are some conversations taking place within the Commonwealth with regard to this matter, and I do not think that a debate could usefully take place before we have reached some further stage about them. However, we shall keep in touch with the Opposition about this matter through the usual channels.

Mr. Eden: Will the right hon. Gentleman let us know when the Government consider that it will be convenient for this debate to be usefully taken? When can we put it down for a Supply day?

Mr. Ede: I have just said that we will discuss it through the usual channels.

Mr. Ellis Smith: In reference to the National Insurance Bill which is to be taken on Thursday, may I ask whether the Money Resolution has yet been prepared? If not, will my right hon. Friend consult the Patronage Secretary, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer so that it may be drawn up in such terms that it will allow more democratic latitude in this House, so that we may move Amendments and not be limited by the terms of the Resolution?

Mr. Ede: I will have such consultations.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Can the right hon. Gentleman give any indication of what will be the action of the Government on the Report of the Royal Commission on Gambling, and can he say whether we shall have an opportunity to debate it?

Mr. Ede: The first action of the Government will be to study the Report.

Mr. Peter Freeman: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication about the length of the Whitsun Recess yet?

Mr. Ede: Not at the moment.

FESTIVAL GARDENS LTD. (INQUIRY)

The Minister of Works (Mr. Stokes): Sir, with your permission, and the leave of the House, I wish to make a statement about the investigations into the finances of Festival Gardens Ltd.
Messrs. Moores, Carson and Watson, the chartered accountants, who have been investigating the circumstances which caused the financial commitments of Festival Gardens Ltd. to be greatly in excess of the amount estimated last year, have now submitted an interim report which the Board have communicated to me.
This interim report is mainly designed to assist the Board to decide what action may be necessary, and it shows that the reasons behind the excess cost of the work cannot be fully established without extending the field of investigation to cover operations on the site. At my request the Board have taken immediate action to carry out this recommendation. I have also invited them to let me have their considered comments on the interim report with all possible speed.
I am in consultation with the Law Officers on the matter and, subject to their advice, it is my intention to arrange for the results of the investigations to be published together with any comments which the Board may wish to make, as soon as the matter is completed. I am pressing this as quickly as possible.

Mr. Eden: I understand the difficulty, but can the right hon. Gentleman give any indication at all of when it will be possible to make that report available, because the Leader of the House will understand that this is connected with the Bill I mentioned earlier? We should not remain longer than we possibly can help in this position where the Government are illegally spending the taxpayers' money.

Mr. Stokes: I do not think the last remark is quite correct. This is not illegal spending. The House was advised of the position, and the normal course of events will follow. The interim report was only received the day before yesterday. The new accountants, appointed independently of the first report to investigate the site conditions, have been appointed today. Until I have some estimate from them as to the length of time which they think it will take to complete their report, it is not possible to answer the question. I do not want to delay the Bill in the slightest, but it seems to me that it would be better to have both reports before us. Otherwise, it will be a milk and water affair.

Mr. Eden: I assure the right hon. Gentleman that it will not be that, anyway.

Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Is it not desirable in the interests of financial propriety that the Civil Contingencies Fund should not be used a moment longer than is necessary to finance operations of which this House does not approve?

Mr. Stokes: What we are doing is perfectly legal. We are hurrying on with the Bill as fast as we can.

Mr. Sandys: Since the report which the right hon. Gentleman is to publish deals with the action of the company and the work on the site, would he tell us meanwhile how it is that, since the contract for this job was radically altered last December, which made it obvious that there would be a large increase in expenditure, this House was only informed—and it was wrong information it turned out—at the beginning of March that there would be an increase in expenditure?

Mr. Stokes: That is one of the most difficult points. Until the further investigation has been completed, I think it would be much wiser not to say anything about it.

Mr. Osborne: Can the Minister say whether responsibility will be pinned upon the people at the top, whoever they may be?

Mr. Stokes: I do not know whether they are at the top or the bottom, but I hope it will be pinned upon those responsible.

Mr. Sandys: The right hon. Gentleman said that he was consulting with the Law Officers. Does that mean that he is considering, or the Government are considering, prosecutions?

Mr. Stokes: No. I said that I was discussing with the Law Officers whether the report should be published or not. So far as we have gone, I see no objection, but it would be quite foolish of me to promise to publish the second half of a report which I have not yet even seen. Subject to the opinion of the Law Officers, my intention is to publish it, but, if they advise not, I shall have to think again.

Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether, after all this bother and enormous expense, it is going to be open exactly on time?

Mr. Stokes: It is very important that we should be clear about this. There is no danger whatever that the South Bank will not open on time. That is all right. The difficulty is with the Festival Gardens themselves in Battersea Park, and I am now awaiting a final recommendation from the Board as to what should be done. My own view is that it is much more desirable that we should have a really spick and span opening, perhaps subject to a bit of delay, rather than that the thing should go off at half-cock.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[12TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1951–52, AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1951–52.

Motion made, and Question proposed.
That a sum, not exceeding £3,540,000, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Defence: expenses in connection with International Defence Organisations and a contribution towards certain expenses incurred in the United Kingdom by the Government of the United States of America.—[Mr. Jay.]—[£2,672,000 has been voted on account.]

Orders of the Day — NORTH ATLANTIC (SUPREME COMMANDER)

3.53 p.m.

Mr. Churchill: As this matter concerns both our country and the United States, I hope I may have your indulgence, Mr. Speaker, if I say, I think on behalf of all parties and every hon. Member, with what deep regret we have received the news this morning of the death of Senator Vandenberg, a great American statesman whose sure balance of mind and lofty disinterested pursuance of large purposes won him the respect of all parties in his own country and of all parties in our island here.
Now I come to the business of the afternoon, and I hope the House will permit me to range rather widely over this extensive topic. In the event of war with Soviet Russia, two dangers would menace the defence of free Europe and our own life here. The first is the large number of U-boats, far more than the Germans had at the beginning of the late war, of an improved German type and of vastly increased underwater speed and endurance. The second is, of course, the mining peril at all our ports and all free European ports.
This mining attack required from us in the late war nearly 60,000 men and more

than 1,000 vessels, sweeping and watching ceaselessly under hard conditions. Every kind of device was tried, and, in the main, mastered by us, but now we must expect ever more subtle scientific inventions to prevent detection and clearance by sweeping or explosives. There is no doubt that the whole of this process is being studied and developed by the Soviet Government, aided by German science and German brains. Our means of keeping alive, and the power of the United States and of ourselves to send armies to Europe, depend on our mastering these two problems.
I am sure that no one knows so much about dealing with U-boats in the Atlantic and the mine menace around our shores and harbours of any kind as the British Admiralty, not because we are cleverer or braver than others, but because, in two wars, our existence has depended upon overcoming these perils. When you live for years on end with mortal danger at your throat, you learn in a hard school. "Depend upon it," said Dr. Johnson, "if a man is going to be hanged in a month, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."
During these two recent wars, as First Lord of the Admiralty or as Minister of Defence, I studied from week to week the hopeful or sinister curves upon the charts, and nothing ever counted more with me than their movements. It is the kind of experience, prolonged as it was, which eats its way into you. The late U-boat war lasted nearly six years. I say that to take the control of this process out of Admiralty hands would, I am sure, be a grave and perhaps a fatal injury, not only to ourselves, but to the common cause.
I would begin by asking where, in fact, did this idea of a Supreme Commander for the Atlantic originate. What were the reasons for the acceptance and enforcement of so radical a change from the system which had proved itself in the recent long years of war to work effectively? What would be the powers, apart from the imposing title, of the American Supreme Commander of the Atlantic? Our coastal waters and the English Channel are not under him. It is in the White Paper. He could not move warships and flotillas from the Eastern Atlantic Zone without disrupting or changing all the intricate business of receiving convoys and keeping the ports open.
Then, what about merchant ships? The Prime Minister told us the other day:
That is really another matter altogether. The allocation of our merchant fleet is, of course, under the Government of this country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Feb. 26, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 1767.]
Well, the merchant fleet can no more be considered apart from the escorts than the escorts can be considered apart from the merchant fleet. What powers will the Supreme Commander have over the American Navy Department? Can he transfer ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic? Surely not? He might make representations, but they would be settled by the American naval authorities, no doubt after consultation with the British Admiralty. Could he move naval forces from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic? Is, in fact, the South Atlantic under his command at all? Could he take ships from the South Atlantic or from the Mediterranean and bring them into the Eastern or the Western Atlantic Zones?
It would be quite impossible for him to settle any of these matters, even if he had the authority on paper, except after consulting the United States Navy Department and the British Admiralty. We are told that his appointment is necessary to avoid the ocean war being conducted by a committee composed of 12 Powers, such as the Committee set up under the Atlantic Pact. But who ever imagined that the intricate handling of the U-boat and mining war could be entrusted to a committee of 12 Powers, most of whom have contributed little or nothing to the common stock?
It would not be fair to a distinguished and capable officer, like Admiral Fechteler to cast all the nominal responsibility upon him when, in actual practice, he could not have real power. There is no doubt whatever that the business of bringing in the convoys safely to Europe can only be settled by an officer, whatever his nationality, seated at the Admiralty, and having immediately under his orders the executive Officer Commanding the Western Approaches and the merchant shipping which is the object of the enemy's attack, and whose safety is the whole object of the operation.
Reading the White Paper, which I had the time to do, one finds that Paragraph 25 is strange reading. It says:

The Atlantic command will include an Eastern and a Western area. The Eastern area, which is obviously the more vital so far as this country is concerned, will be under the command of a British Admiral in association with Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force. This British Admiral will be the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, an appointment at present held by Admiral Sir Philip Vian.
But what has the Home Fleet got to do with the U-boat and mining menace? It has very little to do with them. Of course, when it comes out from its harbours into the ocean it has to look after the convoys and protect them against U-boat attack, and, of course, when it stays in, sometimes it lends the flotillas of the Western Approaches some flotillas of its own. But the Home Fleet, in war-time, dwells mainly at Scapa Flow, and only comes out to deal with enemy surface raiders.
In this imaginary war, to which I am addressing myself, we have, of course, to look at the facts with which one is confronted. The Russians have some modern cruisers, but they have no fast capital ships like the "Scharnhorst," the "Gneisenau," the "Bismarck" and the "Tirpitz," and they can have none in the next two or three years—two, anyhow. How is it then proposed that the Commander-in-Chief of our Home Fleet is to control the movement of convoys in the Western Approaches? The routes to be followed by convoys entering or leaving Britain must be arranged from the British Admiralty. Are the merchant ships sailing from British ports to be given their orders from America, and, if so, how can the American Commander be informed of all that is going on from hour to hour? Fancy presenting us with a plan whereby an American admiral, seated in Norfolk, Virginia, has the supreme command of the Atlantic, although the business of the reception of the convoys and bringing them in through the U-boat and mining attack, must be mainly over here and is vital to us all. I repeat that the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic, if there is one, whatever his nationality, should be situated here.
Of course, since the war stopped, changes in military science have been continued. The power of the air grows ceaselessly. Even at the end of the war, it was at least equal to that of the naval forces at sea. But the movement of convoys on the sea is a matter for naval directions, and in Great Britain the air


forces allotted to their defence must conform to a comprehensive plan prepared, in the first place, by the Admiralty. This important fact was recognised when, from the outbreak of the last war, the operational control of the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force was vested in the Admiralty.
It is not clear from the White Paper whether this policy is intended to be applied in the future. Paragraph 25 of the White Paper says:
The Eastern area…will be under the command of a British Admiral in association with Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force.
Is there then to be no American air contribution to this Eastern Zone? Surely, information of this might have been given to us. It is a serious omission on the part of those who drew up this document.
Let me return to the first point I am making, that there is no need for a Supreme Commander of the Atlantic. That is the point which I submit to the House, and, not only to the House, but to the Committee. The overwhelming weight of British naval opinion supports the view that there is no need to appoint a Supreme Commander of the Atlantic.

Commander Pursey: Nonsense.

Mr. Churchill: I will affirm and sustain my statement. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, a very great sailor—

Commander Pursey: A bath chair warrior now.

Mr. Churchill: I think the hon. and gallant Gentleman might, at any rate, lay off his sneering snarls when naval officers of great distinction have their names mentioned in the House. Admiral Andrew Cunningham used the expression that it would be "a fifth wheel on the coach." Admiral Tovey, who commanded the Home Fleet for a long time, and had a very important action at sea, and Lord Cork and Orrery have spoken in the same sense. I have here a letter, which I am authorised to read, from Sir Percy Noble, who has not hitherto expressed himself in public, but who has unequalled credentials, because he managed the business himself with success last time. It says:
My dear Mr. Churchill, From experience in the last war—first in command of the

Western Approaches and then as one of the Combined Chiefs of Staff—it is my opinion that there is no need for a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic at all. In 1942, when I was at Liverpool, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound discussed this very question with me, and we agreed that such a form of command was not only unnecessary, but might (and probably would) impose an undue strain on the already very complex system of wireless and other communications.
When I was in Washington in 1943 the whole of our machinery for controlling the North Atlantic convoys was again re-examined by Admiral King and myself with Admiral Sir Henry Moore, who was at that time the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff in London. Had it then been considered wise to introduce a change in the system, it is probable that a British officer would have been selected for this Supreme Command as Britain and Canada were providing almost the whole of the escorting forces in that area. However, we decided that no change was necessary.
Great Britain is the 'receiving end' of the Atlantic life-line and the jumping-off place for forces entering Europe.
In view of certain statements to the contrary which have appeared in the Press, I feel it is worth mentioning that in my experience no serious confusion ever arose in regard to the exercise of control by the methods we employed in the last war.
That is not an opinion which should be dismissed in contemptuous terms. It is not an opinion which should be ignored, and I am sure our American friends with whom Admiral Noble worked so intimately will give it full weight in considering this matter now under discussion between us. My first submission, therefore, to the Committee is that there is no need for the appointment of a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic.
Let me now approach the question from another angle. We all rejoiced when General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander of the Armies of the Atlantic Powers. There is no man in the world who can do that job so well. Although the American troops under his command will only be a fraction of the whole of the European Forces which are needed—and far less than the French Army which, if France and Europe are to live, must be reborn—yet everyone was contented, and have been more contented every day since his appointment. It was a great shock however to most of the 50 millions in our island when they learned that a United States admiral was also to be put in command of the Atlantic and of a large proportion of our Fleet employed there.
During the war the life-lines across the Atlantic fell in an overwhelming degree to the care of the Admiralty. We were always most anxious for the Americans to extend their zone eastwards towards us, even during the first two years of the struggle when we were alone and they gave us magnificent help. But in 1942, after they had come into the war, their major theatre in that war—I say that war—was, inevitably and rightly, in the Pacific. They suffered terrible losses in the massacre of shipping through their own inexperience of dealing with the U-boat. The "U-boat paradise"—the Germans called it—took a terrible toll of their own Eastern coast in 1942, and hard pressed though we were ourselves, we were very glad to send them all the help we could in creating their convoy and escort system. They did not suffer to any serious extent from the mining danger.
But the climax of the U-boat war was reached in 1943, and during this struggle nearly the whole Business was managed and the burden borne by Britain and Canada. In fact it was by agreements reached between the British and American Governments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and between the Admiralties, that Britain and Canada assumed full responsibility for the protection of all trade convoys, apart from American troop convoys, in the North Atlantic, and the American naval contribution fell by agreement to a little more than 2 per cent. of the total. This was the period when the U-boat attack was decisively broken by all the means that were available.
We have become relatively, I regretfully admit, a weaker Power since those days—not only on the seas. Nevertheless, we have the experience, we have the art. Our latent resources in trained sea-faring personnel are out of all proportion to what we have presented in recent years. We need, of course, American aid. So does the whole world. We need aid particularly in the air at the reception end, but I can find no valid reason for surbordinating Great Britain in the Atlantic Command. The responsibility should be shared on equal terms and with equal status between the two chief naval Powers. That is my submission.
We are told we are to have the sole command of British coastal waters and the English Channel. We are not told what "coastal waters" mean. The First Lord of the Admiralty in another place spoke of the Americans "commanding in deep waters." What does that mean? Does that mean up to the 100-fathom line, or what? I had better give way if the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence wishes to answer.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell): I am very anxious not to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman because I am intensely interested in what he is saying, but he must take into account what appears in the White Paper about the control of the Eastern Atlantic.

Mr. Churchill: I was coming to all that, but I was talking of the coastal waters. I ask what that means because the Eastern Atlantic like the Western is under Supreme American command. It is the coastal waters alone that are reserved for Great Britain and I am asking if they end at the 100-fathom line. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Minister does not know."] In any case the area is severely restricted round our own coast, and the line that is drawn, be it the 100-fathom line or not, like the line that will be drawn across the Atlantic in no way corresponds to any boundary which applies to U-boat attack. The English Channel is reserved to us. It is surely not more vital to the integrity of the reception of convoys than the Bay of Biscay or the waters between Iceland and Ireland, or the North Sea, or the Arctic approaches to and from North Russia. It is all one story, and one story that can only be intelligently told from one place.
Let me turn now to another aspect—sentiment. Sentiment should not rule in war, but neither should it be forgotten or overlooked. I am sorry that the Prime Minister is not here and still more sorry for the cause of his absence, but I must state the case. He plays too important a part in it to be omitted from any coherent discussion. He certainly does not understand British sentiment about the Navy. Going back a long time, I admit, to 27th March, 1936—it was on the same subject and in the same discussion—the Prime Minister said, accord-


ing to the "Daily Herald"—from which I take the report:
We shall have to give up certain of our toys—one is 'Britannia rules the Waves'.
This was certainly a misquotation. As has been often pointed out, it is, "Britannia rule the Waves"—an invocation not a declaration of fact. But if the idea "Rule Britannia" was a toy, it is certainly one for which many good men from time to time have been ready to die.
No one can doubt that it was a great shock and even an affront—quite unintended by the United States—to the whole nation when, following on an American general's supreme command in Europe, which we all welcome, we were told that an American admiral would have the supreme command of the Atlantic. It was also a shock to see that our Prime Minister had so little knowledge and even less feeling in the matter. However, the United States themselves should consider the sentiments of others in executing their great mission of leading the resistance of the free world against Communist aggression and infiltration. It should not be possible for their enemies to say that they are grasping the supreme command everywhere—on the land, in the air, on the sea. Moreover, it is not true; that is not their wish or their desire.
To create this superfluous supreme command of the Atlantic would be a psychological mistake, making things harder than they are already. Of course, it plays right into the hands of the Communist propagandists and their fellow travellers who declare, in their lying fashion, that we have all been bought up by Wall Street and the almighty dollar. Why make them this present in the discussion when the matter is not, as I have said, of real and fundamental importance? It would, I think, have been a natural thing in sentiment, and also on practical and technical arguments, to have shared the Atlantic Command with equal status between the Admiralty and the United States Navy Department.
I am quite sure it was not the wish of the American people or their government to treat us roughly in this matter, or to make an issue of it at all. When I made my protest I received most active and sincere and widespread American support. It is a trouble into which they have been brought, not at all by their own decision

or desire but through other reasons which I will presently indicate.
I have heard the argument used—and it is even suggested in the last sentence of paragraph 28 in the White Paper—that we shall get much more out of the Americans by letting them have the command, even though it is mainly nominal. That, I think, is a train of thought unworthy of the dignity of both our countries. It implies that the Americans are willing to be fooled by being flattered and that the British have no pride if they can get more help. We should dismiss such arguments from our thoughts. But still we can see the traces of them on the last page of the White Paper. The issue, I think, should be settled between comrades and brothers in common danger and on a self-respecting moral basis, and with the sole desire and resolve to find the best way of winning victory and salvation from our dangers.
It is true, no doubt, that the United States has a larger fleet than we have—double, we are told—in ships in commission, and a great preponderance in the air. Also, they have wisely and carefully kept in "mothball" many scores of war vessels which we have improvidently scrapped, sold or given away. Thus, they have a larger material reserve. Broadly speaking, it can be said that the Supreme Command in war goes naturally with the size of the forces involved, and I accepted and affirmed that rule in the late struggle.

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. James Callaghan): It may be quite true that the Americans have a much larger material reserve, but I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that they do not possess a proportionately larger material reserve than we have, compared with their active fleet.

Mr. Churchill: It is rather difficult to work out these rule-of-three sums. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite laugh at that; that is all they are fit for. Why should they laugh because I am not prepared to argue that question of whether it is a proportionately larger reserve? It is a grave and foolish thing to cast away valuable ships at the end of a war. It is much better to keep them, even if you do not want them, in care and maintenance, and then you can never tell when they will turn out to be


useful. I have not worked it out in proportion, but at any rate the Americans have a far larger material reserve than we have.
I was saying that, broadly speaking, the supreme command in war goes naturally with the larger forces. I think that may be taken as the rule. Nevertheless, in the campaign of Tunis we did not hesitate to allow our armies to remain under General Eisenhower's command, although we had 11 divisions in action to the Americans' four. On the other hand when, later in that year, the United States asked for an American supreme commander to have control both of the "Overlord" campaign in France and also of the Mediterranean, I refused to agree, and although there were tense arguments the matter was settled agreeably, as so many other matters were settled between us, and it was settled without any ill-feeling.
How was this accomplished? It was accomplished by the personal relations between the Heads of Governments and, of course, based upon the continued comradeship and intercourse of our Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. I shall come back to this institution before I sit down, but the conclusion I now draw is that commands in particular operations and in various theatres are not necessarily regulated merely by the size of the forces locally involved.
In estimating the size of these forces one must not only consider the relative naval strengths of the fleets and flotillas and aircraft squadrons as they now stand. I know we are in a temporary eclipse, but we are capable of a far greater and more rapid development of strength in the naval sphere than almost any other country. Besides the warships of all kinds, there is the Mercantile Marine. We must not forget them, or the sacrifices the merchant seamen made in the struggle?—many of them sunk three or four times with their ships, but always going back. We may have let our Navy down, but it can be revived. We have not let our Mercantile Marine diminish. On the contrary—

Mr. Callaghan: Mr. Callaghan rose—

Mr. Churchill: The Parliamentary Secretary is a subordinate Minister of the Government and he should not interrupt

from the Front Bench. We have not let our Mercantile Marine diminish. On the contrary, here are the figures. [Interruption.] I think I have the right to put forward the case for the potential contribution which Britain can make to war and transport on the seas. The United States have 12,400,000 tons of merchant shipping in use and 14 million tons in reserve. They have 250,000 tons under construction. Great Britain has 16,600,000 tons in use, or 19,600,000 tons if the Commonwealth and Empire are added, and two million tons under construction, some of it for foreign account. Moreover, we have far larger reserves of merchant—

Mr. Snow: Damned old fool.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: On a point of order. Is it in order for an hon. Member to refer to the right hon. Gentleman as "a damned old fool"?

The Chairman: It is certainly not in order.

Mr. Snow: I beg to withdraw that statement and to apologise but, of course, the right hon. Gentleman has been extremely provocative.

Hon. Members: Get out.

Mr. Churchill: I always accept an apology here.

Mr. Snow: Will not the right hon. Gentleman follow my example and apologise to my hon. Friend?

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: May I call attention to the fact that this whole incident arose from—

The Chairman: It was within the hearing of all Members of the Committee, and there is no point in calling attention to it now.

Mr. Thomas: On a point of order. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to refer to an hon. Member of the Committee as somewhat subordinate to another—[Laughter.] Let hon. Members wait for the whole of it—and, therefore, not entitled to the same consideration as a Member of the Government? Are not the rights of every Member on the Floor of the Committee equal?

The Chairman: I do not think any procedural objection can be taken to the right hon. Gentleman's reference to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] But it is, of course, true that the hon. Gentleman is the chief Minister of the Admiralty in the House.

Mr. Churchill: Well, I understood that the Minister of Defence was going to take responsibility for the case today; and everything is relative in importance, and consequently, compared with the Minister of Defence, the hon. Gentleman must accept the position of being subordinate; although let me make it quite clear that this is the first time that I have ever heard the word "subordinate" regarded as un-Parliamentary or even as almost an obscene expression. However, the "damned old fool" has accepted the apology.
I was saying that, moreover, we have far larger reserves of merchant seamen than the United States; we have a much larger merchant fleet; and I say that that is not a negligible contribution to the solution of the problems we have to settle between our two great, friendly countries.
This very serious mistake arises from the fault of planning from the bottom instead of planning from the top. When the top are incompetent to plan or give guidance, the process naturally begins from the bottom. We suffer from the fallacy, deus ex machina, which, for the benefit of any Wykehamists who may be present, is "A god out of the machine." There are layers of committees and super committees, and the business is passed upwards stage by stage to a decision. When all the process has been gone through, the machine speaks, but what one gets at the end is not truth or wisdom or common sense: it is a White Paper. All that comes out of the machine is unreal and meaningless formulae expressed in official jargon and accompanied by fatuous grimaces.
Now let me tell the Committee, so far as I know the facts, the procedure by which an American admiral was appointed to the Supreme Command of the Atlantic. I have been looking into the workings of the machine, which, I hope, will interest the right hon. Gentleman. Here let me say and let me emphasise that I have no doubt that Admiral Fechteler is a most capable and

competent officer. Although he has no special experience of the Atlantic theatre, he is, I am sure, a naval officer of the highest quality. But so far as I have been able to ascertain, this is how the decision was taken by planning from the bottom.
The original proposal came at a meeting in Washington some time last year, and was made by the Canadian representative. So I ask the Minister of Defence, when he replies, to tell the Committee whether this was agreed or was, at last, a matter of consultation beforehand between the British and the Canadian Governments. If it was not, it would seem it ought to have been. All the other Powers present supported the proposal. The British representative, Vice-Admiral Schofield, who has been very vocal in the recent discussions, felt that the best he could do was to ask that the Supreme Commander's deputy should be British. Now I ask the Minister of Defence, did he have instructions to take this course? Surely on a matter of such high importance of this character, he should have had definite instructions from above. If he had none, he should, in my opinion, have said that the matter was too important to be decided without reference to higher authority, and asked for an adjournment. But all passed off very pleasantly with unanimous agreement. The matter then slumbered for several months while the machine was grinding away from day to day, until the decision leaked out from Copenhagen.

Mr. Driberg: Washington first.

Mr. Churchill: Let us look at some of these countries whose subordinate officers—I beg the pardon of the Committee for using that word—settled the matter. I may say that they are all countries for whom I have the strongest regard and from whom I have received many compliments and honours. But let me take four of them—Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland. Though we accept the statement that the American Navy is double as strong as the British, the British Navy, even in its present phase, is more than 12 times as strong as all these four put together. Even if France be included, their combined strength is less than a quarter of ours.
These four Powers I am speaking of have between them one aircraft carrier, acquired from Britain since the war, and


15 destroyers and 16 frigates, many of which have been purchased from Great Britain. Yet the voting strength of each round the table was equal to ours, and also, of course, to the United States, whose Navy is larger than everyone's. Everything went off smoothly, and the American representative, no doubt with a becoming blush, accepted the supreme command for his country.
All this is happening far below the cognisance of statesmen, premiers, presidents, and leading people—even, perhaps, Ministers of Defence—who manage our affairs. But it went on steadily up to the higher levels—the committees of greater status—until we reached the present situation.
Since the disclosure was made to Parliament, the Government have become conscious that the policy to which they had been bound by the workings of the machine was neither sensible nor—what is, perhaps, for the moment more relevant to their preoccupations—popular. Why have we been waiting so long for the White Paper, and now have only an interim incomplete document? It is because His Majesty's Government suddenly became aware of what was going on and that it was bringing them into discredit, and they have tried to find some counterpoise to restore the balance and help them out of their scrape. Then the happy thought came: "If we have given up the command of the Atlantic, let us try, as a sop to placate our people to keep or gain the commander-in-chiefship of the Mediterranean. That would make things more even."
Though I have no definite information, I presume that most active discussions have been proceeding on the basis that as Britain has given up the Atlantic she must at least have the Mediterranean. But here again there is a great difficulty. This is the cause of the delay in our getting the full White Paper. The Mediterranean Powers, whose Governments have now been brought into the matter—not a mere committee of medium officials sitting round a table—want to have the Americans in command of the Mediterranean. There are almost as many powerful arguments in favour of the United States having the command in the Mediterranean as there are against them

having the over-riding command in the Atlantic.

Mr. Shinwell: At this stage I want to be quite clear about the statement the right hon. Gentleman has just made. Do I understand him to say that Governments who are concerned in the Mediterranean zone have decided that there should be an American commander, or have suggested that there should be an American commander? If so, will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to let me have the evidence on this?

Mr. Churchill: I will say what I have said and what I am going to say. I say that, since all this matter became public in discussions on the American command of the Atlantic, there has been a very great deal more attention paid to the discussions about the command in the Mediterranean; very much more.

Mr. Shinwell: Mr. Shinwell rose—

Mr. Churchill: The right hon. Gentleman ought to keep something for his speech.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman need be under no illusions. He will be surprised, and probably disagreeably surprised, at how much I have to say in replying to him. I want to put him right about the facts, because I think that is very desirable, and all I say to him now is that the discussions about the Mediterranean and the discussions about the whole command have been taking place simultaneously.

Mr. Churchill: They may have been taking place simultaneously, but one ended before the other. That sometimes happens in horse racing. I am certainly not seeking to gain personal popularity by what I am going to say. On the contrary, I am saying only what I think is right and true, and should be considered and weighed by the Committee and the Government. I say that there are almost as many powerful arguments in favour of the United States having the command in the Mediterranean as there are against them haying the over-riding command in the Atlantic.
Personally, if I had to choose I should prefer, on nigh military and national grounds, the United States having command in the Mediterranean. I am sorry to have to trouble the Committee with


details, but it is better that the matter should be understood. A powerful fleet—and this will interest hon. Gentlemen opposite below the Gangway—of American carriers can be and is being placed in the Mediterranean which, working in conjunction with the air bases America has obtained from France and in Tripoli, would bring a tremendous potential attack with the atomic bomb upon the most vulnerable parts of Russia, including the oil fields, in the event of war, and this fact constitutes an immense and precious deterrent against another war.
The United States can, if it chooses, have by far the most powerful fleet in the Mediterranean, and a fleet suited to the actual task which might have to be performed if the worst came to the worst. I think we should be ready and proud to be the hosts of our American allies and comrades at our famous and vital Mediterranean bases at Gibraltar, Malta and, presumably, Cyprus. I would much rather the British offensive atomic base in East Anglia were not the only major deterrent of this kind upon Communist aggression.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Who is being aggressive now?

Mr. Churchill: This is rather up the hon. Gentleman's street. It is right to spread the risk of reprisals. We at home should be safer, and the United Nations and Atlantic Powers would be stronger.
Therefore, I do not oppose the United States taking the command, if that is their wish, of the Mediterranean on the practical and strategic merits. Moreover, there are far-reaching political arguments. We are no longer strong enough ourselves to bear the whole political burden we have hitherto borne in the Mediterranean, or even to take the leading part in the diplomatic control of that theatre. But the United States and Britain together, aided by France—which in the Mediterranean makes a very different contribution to the common strength than it is possible for her to do in the Atlantic, with her bases and her ships—we three together would be in a most powerful position to deal with, say, the Egyptian problem and the whole question of the defence of the Suez Canal. We and the United States ought, to act together there and in these matters.
I am always looking out for something to give the Government a good mark for, and I read the papers vigilantly every day, and I was very glad to see that about the Persian oil, the Government are already working with the United States. That is right and wise. The same combination will enormously relieve our difficulties in Egypt, the Levant and throughout the Middle East. After all, the United States are now looking after Turkey, and have taken over from us the salvation of Greece. These countries would welcome the United States in the Mediterranean, and would gladly accord them the supreme command there.
What are the Government trying to do? Having let the question of the Atlantic command go largely by default, they hope to put themselves right with the public—this is my guess—by claiming the Mediterranean. It is as if a man had put the wrong shoe on his right foot should say: "I will put the other shoe on my left foot, and that will be a compromise which will make it all right." Such absurdities have no part in the grim realities of warding off war or of war itself.
I ask that this matter should be reconsidered from the beginning. I ask that the command of the Atlantic shall be agreeably divided between Great Britain and the United States on equal terms. In the war the line was eventually drawn at the 26th Meridian—quite a different thing from the 38th Parallel. But wherever the line is to be drawn, it would be easy to arrange for the taking over of the convoys and for their air defence; and the adjustments, sometimes almost daily, can be made quite easily, and can only be made, between the Admiralty and the Canadian and United States Navy Departments. If it is a question of large transfers of forces from one side to the other, that is really a matter first for a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, if they exist still, and in the ultimate issue for settlement between the Prime Minister and the President, who together control 90 per cent. of all the effective air and naval forces involved in this whole business.
Now I come to the existing organisation for the Atlantic Pact. The costly error was made when the Combined


British and American Chiefs of Staff Committee was dissolved, of sweeping this away, of breaking up this organisation. It was a disaster. We speak the same language; we have many other ties. What a pity it was to let go that organisation which served us so well, and which carried the direction of war between allies to the highest and most smooth-working efficiency ever reached in history.
The Prime Minister told us that he regretted the abolition of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee. But why did he not put up a fight about it? Surely this was an occasion when he might have crossed the Atlantic and had a personal talk with the President on the top level. Keeping the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee in existence need not have prevented a co-existent instrument with other powers on it for the purpose of executing the Atlantic Pact. Half the misunderstandings which have been so dangerous to Anglo-American relations during the Korean War would, I believe, have been avoided had there been a regular and constant meeting, as there were in the bygone years, between our two Chiefs of Staffs Committees. We cannot afford, in the dangers in which we now stand, to make mistakes like this. By mismanaging these affairs the responsible Ministers may bring untold miseries upon the hard-working, helpless millions whose fate lies in their hands.
What organisation have we got now to replace the contact between the President and the Prime Minister and the continued daily intercourse of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee? We are told of a standing group of Powers under the Atlantic Pact. This group which deals with the forces deployed under that Pact consists of three men—a French general, a British airman and an American vice-admiral. There is not a British sailor on it at all; not at the head of the Fleets not in this higher organisation. But surely the carrying of food and supplies from which Britain lives, carrying the armies of the New World to Europe, and maintaining them there across the broad oceans and through the narrow seas—surely that is a business in which sailors and merchant seamen and ships of all kinds, and naval skill and knowledge have their part.
I hope that the House will carefully consider many of the arguments that I have ventured to put before them, and I hope that we shall not allow this matter to rest as a thing definitely settled. I hope myself that the mistakes that have been made will be recovered.
This White Paper, so long withheld, is mainly a repetition of the one we got over a year ago. It has the addition of the names of various officers appointed by General Eisenhower in his Continental Command. But it gives us no real information. It is only a painful exposure of the paralysis of Cabinet mentality. If the Minister of Defence is not able tonight to make a genuine contribution to our knowledge, I shall feel it my duty to move a nominal reduction of his salary as a protest against the manner in which these grave matters have, so far, been handled by him and by the Government as a whole.

4.55 p.m.

Mr. Shackleton: The surprising thing about this debate is the fact that the Opposition have decided to raise what, according to the words of the Leader of the Opposition, seems to be an important matter and have allowed only three hours for the debate. They propose to devote the remainder of the day to discussing Post Office charges. The right hon. Gentleman has in fact continued what he started about six weeks ago when he proceeded to extract from the question of the appointment of an American Admiral the maximum amount of party political advantage and, of course, to cause the maximum amount of doubt and discussion on the subject of this appointment.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman has done the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and this country a real disservice by the tone of his speech today. I am equally certain that there are many hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House who do not share his views or his general approach to the problem of the organisation of North Atlantic defence. [Interruption.] It is a pity that the right hon. Gentleman has not allowed a little more time for hon. Gentlemen behind him to speak on this matter. He has been complaining that the information contained in the White Paper is inadequate. He knows perfectly well that the negotiations are going on and that the picture


is still incomplete and that the fact that the supreme commander for the North Atlantic area has not yet been appointed is largely due to the tactics which he himself has applied in raising the matter as he did a few weeks ago.
The right hon. Gentleman blamed the Prime Minister for the way in which the announcement was first made to the House. It is within the knowledge of all Members of this House that in fact the first news about the appointment of the Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic area did not come from this country but came through a leak from American sources, subsequently confirmed from Copenhagen. It is not surprising that the negotiations were incomplete, and I would point out for the benefit of hon. Members who may be under the impression that Admiral Fechteler has been appointed that no appointment has been made to date.
I think that it is our duty to examine seriously and objectively the purpose which the N.A.T.O. organisation is intended to serve. I do not think that it is helpful to such an examination to start off without looking at the aims, objects and first principles, and the right way to build up the command. It does not help to point out all the difficulties that lie in the way of building up such a joint organisation.
There is no question that there are such difficulties. I think that we should see whether these difficulties are not outweighed by the greater advantages. It seems to me that we are not concerned today with the broad purpose of major policy. That has been agreed. The purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance has largely been confirmed and accepted by all the countries taking part in that organisation. But we do need to know whether the system of defence, the military committee, the Standing Group and so on are in fact necessary, both politically and military.
Here we come to one of the most important aspects of the whole organisation—the system of the military committee and the Standing Group—and it is rather surprising that the right hon. Gentleman, in making his precise survey of the set-up, did not name the Standing Group in the course of his speech. [HON. MEMBERS: "He did."] Then I can only point out that it was very inconsistent—

Mr. Churchill: I did, indeed. I said that it had a French general, a British airman and an American admiral upon it, but no British admiral.

Mr. Shackleton: Then it is all the more surprising that the right hon. Gentleman suggested that in fact the command of operations would be in the hands of a military committee of 12 nations, which is what he did say. It is made clear in the White Paper that the Standing Group is a body comparable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is there not also an Italian?

Mr. Shackleton: The major set-up is quite obviously only in the broadest outlines, and some consequential arrangements that still have to be made are not yet apparent. The right hon. Gentleman asked how the Home Fleet and subordinate commands would operate, but these details can be worked out as they were during the last war. This organisation is an embryo of what will be necessary in the event of war, and is a satisfactory peace-time arrangement. It must be made clear that it is an arrangement only for peace-time purposes, and it must be of a kind that can be evolved into an effective body for conducting a war if war should come.
On the political side, it is clear that the position today is different to that of the last war. There are 12 nations today linked together in the North Atlantic Alliance, and we should be grateful and pleased about that fact, which is something of importance. It is something that must be taken into consideration, that these various nations should take part in the set-up, planning and conduct of any defence organisation.
If we are to have a system of military committees, if we are to have a system under which all these different countries are represented, then it is an absolute essential corollary that there should be beneath the Standing Group some kind of joint headquarters or Supreme Command, or call it what you like, to carry out the orders of the Standing Group or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The political necessity, as well as the military necessity, of the present situation makes the establishment of supreme commands


in the different areas of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation absolutely essential.
I cannot accept the view that the situation in the last war was entirely satisfactory. It was my experience in the last war, in taking some part in the Battle of the Atlantic, that the set-up in regard to the pooling of resources, co-ordination, tactics, intelligence and so on was anything but complete. When the right hon. Gentleman refers to the line of distinguished retired naval officers, he must bear in mind that the whole weight of present-day naval opinion is against him. The Board of Admiralty and the Chiefs of Staff do not support this proposal.
It has been made clear in the House that it is the wish of the naval, military and Royal Air Force officers of the Ministry of Defence that this set-up should be achieved. It is not something that has been reluctantly agreed to, but something which they have advocated. In the last war, we ran into the most tremendous difficulties in the North Atlantic over a number of problems. There was the problem of signals procedure which was difficult enough between the Royal Air Force and the Navy, but it became much more difficult when we had to take into account the American methods. Gradually some of these difficulties were overcome.
It is also a point of some interest, in view of the tenderness of certain people in regard to the idea of British forces being under an American commander or under the command of any other country, that whereas we in the last war in the North Atlantic played a predominant part in fighting the U-boats, there were also present some naval and air forces belonging to the United States operating from our aerodromes as part of our patrol organisation which were not technically under our command.
The reason was that the American Admiral King refused to allow the American naval squadrons to come under British command. It was suggested in a letter that was written from Admiral Sir Percy Noble that the question of a supreme command was discussed in the last war and that if such a supreme commander had been appointed he would have been British. That is a most unlikely outcome in view of the fact that

on one occasion I know American naval squadrons refused, under orders from Admiral King, to escort a British convoy for which escort was absolutely necessary. I do not blame the commander of the squadrons, because his orders were such as to impose on him the responsibility which should have been imposed on him but should have belonged to the commander in the theatre. The escort was provided by the American Army, which was more willing to accept British orders. That was the sort of position which was not at all satisfactory during the last war.
I find it difficult, when under this arrangement we can see American forces in the Eastern Atlantic and in the areas in which our forces will be operating under our direct operational control, to do anything but welcome the arrangement which is a marked improvement on the situation in the last war. Again I ask, who is the Standing Group to pass its directives to unless there are supreme commanders? Either we have one Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic or a lot of little ones. But at some point it is necessary to provide a combined centralised control where tactics, signals procedure and all the other things necessary for common action in war can be sorted out in the way in which they should have been sorted out at a Joint Allied Headquarters during the last war.
It is a strange thing, in view of the obvious need in the present defence picture for such a command, that an attack should be made on the appointment of an American admiral. What makes it so surprising is the fact that the right hon. Gentleman accepted the position during the last war of British naval forces being under the command of the Americans in the Pacific, while the Americans refused to put their forces under our command in the Eastern Atlantic. It is surprising, despite the infinitely greater experience at that stage of the war in military operations, when most of the fighting in Tunisia was being done by British forces, that the right hon. Gentleman accepted the necessity for an American supreme commander. Surely the need for a co-ordinated command is just as important today. It was not a serious difficulty to the right hon. Gentleman, as Minister of Defence and wartime Prime Minister, to accept these proposals during the war. I cannot see


why, if he was able to swallow this camel during the war, he should be so concerned about this difficulty at the moment.
The essence of a joint headquarters and joint command must be that a proper measure of friendly co-operation is established between the representatives of the different nations that make up the command. I see no reason why that should not be satisfactorily achieved with regard to a supreme commander in the North Atlantic. It was done in other areas in Europe in the case of land operations. What has been said by the right hon. Gentleman today, and on previous occasions, has not helped towards that desirable end. He may say that there has been sympathetic reaction and response to some of his ideas among Americans, but friends with whom I served in the last war tell me that it is all very strange, that they never thought we bothered, and they ask whether the British are now not prepared to serve under an American commander where that is necessary.
One is forced to accept what has been said in the House of Commons was the result of an emotional outburst calculated to strike at the very deep feeling in the people of this country. There was a great deal of sympathy on both sides of the House when the right hon. Gentleman made this point. It is all the more necessary for us now to look at it objectively, and when we can look at it objectively I believe the arguments, which are strongly supported by our Chiefs of Staff and the Admiralty, are overwhelming.
It would not be the first time that the right hon. Gentleman has possibly been right and the experts wrong. But on this occasion I am afraid that the whole weight of evidence is against him. What we are trying to do today is to build up in peacetime something which has never been attempted before, the framework of co-operation for defence, which will deter an aggressor and place us in a state in which we will be ready to go into immediate action to deal with any situation that might possibly arise.
An American friend of mine said—it has been said, too, by other people—that the real secret weapon in the hands of the Allies during the last war was Anglo-American co-operation. I believe that in the military field, if such should be

necessary again, the Anglo-American co-operation of the last war would have to be extended into a much wider area—into the field of the North Atlantic nations generally. I believe it is possible to achieve that provided we bring goodwill to bear on the matter, but we will only do it if we can look at it objectively and seek to achieve the sort of set-up which existed in North Africa during the last war.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) had some experience of the difficulties to be encountered in a joint headquarters, and during the war he played a decisive part in overcoming some of those difficulties. The man in supreme command must be determined not simply on the question of whether a nation's pride demands it, but on a number of factors. I believe in this case it is our duty, in making our contribution to a new world set-up, to take the lead, if necessary, and show our willingness to surrender part of our sovereignty if it is in the interests of the common good.
Under the proposals of the White Paper, incomplete though they are, and hoping as we do that we may have command in the Mediterranean, the British, in proportion to the strength of the forces at our disposal, have, in fact, been given adequate representation. I hope that hon. Members from the other side of the Committee, who will speak on this matter, will not follow the mischievous line taken by their leader today.

5.14 p.m.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: I have not found very much to bite upon in the speech of the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton). He came to the rescue of his party and Government quite briskly, and pointed out that certainly the controversy over this question of an American Admiral being appointed was one that has stirred deeply the emotions of the country. He seemed to think that there was a reason for condemning the attitude of the Tory Party in that the country was stirred adversely to his party. I think I am right in saying that although it was not necessarily stirred towards my party, it certainly was stirred in a sense very adverse to the party of hon. Gentlemen opposite.
One thing seems quite evident from the preliminary stages of the discussion of this matter in this House, and that is that the issue has been deplorably handled by the Government. Nobody I feel in this country—and I should like here to declare a certain interest in the Royal Navy from several points of view—least of all in the Royal Navy, is inclined to envy the Americans their prospective appointment, which is now somewhat hesitant and suspended. There are no hard feelings here against America. It is an extraordinary thing that this country was confronted so bluntly and with such complete insouciance by the Prime Minister with the apparent appointment of an American naval officer to the Supreme Command of the Atlantic.
The way it was handled in this House was the worst thing of the lot. It was done tersely and casually, and in a way which seemed to be quite ill-informed. I cannot say that I am surprised at the feeling in the country boiling over. I can assure hon. Members opposite that the feeling on this subject in Portsmouth and in the naval ports, including Gosport where I come from, was explosive, again not against the Americans but against the slight and the apparent devaluation of our Navy which the Government brought about.
Personally, I question the necessity for this Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic. Is it necessary to have one? The reasons set forth in the White Paper seem to me to be absolutely shallow and inadequate. Was there any great fault in the organisation that existed during the war? We never seemed to hear that there was any gross disorganisation nor that there was in any way a wrong structure. Many of us in this House saw the last war from the Atlantic Ocean, and it seemed to most of us that the organisation, considering the different arms of the Services involved, was well coordinated. It struck me more than once that the problem of co-ordinating air and sea was a far more difficult problem than co-ordinating the Americans and the British. I think it is still.
What was wrong with the existing structure? Why should it not be used now? It seems to me that there is no reason against it. I think I am right in saying that some 12 nations are mentioned in Paragraph 27 (b) of the White

Paper as being involved in the Atlantic. If that is so, will they not be quite relieved to have the British Admiralty take over the Eastern side of the Atlantic Ocean and run the war there in that way, with the American Navy taking over the running from the Western side?
Is it advisable to break up the existing organisation and build up this new scheme? Is there any great need to refer to the disparity of the naval forces and the air forces of the two countries? If there is any great disparity, the boundary line which was formerly fixed at the Meridian of 26 West, could be moved appropriately either way in operational circumstances. If there is a boundary of that kind with the existing naval structures, which have got the experience of years behind them—I am not advocating them necessarily on that account alone—surely they would be far better at handling all the subsidiary departments involved, rather than some new structure located on the wrong side of the Atlantic dealing with matters which are certainly not under its own direct notice.
How does the air come in under this new structure? We see in the drawings at the back of the White Paper the genealogical tree of this organisation, and there is another "command organisation (not yet decided)." Could the Minister of Defence tell us about this other command, and whether it is on a geographical basis or in respect of Strategic Air, or of air warfare of all kinds? We have not seen anything about air, and it is my firm opinion—I think I shall have most hon. Members with me when I say this—that the air is going to play an ever-increasing part in the war on the Atlantic, and we shall need to have co-ordination of the air in the sea war as well as a strategic air force under independent command.
Are we going to have the air under the command of a Supreme Allied Commander of the Atlantic? Is he going to have what we might call a tactical or anti-submarine air force confined to Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm, and will the Supreme Commander only be able to call upon the strategic air command for larger forces with longer range to carry out strategic attacks? If we have that, we must make it clear that that air command is likely to grow and to


outstrip all-the other commands of this organisation. That is the one thing on which I want to have much more enlightenment.
If we have this Supreme Allied Command of the Atlantic, I, and I think many men in the Navy and many citizens in this country, do not think it is at all bad to have an American in charge. We have no animosity against the Americans. Far from it. I myself speak as a descendant of a certain John Paul Jones, so I do not mistrust the Americans. But if we do get an American, I hope he will be one who knows this kind of work.
If we happen to have this distinguished officer, Admiral Fechteler, what evidence have we that he has had a lifetime of antisubmarine work, which is what this command involves? We know that he has been a great man in task force work and in the Fleet Air battles in the Pacific, but has he had a long and rigorous training, a lifetime of endless training, in antisubmarine warfare, such as is possessed by every admiral in the British fleet, without exception? If he has, or is capable of getting on top of the subject in quick enough time, I am sure that we can be satisfied that he is a good man for the job. I am sure there is no animosity against the idea of having this admiral, or an American, and the fact that there has been a violent outburst of feeling in this country and in this House of Commons has in no way impaired Anglo-American relations.
Something was said by the hon. Member for Preston, South, about his friends, who had told him that they were surprised at the way in which there had been an explosion in this country on this subject. My own belief is that throughout America the explosion was very largely interpreted as a welcome sign of vitality in a country which they largely suspected of becoming a pensioner upon them. They are proud to have their supreme Ally showing signs of life again. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes, and I certainly feel that we have done no harm in questioning this thing and that we shall do a great deal of good by bringing it into the open and hammering it out instead of doing it in committees whose proceedings might not otherwise see very much of the light of day.
If this command is set up, what is the position of the Admiralty going to be? It will be utterly ludicrous if the

Admiralty is to have the privilege of providing the ships and absolutely no say in what is to be done with them. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] The orders will not go through the Admiralty, and how can it possibly take that? The Admiralty should run its own ships. [HON. MEMBERS: "It will."] No Supreme Commander will have the organisation for doing so that the Admiralty has. Furthermore the Admiralty has a function known as "Sea Transport." It is the organisation of the trade routes and merchant shipping. Is that sea transport department of the Admiralty to be internationalised too? If so, is the shipping which it controls to be internationalised? If so, we shall be losing control of our merchant shipping, in spite of all the fair protestations of hon. Gentlemen opposite.
We must have a lot more information about this matter. I am sure that it will invalidate our control—not that I am speaking as a Little Englander—but we must have some control as a nation over our own food and drink, even if there is not much of it. I feel that the whole of this project is very ill-digested. It is of very doubtful use, and I shall need a great deal more persuasion, and so will many of us, before we can accept it. I should like to hear a great deal more about this conception in the White Paper by the Minister of Defence.

5.25 p.m.

Commander Pursey: The hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett) said that he did not find much to bite on in the speech of the previous speaker. I must say that I cannot find very much to bite on in his speech, except to say that he is obviously thinking in water-tight compartments and working in parochial front gardens, instead of looking at the things collectively. But, this afternoon, I am after bigger fish.
I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) is not in his place. I warned him that I was going to deal with him. [Laughter.] I am told that he never is. He just arrives as a prima donna, does his part, and then fades away. The right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition has made one of the most deplorable speeches that he has ever made, of the many which he


has made, as regards both its content and its time. As he has done often during the last six years, he has crashed into a subject like a bull in a china shop. He had his Children's Hour at Question Time and then he forced an untimely debate with a lack of knowledge and understanding which is incredible in a politician of his past standing, with no consideration whatever—[Interruption].
The hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head), who has just arrived in the Chamber, on a previous occasion said that if hon. Members on this side of the House wanted to quack they could go into St. James's park and quack. I suggest to hon. Gentlemen opposite that if they want to quack they can go into St. James's Park. There are only three hours for this debate. The Leader of the Opposition has taken an hour, and I do not want to waste time with unnecessary and nonsensical observations. I shall make my speech in my own way, irrespective of what happens over there. Now, to take up what I was saying previously:
The Leader of the Opposition has done it without any consideration whatever for the effects of his ebullitions on either national or international affairs. International affairs are the one thing that we should be concerned about in this House. The only explanation is that he has reached the stage when he is never happier than when scoring goals in his own net, or even fouling his own nest, so long as he is attacking the present Prime Minister and the Labour Government and denigrating his own country. Whatever the real reasons for his criticisms on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which we are discussing this afternoon, this was the one week not to have voiced those views in public, for several reasons which should have been apparent to all, and more particularly to him, as a previous Prime Minister.
First, the United States Government at this moment have quite enough trouble on their plate with the aftermath of the dismissal of General MacArthur and such reactions as might be tied up with this country, without the Leader of the British Opposition causing them more trouble. Secondly, and more important still, it should have been obvious to the right hon. Gentleman, with the structure of this organisation still incomplete, that

delicate discussions are still proceeding to complete the picture, among our United States Allies, our other Allies and ourselves, and that this was the time when no irresponsible person was required to throw a spanner in the works, which is just what he has done. Thirdly, as the White Paper is not complete, the right hon. Gentleman should have waited until it was. There was no urgency for this debate. There is no question of having had to wait because of the Government. [Interruption.] The organisation is international and is not complete, and the stupid irrelevant interruptions from the other side are just typical of their ignorance of what is going on. That was suggested to the right hon. Gentleman, but I understand that in spite of advice even from his own side, he persisted in forcing this debate on the House to try to find a subject on which to attack the Government and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Nigel Birch: There is no difficulty about doing that.

Commander Pursey: The main reason is that the one thing that the right hon. Gentleman did not want before this debate was the complete picture. He has no real case today with only part of the structure to discuss. He knew full well that once the full picture is produced everyone will realise that British interests have been amply provided for and that the Government are in an unassailable position and able to justify their actions up to the hilt as regards both the Organisation and the British commands. Now let hon. Members opposite laugh that off.
The trouble with the right hon. Gentleman is that at 70 plus he is still thinking of the horse era of 50 years ago—he himself referred to horses, but he does not know one end of a horse from the other—instead of the guided missile age of today. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the Wars of the Roses?"] The right hon. Gentleman is still thinking of containing a non-existent fleet in the North Sea and of dealing only with a couple of Allies instead of a dozen.
The most important question to ask this afternoon is: What is wrong with this Organisation? [HON. MEMBERS: "Everything."] The answer is, "Nothing." The second question to ask is: What is wrong with the White


Paper? The answer again is "Nothing, with one exception." [HON. MEMBERS: "What is wrong with it?"] You just wait for it. The only argument—and this is peculiar to the Leader of the Opposition and his one-track mind, though he has not said so in direct terms—is that three letters have been omitted. Any suggestions? No? Well, the letters are W.S.C. taking care to include the "S"—the right hon. Gentleman's own initials. If he had been the Prime Minister—fortunately for this country and the world, he has not been, otherwise we might have been at war with Russia—more than likely we should have had practically the same Organisation, and practically the same White Paper.
What the right hon. Gentleman fails to appreciate is that, whereas he previously dealt with two Allies in war, which was comparatively easy—[Laughter]. Hon Members opposite are just advertising their own stupidity. While the military effort is far more difficult in peace, the political effort is far easier in war than it is in peace. So you should not laugh so stupidly. The present Government has to deal with a dozen Allies in peace, which is far more difficult—

Earl Winterton: That is not the way to address the Chair.

Commander Pursey: Let me say to the noble Lord, the Member for Horsham, or whatever his present constituency is, that I do not want any help from him in making my case.

Earl Winterton: Earl Winterton rose—

Commander Pursey: I will not give way.

The Deputy-Chairman (Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrew): Order! I do not think that that remark was called for. I was paying particular attention to everything that was being said.

Commander Pursey: In making that remark, naturally I did not wish to reflect on any action by the Chair. As the noble Lord has only just come into the Committee and has seen fit to join in the barracking—

Earl Winterton: On a point of order—

Commander Pursey: May I finish my sentence—

The Deputy-Chairman: Order! The noble Lord is seeking to raise a point of order. Earl Winterton.

Earl Winterton: I indulged in no barracking. When the hon. and gallant Gentleman addressed you, Sir Charles, and said to you, "You should not laugh so stupidly," I called out, as I was entitled to do, "That is not the way to address the Chair."

Commander Pursey: I think we shall get on much better this afternoon in view of the mood of the Opposition, if the noble Lord will leave matters concerning the Chair to the Chair and mind his own business.
What is the position about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? It has the unanimous support of 12 nations, no small triumph in itself, because nothing like it has ever been achieved before, not even by the Leader of the Opposition in his long career. It also has the full support of our chiefs of staff, the full support of the Admiralty and the full support of the Navy, in spite of statements quoted from officers who are now on the retired list.

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: Is not the hon. and gallant Gentleman on the retired list?

Commander Pursey: There is no misunderstanding about the list that you are on, so the hon. and gallant Gentleman had better not make any interruptions.

The Deputy-Chairman: As far as I know, I am on no list.

Commander Pursey: I apologise. Sir Charles, for using the word "you" instead of the expression "the hon. Member."
What more does the Leader of the Opposition want? It cannot be that everyone else is wrong and he is the only one right. If he had been in power, he would have had the same advisers producing the same plans. What his argument boils down to is this: the same experts giving the same advice and producing the same scheme to him as Prime Minister, would have been right; but the same experts producing the same plan for a Labour Prime Minister is wrong. In other words, the only thing wrong is that the right hon. Gentleman was not in the position to announce the scheme, and that,


to say the least, is just plain nonsense. "The Daily Telegraph," a newspaper certainly not favourable to the Labour Government, yesterday stated in its second leading article:
The debate in the House…may well bring out further points of criticism, but the general impression must surely be that national susceptibilities and practical requirements have been harmonised with considerable judgment.
That is a very good summing up, of the position.
The real position of the right hon. Gentleman is therefore clear for all to see, both at home and among our Allies overseas. This synthetic controversy is not a question of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or of commands; it is purely and simply a question of internecine party politics in an attempt to belittle the Labour Government and the Prime Minister both at home and abroad. The right hon. Gentleman realises, as do his colleagues, that as a result of the Chancellor's success with his Budget, the Labour Government has batted itself in for a good second innings this year, if not longer. Consequently, the synthetic furore about the Organisation and the commands today has simply been, as it was from the start, a Tory Party electioneering stunt which has now largely recoiled on himself and discredited him, as have other recent actions, both at home and abroad.
Furthermore, the question of joint and allied commands is no new one. To give only one example: the Leader of the Opposition had a better sense of politics when he was a Liberal and the most destructive critic of the Tory Party. He was the First Lord of the Admiralty in August, 1914, when the Liberal Government decided, as stated in the "Naval History of the War," Volume II:
By the Convention of 6th August, 1914, France was to have the general direction of operations in the Mediterranean.
This was after the war had started, and if there is any misapprehension as to what that meant, the point is put even more cogently in "The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss," an Admiral of the Fleet, who wrote:
By a Franco-British Convention, the Commander-in-Chiefship, Mediterranean, had at the outbreak of war devolved upon a French Admiral.

Apparently, the Leader of the Opposition today, having said that he would be prepared to throw away the Mediterranean in order to get command of the Atlantic, is in precisely the same position as he was in 1914 when he did the same thing.
But what is the position about the Mediterranean? As the eminent historian Sir Julian Corbett, said in the first volume of the Naval History of the War:
In Great Britain, the instinct that our position in the world was in some way bound up with the strength we could display in the Mediterranean was even stronger. It had become a canon of British policy—consecrated by repeated experience—that our Mediterranean Fleet was the measure of our influence in Continental affairs, and the feeling had only increased since the road to India lay that way, and Egypt and Cyprus had become limbs of the Empire.
Where does the Opposition stand on that statement? With all their arguments about Commonwealth and Colonial policy, do they throw that statement completely overboard? No answer?
The general position is far different today. There is no Russian Fleet to compare with the German Fleet of 1914 or 1939 to be contained in the North Sea. Consequently, for reasons which should have been obvious to all, including even the Leader of the Opposition, the Mediterranean is the most important naval theatre to Britain today, and that is where we should exercise the Supreme Command. Unfortunately, due to the short-sightedness and the pig-headedness of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in forcing this debate on the House today, we cannot now discuss the Mediterranean Command, because the appointments have not yet been made and that area, therefore, has to be considered as sub judice while the discussions are proceeding. With the Eastern Atlantic zone and our home waters under the Command of British admirals, the Western Atlantic Command and the post of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic should obviously be held by American-admirals, our position being further safeguarded with a British Deputy Supreme Commander.
This country in particular, and the world at large, ought to know what is: behind all this phoney shadow-boxing in naval affairs by the Leader of the Opposition with his own imagination. Since the end of the war the right hon. Gentleman has tried to impress on this House;


and the country that he has a greater knowledge of naval affairs—not only than those here but also the Sea Lords of the Admiralty, who have spent a lifetime in the Service. It is high time that this idea was completely debunked.
The right hon. Gentleman is a landlubber who has never really understood the sea or sea warfare, and he has certainly never understood admirals. In 50 years the admirals cannot all have been wrong and himself, the amateur, the only one right. Generally speaking he has nearly always been in opposition to the admirals, and often at loggerheads with them, but his head has usually been the loggerhead. Apparently, he would now like to stir up dissension among the admirals against the Labour Government, as he did when he was First Lord of the Admiralty in a Liberal Government before the first war, and have the Tory Party exploiting this dissension as he did at that time. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] If so, he has been unsuccessful, because the Navy realise that they have never had more consideration from any Government than this present Labour Government.
A long memory is necessary in politics, but long experience in a fighting service is a much greater asset. I happen to have both as far as naval affairs are concerned. Indeed I am probably the only one in this House with a longer connection with the Navy than the Leader of the Opposition, so I know what I am talking about.

Lord John Hope: Will the hon. and gallant Member give way?

Commander Pursey: No, I am giving way to nobody. I am one of the hon. Members—I take no credit for it—who is invariably prepared to give way, but this is only a three-hour debate, of which an hour has already been taken by the Leader of the Opposition and I am not prepared to give way. The first intervention of the right hon. Gentleman in naval affairs was to oppose the Admiralty in the building of two battleships which afterwards he regretted had not been built. He picked out one admiral, if not more, because he was good on a horse. HANSARD carries a melancholy story of his controversy with the admirals from 1911 to 1914. I have selected numerous examples

but I will not inflict them on the Committee on this occasion because of the time.
In the early days of the first war the right hon. Gentleman was defending Antwerp as a soldier—no doubt with a pair of spurs in his pocket looking for a horse—instead of being at the Admiralty taking charge of the Navy. Again I know what I am talking about. [Laughter.] This is the best public meeting I have had, because I get all the applause before hon. Members opposite hear what I have to say. Again I know what I am talking about—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—because I was in one of the ships which used to take the Leader of the Opposition on those banshee trips across the Channel getting mixed up with the military. His, errors during the First War were written by other people—he would not admit them in his own books. His errors of the Second War have yet to be written. We are then likely to know more of the self-appointed Minister of Defence, with no limitation of powers or duties, barging into the fields of experts, often with disastrous results.
The Leader of the Opposition has had a good innings, with a long time in the outfield when all his stumps have been knocked down. He was particularly kept in the outfield by the Tory Party.

Captain Ryder: On a point of order. Sir Charles. May I ask what this has to do with the White Paper we are discussing?

The Deputy-Chairman: I understand that the hon. and gallant Member is criticising the Leader of the Opposition.

Commander Pursey: As the hon. and gallant Member has challenged me about what this has to do with the debate, let me say this. When someone comes here and poses as the one and only expert on naval affairs, when in fact all serious naval opinion has been mainly against him, any Member of the House has the right to challenge the credentials of the right hon. Gentleman for his statements. He claims to be a great patriot. Perhaps this will interest the Opposition. His, greatest patriotism now, at this difficult period of international tension, would be to be pro-British and not anti-British. In the interests of this great nation—and we are still a great nation—

Major Legge-Bourke: Surely, Sir Charles, it must be out of


order for an hon. Member to impute that my right hon. Friend, or any other Member, is anti-British.

The Deputy-Chairman: I think we do not do that here.

Commander Pursey: If we do not do that here, Sir Charles—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] There is no question of the Opposition taking charge of the debate. If there is any question, Sir Charles, in deference to your remark that we do not say those things here, I will qualify the statement—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."]—that the right hon. Gentleman should be pro-British and not anti-British, by saying that he ought not to take up an anti-British attitude.
In the interests of this great nation, and we are still a great nation—in spite of having to carry the Leader of the Opposition with us among the ullages—he should give someone else the chance to quote him from his own book, "The World Crisis," Vol. I, in the chapter "Admirals All," in reference to the First Sea Lord, Sir Arthur Wilson, whom he sacked:
I could not help thinking uncomfortably of the famous Tenniel cartoon 'Dropping the Pilot,' when the inexperienced and impulsive German Emperor "—
the right hon. Gentleman is putting himself in that category—
is depicted watching the venerable figure of Bismarck descending the ladder.
It is high time that the right hon. Gentleman was "piped over the side." He would be far better engaged in backing horses than in baiting Prime Ministers and Admirals. The times are too serious to have him at the helm or even in the crew rocking the boat. He should be discharged with the corner of his Service certificate cut off, indicating "Services no longer required."

5.54 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies: I shall not take up the time of the Committee for more than a few minutes, but I certainly do not intend to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey). The reputation and position of the Leader of the Opposition, whatever our views may be regarding politics, will remain untouched. I was rather disappointed—and I think I am

expressing the opinion also of other Members of the Committee—that the Minister of Defence did not get up to reply immediately at the end of the speech of the Leader of the Opposition. There may be an explanation for this, but we would have preferred to hear straight away the reply of the Minister and his answers to the questions that had been put to him; and we are still awaiting his reply.
The one matter which is concerning us all, and upon which we are all anxious, is what is the best form of organisation that can be devised for the defence, not only of this country, but of all the free nations now combined together. That is the first and main question to which we desire an answer.
The White Paper has been criticised by the Leader of the Opposition, who spoke from his tremendous knowledge, dating back to before the First World War, when he was First Lord of the Admiralty. Speaking for myself, I know little about these matters and am prepared to be guided by those who have had the wide experience of the right hon. Gentleman. His first question was: Is there any real reason why we should have one Supreme Commander? On turning to the White Paper, one finds that in dealing with this matter it starts by saying:
A single unified command for the whole North Atlantic Ocean is regarded as essential by the Chiefs of Staff of the various North Atlantic Powers.
Does that mean one Commander, or merely that there should be the unified Standing Group, which covers all Commanders, and which will have, I take it, a supreme position over everybody and every Commander, wherever they may be? Does it, in fact, go even further and mean that the conclusion has been reached that there should be one Commander and two deputies, one in the West and one in the East? If so, I should like the Minister to give an explanation, because the Leader of the Opposition, with his vast experience, quoted admirals who had served throughout the last war—which is, after all, very recent experience—as saying they did not think that that was necessary. We want an answer, therefore, to the question of whether a single Commander is necessary.
When that is established, surely the right thing then to ask is, Who is the best


Commander? Unfortunately, in looking at the White Paper, it appears as if the first question which was put was to ask: To what nationality shall he belong?

Mr. Shinwell: Mr. Shinwell indicated dissent.

Mr. Davies: I am only quoting from the White Paper. That is why we wanted to hear the reply of the Minister. Perhaps I may refer the Committee to paragraph 28, which begins:
In deciding upon the nationality of the Supreme Commander a number of factors had to be taken into consideration.
Having read that, it appears that the first question which these people put to themselves was, What should be the Commander's nationality? If that is the approach which was made, it is the wrong one. The right question should have been: Who amongst us all would be the right person to appoint?
From that stage, we come to another matter to which the Leader of the Opposition referred. As he said, the question of sentiment cannot be ignored. This old country, with all its faults—of course, there have been many—has been marvellous in the last 300 years, largely due to the fact that it kept the seas of the world open for all and maintained the freedom of the world, standing alone against all kinds of dictators. That is something that cannot be brushed lightly aside or which should cause anybody to say: "Now, they are second in power. The main power is on the other side." I agree that size, as the White Paper says, is a matter to be taken into account, but it is not the only matter.
We are anxious to know how the decision was arrived at, and whether it was a right decision that there should be one admiral and that he should be of American nationality, without actually naming him. That goes back to the decision that he should be an American, instead of a decision that he should be a particular person because he held great qualities making him so superior to everyone else that we were agreed that he was the man. That is what happened in regard to General Eisenhower and in regard to General Foch in the First World War. It was not a question of a Frenchman fighting on French territory; the question was put to the Allied Governments and they decided that Foch was the best man for that job. That was

not because of the weight of material or numbers in the Army. That is what we are anxious to know about in this connection.
If war comes, we shall be in a more vulnerable position than any other country. We shall be a beleaguered island as we were in the last war, and everything will depend on our being able to keep the sea lanes open to get food. We have only food for two-fifths of the population and the food for three-fifths has to be brought to this country, and raw materials have to be brought. This will be the danger spot. It is from here that we can best see what is happening—not from America. They will not be in anything like the danger in which we shall be. Look at the enormous size of America. It is a greater distance from the Atlantic Ocean across to the Pacific than it is from New York to this country.
We are a small island with 50 million people in it, only 20 million of whom can be fed from our own resources, and there will be the danger, of which the the right hon. Gentleman spoke, of an enormous fleet of submarines. It is here that this Supreme Commander should be. Surely he should be here on the spot in charge of the whole matter and able at once to take such steps as are necessary. Those are the matters about which we are anxious to hear. The question which concerns us all, in all parties and all countries, is whether, for the maintenance of freedom, the best organisation and the best method have been adopted. Have we chosen the man, not on the ground of nationality, but because he is the best man for the job?

6.4 p.m.

Captain Ryder: As many other hon. Members must have found when speaking towards the end of a debate, I find that many of the arguments I intended to deploy have already been dealt with amply. The heavy artillery has opened fire and I find myself more in the position of the officer spotting the fall of shot. But, if I may add a few humble parting salvoes, I would say that I feel we have many lessons to learn from this White Paper. Not least is the manner in which a great alliance of this sort is to be negotiated.
I should have thought that in matters of such enormous magnitude and significance to this country the broad outlines


of an agreement would first of all have been a matter of personal discussion between the Prime Minister of our country and the head of the United States of America, leaving the subordinate committees to fill in the details after the main agreements had been reached. But, as far as we can gather, what in fact happened was that the agreements on the main points were reached by the subordinate committee and it was then left to the Prime Minister to adopt the inferior role of filling in the details. Surely, when this process is looked at in retrospect, it will go down as a classic example of how not to do it.
We are told that this arrangement was recommended by the Admiralty, or recommended by the Chiefs of Staff. There is a great difference between being told, "This is a splendid arrangement which we strongly recommend you to accept," and being told, "This is all that we can achieve for you; we therefore recommend you to take what is left." When the waiter recommends a humble dish of Woolton Pie, if I may take a non-controversial dish, that does not mean to say that in his considered opinion it is better than the roast beef of old England, but it probably signifies that that is all that is left. Just as we would take that with a pinch of salt, so when we read that this proceeding has been recommended by the Chiefs of Staff, we are entitled to do the same.
Then we read in the White Paper that it was "unanimously agreed." That implies a policy of self-effacement on the part of the British Admiralty who presumably did not put forward the name of any admiral in this connection. The Admiralty, with all their great record, have not always been wise in their occasional excursions into politics. There were the well-known cases of the Irish Ports and of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty and sometimes there are more technical questions, such as the institution of the convoy system, which in the event have not proved wise decisions.
In this policy of self-effacement on the part of our Admiralty, I question very much whether, if it is so, it is indeed a wise policy, or whether it is indeed the correct way to carry out the office of Admiralty, and whether it is what the British public expect of the Admiralty.

I will quote from a letter I have received from a man who served with me in the war as an ordinary seaman and has now left the Service, but works in one of the dockyard towns and hears what people have to say. He says:
All my conversations since I last met you have confirmed the opinions I expressed at the time. There is very little said in this matter and the new type of officer these days seems to have been brought up in this 'second rate power' atmosphere and assumes automatically that America calls the tune these days.
Hon. Members will see the demoralising effect it will produce in the Service if the Admiralty do not adopt a more robust attitude than appears from the remarks in this White Paper.
We must realise at once that we are facing a far harder task in reaching a system of joint command amongst 12 Allied Powers than we had to face in this particular respect when working together with the United States of America during the last war. We would have been well advised therefore to retain the Chiefs of Staff Committee as a nucleus on which to work, but, that having been jettisoned, we see the emergence of the Standing Group Military Committee amongst this welter of committees as the one really good feature of this White Paper.
When I raised the matter of the composition of the Standing Group, it seemed to me that there was no naval representation at all on that group. There was no seafaring officer, but I am glad to say that this has now been remedied. The American representative is now a naval officer. But we now have no general; we now have no soldier. Next time we make an inquiry perhaps we shall find that there is no airman, but in due course let us hope that this Standing Group will settle down into being a really representative and effective body. It is surely on this small, but, let us hope, efficient group of three officers that we should build our hopes in the unfortunate event of a conflict coming upon us. I suggest to the Committee that that is the one solid gain in this White Paper. Let us therefore recognise it and pay due tribute to it.
If I may work in an upward direction, there is the North Atlantic Council, the Council of Deputies and the Defence Committee. My suggestion is that these three committees should be reduced to


two or eventually one, and that in that event our representative on that committee should be either the Foreign Secretary, or our permanent representative or the Minister of Defence, according to whatever is on the agenda. The advantage of that would be that it would greatly reduce the possibility of any one project being tossed from one committee to another with all the corresponding delay. It would greatly reduce the paraphernalia of all the secretariat which inevitably grows larger and larger round these committees. I put that forward as what I hope will be taken as a constructive suggestion for the improvement of the arrangement which we are discussing.
Turning in a downward direction, we come to the level of the Supreme Commanders. I wish to associate myself with the remarks that have already been made about the appointment of General Eisenhower, which was so much welcomed in this country. I feel that that is one matter about which we are all agreed—that this distinguished officer, under whom many of us have served, has, since he has taken up his appointment, added to the confidence which we all feel in his ability by the way he has gone about his difficult task. We are surely all very grateful indeed for the service which he is rendering to this country and to all the other free countries of the world.
Before going on to the more controversial matters, I wish to deal with two points. There is no mention in this White Paper of any air commander. Perhaps when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will make some comments on this important omission. Are we to understand that a decision has been reached that there is to be no supreme air commander either for the Treaty Powers or for the North Atlantic Ocean area?
There is no mention either of any organisation for the control of our merchant shipping. This was referred to by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition but I am not quite sure what was in his mind. An important point which I should like to bring forward is the fact that there is a big and important difference between the defence of our shipping and the organisation of the convoys on the one hand, and the allocation of tonnage on the other. It is very important to realise that whoever controls the allocation of tonnage it should not be one of the principal users. The Standing

Group here will, of course, be one of the principal users. If we allow the control of shipping to come under such a committee as the Standing Group it will be an unfortunate and disastrous arrangement for allocating our merchant shipping. I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether we can have some assurance that the allocation of our merchant tonnage will not be subordinated to the purely military command.
I come now to the question of the sea command. In my view, the test that we must apply to this controversial matter is whether the arrangements which are set out in the White Paper are calculated to increase or decrease the operational efficiency of our naval forces. It is from that aspect that it should mainly be judged. There is, of course, the purely British point of view that this arrangement will mean that the main Home Fleet will no longer be under the operational control of the British Admiralty. In that respect it is to many of us a wholly unacceptable arrangement for this country.
But I wish to dwell chiefly on the purely Service test of efficiency. In carving up the oceanic commands, as this White Paper seeks to do, there is a danger in applying the same measures and methods to this process as would be applied to a similar arrangement on land. That is a mistake. The whole set-up at sea is quite different. I confess that I find it difficult to explain exactly why, but I am sure that anyone here who has served at sea will agree with me when I say that these arrangements look quite different from the bridge of a ship from the way they look at say, Versailles or some headquarters, or even in discussion on the Floor of this House. If one were on the bridge of a destroyer off the Faroes, I think one would feel very remote if one's movements were controlled, even indirectly, from some far-off headquarters in Washington. We have a well-known naval song which would describe the frame of mind thus engendered, but I do not sing, and that song would undoubtedly be out of order, but it may well be known to some in this honourable House.
We are told in the White Paper, in paragraph 27, that the outstanding lesson of the Battle of the Atlantic is that the Atlantic Ocean is now one battle area. That is a very sweeping statement. It


looks very convincing when one reads it, but it is a statement which might equally be applied to the whole surface of the world. But when one comes to look at it from a purely practical point of view, I suggest that it is very unwise to base the foundation of our naval command on it.
We are told in this White Paper that what has been arranged is that there are the British coastal waters and Continental waters on the one hand, by which might be implied either the territorial waters up to the three-mile limit, or else, as has been suggested, out as far as the edge of soundings. That area is to be under British Admiralty control. On the other hand there is to be the Western Atlantic, which is of course to be under American control, and in between, a peculiarly shaped stretch of water, the Eastern Atlantic, which is the command of our Home Fleet.
There we have the Admiral under the operational control of the American authority. When I intervened to suggest that this meant that the Admiralty would no longer have operational control of the Home Fleet, I was contradicted from the Government Front Bench. I see that the Minister of Defence nods his head. Has he ever seen an Admiral receiving contradictory orders from two different authorities?

Mr. Shinwell: Mr. Shinwell indicated dissent.

Captain Ryder: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. May I suggest to him that he should try the experiment on the present Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet and see what is the effect? I can assure him that it has a peculiar effect on admirals. It is very bad for them. It is very bad for the Fleet; and it is fatal for the flag-lieutenant. I would seriously suggest that we cannot in any circumstances maintain that under this arrangement the Home Fleet will be under the operational control of the Admiralty. I look forward to the comments of the right hon. Gentleman on this vital matter.
What in fact we have achieved by this arrangement of two operational areas, one on the British side and the other the rest of the Atlantic, is that we have drawn a line of demarcation—which is always difficult to draw—down the edge of the

British and Continental coastal waters. But if we study the history of the U-boat campaigns in the last war, we find it was in this very area that the main U-boat campaigns usually took place. It is true that at one stage we drove them out into the middle of the Atlantic; but with the advent of the "Snort"-fitted submarines, there is every reason to suppose that they will come once again into the focal areas leading into the ports, which may also very well be the subject of main mining operations.
Under those conditions, to try to conduct operations in those areas from the far side of the Atlantic seems a poor arrangement indeed. If we look at it from this side of the ocean it seems it would be just as difficult and dangerous for us to intervene in a difficult situation arising off the entrance to New York harbour. I feel that to draw this major line of demarcation right down through what, in the event of a war, we would expect to be the main U-boat area, is indeed the worst possible arrangement.
Let us look at this from the point of view of the air, and consider ourselves in the position of the Air Officer Commanding Coastal Command. He has his base in the British area and is operating his flying boats partly in the Eastern Atlantic and partly in the British coastal waters; flying his patrols, it may be, off Tory Island, well-named no doubt for its recognition in the minds of every mariner. He will be operating from this country and receiving his orders, so far as we can see from this White Paper, from the other side of the Atlantic. Well, they may also have in the R.A.F. a song for that, to conjure up the state of mind that it is likely to engender, but surely we have reached an absurd arrangement which should be roundly condemned. Surely the natural place to draw this line between the two systems of command would be down the middle of the pond where aircraft operating from each side would normally expect to meet at the limit of their patrols. That is what I suggest we should restore, or attempt to restore, when this White Paper is discussed, as indeed we hope it will be from now onwards.
There is considerable merit in the suggestion of having a Northern Command, corresponding somewhat with the


area in which the Home Fleet operated in the last war, an area very much similar, I would suggest, to what was called the Western Approaches during the last war; so that as soon as a convoy comes within this half of the Atlantic it is retained under one single command until it comes right into the port of discharge. The Prime Minister, who stressed originally that the outstanding lesson of the Battle of the Atlantic was that it was to be one battle-field, would find it hard to quote any example where the system of passing convoys from one command area to the other, across what came to be called the chop line, failed, once it was properly established.
I reiterate that the test which we must apply to these matters is whether it will lead to an increase or a decrease in the operational efficiency of our naval forces. The Government by the inept way in which they have handled this affair, have greatly shocked the country. But that is not the main issue which we have to consider at the present time. We have to consider whether this will lead to an increase in efficiency or not. I am absolutely convinced that the present system, as set out in this White Paper, is fundamentally unsound. Either the Government have been badly advised on this matter or they have put a wrong interpretation on the advice which they received. I cannot recommend this to the Committee in any way from my own personal experience—having operated in this area—and I earnestly hope that the Minister responsible will see his way to make the very necessary alterations I have indicated.

6.27 p.m.

Mr. Thomas Reid: I have only a few minutes allotted to me so I shall be brief and abrupt. The right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) has argued that there is no need for a Supreme Atlantic Command; that the advice given was bad. I would like to read from the White Paper, paragraph 27(a):
A single unified command for the whole North Atlantic ocean is regarded as essential by the Chiefs of Staff of the various North Atlantic Powers.
These are the experts of all the North Atlantic Powers, and their advice is contrary to the advice of the right hon. Gentleman. I would put this question to

the Opposition: Is the Opposition prepared to disregard the advice of all the experts of all these countries? It is no use going round the country condemning this White Paper and these arrangements if they are not. Is the Opposition prepared to disregard that definite advice of the present military experts of the countries concerned?
The right hon. Member for Woodford told us that the U-boat menace must be controlled from Britain. That may be so, but is there anything in this scheme, as in all big administrative civil or military organisations by delegation, which would prevent the U-boat menace from being controlled from Britain? There is an Eastern Atlantic Command under a British admiral there, and if any powers and responsibilities have to be delegated—[Interruption.] I may tell the right hon. Member for Woodford that I love interruptions and if he likes to go on he can. There is nothing in this scheme to prevent the control of the U-boat menace from Britain.
Then the right hon. Member for Woodford asked, that because of our great and glorious experience in the past in controlling the U-boat menace, that should be left to us, and that the Commander in the Atlantic should be a British admiral. Then he jumped to a contradictory conclusion. In spite of our war-time experience and bases in the Mediterranean, he recommended that the Mediterranean area should be handed over to the Americans. That is quite contradictory.
The right hon. Gentleman quoted the experience of Admiral Cunningham, a very great sailor, and others in the last war. I would say to hon. Gentlemen opposite that the last war is a false guide for any coming war which may occur. The protagonists will be utterly different. The Forces engaged will be totally different. The geography will be totally different. It would be a wider thing from the start next time. The Russians impinge on the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and the war would be in the two zones from the outset—the Pacific, the Atlantic, and perhaps the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The protagonists are different, the weapons are different. I do not pretend to know what the new weapons are, but at least they are totally


different. The strategy and tactics which may have been of use in the last war may be of no use in a future war. Are hon. Members opposite going to rely on the statements made by retired admirals in preference to the advice of the naval experts of today? If they are, they will not get that over to the country, I can assure them.
When this information about the appointment of an Atlantic American admiral leaked out at Copenhagen, I cannot understand why the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford rushed down to the House and, at a few hours' notice, asked a Private Notice Question of the Prime Minister and badgered him at the Despatch Box. Why did he not go and discuss the matter with the Prime Minister, as he had a perfect right to do, instead of using this as a vehicle for Tory propaganda? I am convinced that this debate, which did not arouse much enthusiasm among the ranks opposite, is nothing more than a propaganda stunt, and that it will have nothing but a detrimental effect on the Opposition.

6.32 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell): The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), in solemn tones, informed the House that if I failed to furnish a genuine reply to the case submitted, he would move a reduction in my salary. It is true that he qualified what he said by suggesting that it might be merely a nominal reduction, for which I am most grateful—in these hard times, necessarily so. But a reduction in my salary—and indeed my personal position—is, I say sincerely, of very little consequence in this setting.
What is of consequence is the maintenance of the most friendly relations between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Any criticism, any suggestion, any utterances calculated to exacerbate feelings and relations, would render a great disservice not only to both countries but to all the countries concerned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Lieut.-CokMiel Bromley-Davenport: "Shabby moneylenders."

Mr. Shinwell: I am not complaining about the tone and temper of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. Nor indeed

am I complaining about the tone and temper of the debate. It might have been very much worse, and no doubt if it had extended beyond the hour of seven, which is I understand the arrangement agreed through the usual channels, feelings might have been aroused. Heaven forbid that they should in this particular context—I must emphasise that.
It must not be assumed that there is complete unity in the Conservative ranks about this matter, in spite of the moderate ovation the right hon. Gentleman received. Of course, that is common form in this House. The right hon. Gentleman's supporters are impelled, even compelled, to cheer in order to keep their courage up. After all, they have had a very rough time in recent months—
The best laid schemes o' mice and men Gang aft a-gley.
Things have not turned out as they intended, so that we can understand these foibles and this modified enthusiasm for the right hon. Gentleman's utterances. Therefore, I make no complaint.
But as I say, it must not be assumed that there is complete unity in the Conservative ranks. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), quoted from the "Daily Telegraph" of all papers—no supporter of the Labour Party or of the Labour Government. This quotation—[HON. MEMBERS: "The right hon. Gentleman cannot find it."] Hon. Members had better listen. If they do not read the "Daily Telegraph," we do. [Interruption.] May I at this stage beg hon. Gentlemen opposite to understand that I intend to make my speech in the time allotted to me? These interruptions and interjections have no effect on my mind whatever. My withers are un-wrung, so I shall quote from the "Daily Telegraph" leader:
…the general impression must surely be that national susceptibilities and practical requirements have been harmonised with considerable judgment.
That is their comment on this scheme. The right hon. Gentleman can put that in his pipe and smoke it, or he can put it with any other form of tobacco in which he indulges. But it is not only one newspaper that has come to the rescue of the Government in this connection. Even the "Evening Standard" has commented


favourably on the scheme. I suspect that there are hon. Members opposite who are not too happy about the case presented by the right hon. Gentleman.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) asked me a pertinent question. He asked why it was that I did not rise immediately the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford sat down. It was no act of discourtesy on my part.

Mr. Churchill: Oh, no.

Mr. Shinwell: I sometimes do not hear the utterances in which the right hon. Gentleman indulges, just as sometimes he does not hear what we say. Can we let it go at that, and call it quits? I beg of him not to interrupt any further. He is going to get it, whether he likes it or not. I want to reply to the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery upon just why it was I did not rise. The reason is that I wanted to hear the views of the Committee in the limited time at our disposal. I am not prepared to rely exclusively on the views expressed by him. There are other Members of the House who are subordinate to him, but who, nevertheless, are entitled to express an opinion.

Mr. Churchill: Or insubordinate.

Mr. Shinwell: I am very grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery for addressing certain questions to me on this very important matter. In my view, the issue is one that can be simply expressed. It is this. What is it that we want in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on its military side? Surely, it is common to every hon. Member, no matter in what quarter he may reside politically, that what we want is the most efficient and the most effective organisation in preparation for war, if it should unhappily occur. We want to present, in short, a most formidable deterrent in the form of an organisation in readiness for an emergency. That is our purpose, and the right hon. Gentleman will naturally agree with that.
In the situation in which we found ourselves, which was none of our making, we had to enter into negotiations and protracted discussions, as it happened, with 11 other countries—the United States and the others—some of them, perhaps, not so important numerically, but, though subordinate—that is not my

language, but the language of the right hon. Gentleman opposite—nevertheless entitled to express their opinions. Nations, whether large or small, in this democratic context, are entitled to express their opinions.
In view of these protracted discussions, it was—and I confess it quite frankly—difficult to reach a complete solution. What we aimed at was to finalise, so far as practicable, some of the command organisations. We had succeeded as far as the West was concerned. I regard that as a considerable achievement. As the result of discussions, and, indeed, considerable pressure, we were able to persuade the United States President to appoint General Eisenhower to take the command of the West, and, when that was achieved, we succeeded, as a result of our discussions, in securing the appointment of Field Marshal Montgomery as Deputy Supreme Commander, and also the appointment of a Deputy Supreme Air Commander, working in close conjunction both with Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower. On the whole, we have been very successful as the result of our negotiations in regard to the West, and I have noted that no complaint was made on that score in the speeches to which we have listened, so that there is no blame attaching to the Government in that regard.
Then, as regards the naval aspects, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that he has got hold of the wrong end of the stick, and that, in fact, these negotiations were not originated by some subordinate admiral. He is quite wrong about that. I do not know where he got the story, but he gets a lot of stories and he has a lot of contacts, but sometimes they do not give him the best information. He ought to be careful, and have it checked and cross-checked. As a matter of fact, these negotiations have gone on for a considerable time, and our Chiefs of Staff, with the American and other Chiefs of Staff, have been in at all the discussions. No appointments of this kind, quite obviously, could have taken place or even have been suggested unless our Chiefs of Staff had been in complete agreement; equally, the American Chiefs of Staff must have been in complete agreement, as well as the French and the others equally concerned.
As to whether we originated the idea of an American Supreme Commander in the Atlantic, that idea was not originated by us at all. It emerged as the result of planning discussions, which were quite proper in the circumstances; and here I would like to make this comment. The right hon. Gentleman opposite spoke about the last war, and, of course, nobody is more entitled to speak about it, with his vast experience, and, if I may say so with great respect and sincerity, his high qualities. Of course, we have a barge with the right hon. Gentleman now and then, but we never seek to depreciate his high qualities. [Interruption.] No, certainly, as regards the last war. He surely must be the first to admit that many mistakes were made in the last war, and that many defects occurred. I was not in the Government in the last war. I sat on those benches. It was not the fault of the right hon. Gentleman, who asked me to be—

Mr. Churchill: I should like to confirm that. The fault, if fault it was, lay among the leaders of the right hon. Gentleman's own party.

Mr. Shinwell: I assure the House, in parenthesis—and this is all in parenthesis—that the right hon. Gentleman has said that to me many a time, but, really, it is quite inaccurate. It is a matter between him and me, and we will forget it now. No doubt, it is recorded in history in more subdued form.

Mr. Churchill: I really fancied the right hon. Gentleman, when he was an hon. Gentleman, as he was then, as Minister of Fuel and Power, but it was one of those mistakes I made.

Mr. Shinwell: Now, it will be noted that we have arrived at this position. The right hon. Gentleman admits that there were mistakes in the last war. So far, so good. There were mistakes in regard to the hunting of the U-boats, and there were, moreover, huge losses, which we deplored. There were protracted discussions between ourselves and the United States, after the United States came into the war, which only occurred many months after the war had begun.
Let the right hon. Gentleman not forget that France was out of the war not long after it began, that there were many

mistakes, and that those mistakes only began to be corrected towards the end of 1943, when we began—and only began—in a modified form to build up a unified control, which is, after all, what the right hon. Gentleman desires. It is precisely a unified control at which we are aiming now in this White Paper. That is the position, and, after all is said and done, it is far better to plan before the trouble occurs than after it has happened, and that is precisely what we are doing.
I am not blaming the right hon. Gentleman, or the Government which he blamed many times before the war, when he sat over there. I am not blaming the right hon. Gentleman, but if Governments before the war—and perhaps all parties are to blame in this regard—had planned as we are planning now, perhaps the war would not have occurred. [Interruption.] I agree, it is a matter of speculation. Who can tell? At any rate, the right hon. Gentleman will agree, and I am sure I have the whole House with me in this, that it is far better to plan, first of all, in order to provide an effective deterrent, and, if we fail in providing an effective deterrent, we are then ready to give a good account of ourselves. That is the purpose of what we are doing.
I want to deal now with what I think are the more substantial arguments. Naturally, I do. That is what hon. Gentlemen of the Opposition want; certainly, the right hon. Gentleman opposite asked for it, and so did others. I will not attempt to enter into a discussion with the right hon. Gentleman on strategic matters. He is much better informed than I am; I am a mere layman, except that I would say that he is not the only naval expert in this country. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear."] There are many naval experts of high quality outside the House upon whose advice we are bound to rely, and, with great respect to the right hon. Gentleman and to the naval advice he offers, if I have to choose between his advice, with all his experience, and the advice offered by my military advisers, I accept their advice, and I should not be surprised if I am doing the right thing.
What is the argument? It is that no Supreme Commander is necessary. The right hon. Gentleman not only told us that no Supreme Commander was required, but also that a war cannot be


conducted through committees. Of course a war cannot be conducted through a Standing Group, and it may be that a war could not be conducted through Combined Chiefs of Staff similar to those in the last war, and I will tell the right hon. Gentleman why.
As I said a moment ago, America did not come into the war early enough, and France went out too early. We were left to conduct the operations ourselves for a long time. But the situation today is different. There are 12 countries involved, and that being so, obviously some form of organisation has to be set up. That form is the Standing Group, and the Standing Group—perhaps this will illuminate the minds of some hon. Members who have been confused about it—consists of representatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It consists not only of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the United Kingdom, but all the countries concerned in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
As I pointed out in the White Paper, which the right hon. Gentleman said he had read—I hope he has—there is a Military Representatives Committee in Washington. The three members of the Standing Group, who were Lord Tedder, General Ely, and, before the appointment of Vice-Admiral Wright, General Bradley, were themselves members of the Military Representatives Committee, who are the permanent representatives of the various Chiefs of Staff sitting in Washington, and who are in constant consultation. That is the position. How does that react on the Supreme Command question? It is obvious that there must be a body responsible for strategic policy, that is, the Standing Group, taking the advice of the Chiefs of Staff of this country and the others. The execution of that policy must be vested in a Supreme Commander, and, therefore, I put it to the Committee that if the right hon. Gentleman says that we cannot operate through committees and boards, then obviously the right way to do it is to appoint somebody in whom is vested the power to execute the strategic policy determined by those in higher authority.
It may be, of course, that all this planning—after all, it is all conjecture; mere planning—may be quite useless if war occurs, and it may be that we would have

to adopt the system as in the last war, of Prime Minister and President. It may be that a similar arrangement to that which took place between the right hon. Member for Woodford and the late President Roosevelt might have to take place again. But the essential thing is to plan now, even if we have to modify our plans when the time comes to engage in operations.
The next question is: if there is to be a Supreme Commander, should he be an American or a British Commander? There is the problem. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery asked: Why not appoint the man with the highest qualifications? I must confess that I am in a difficulty there, because it is very difficult to determine at a particular moment who is the man who possesses the highest qualifications.

Mr. C. Davies: There was no difficulty about General Eisenhower.

Mr. Shinwell: A man may be appointed in peace-time, but he may not be the proper person to command in war-time. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery, I agree, is on a fair point, but it must be remembered that General Eisenhower was an American Supreme Commander.

Mr. Davies: Does the right hon. Gentleman really mean that it has been decided that whatever happens, the Commander shall be an American, and that if No. 1 fails or dies, then No. 2 must, again, be an American?

Mr. Shinwell: I take the Committee, as I must do—and I am not being at all condescending about it—into my confidence on the matter. We had to consider what was the most effective arrangement. We had to take into account a vast number of considerations, one of which was that the United States would have very large forces. However, I must qualify that by saying that the fact that one country has overwhelming forces is no reason why it should claim the Supreme Command. But, at any rate, it is one reason, and a reason which cannot be ignored.
There is another substantial reason. In the plan of command which we were exploring—I have some maps here, and perhaps hon. Members would like to see them after the debate because they might


help to explain the matter—it was decided that the whole of the Eastern Atlantic running from the southern tip of Greenland down to Cape Finisterre should be under the control of a British admiral. It was our view—I am merely expressing the expert view, and, as a layman, I cannot compete with it—that that was likely to be the main operational area. The point was that the main operations would take place in the Eastern Atlantic. Of course, there would very likely be submarine chasing and the use, to some extent, of a carrier task force under the Americans, because they have many more of these vessels than we have, but we expected that, if war occurred in the Atlantic, it would be in the Eastern Atlantic where the main operations would take place, and there is to be a British admiral there.
Let me deal with the command in coastal waters. The right hon. Gentleman put a technical question to me, but, after a little while, I began to understand what he meant when he talked about 100 fathoms. What he was after was this. We have the exclusive control of our coasts. There is no question about that, and I only mention it in passing. There is an area which, for the sake of simplicity, might be called the southern part of the North Sea. It has not yet been determined who is to command that area, because we are not the only country concerned. France, Belgium and other countries are concerned in that area. But there is one thing I can say—this is an answer to some of the questions that have been put—and it is that this very important area will not come under the control of the American Supreme Commander. That is another reason why we accepted the arrangement. I will explain it at greater length if there is any confusion about it, but I presume that the right hon. Gentleman has followed what I have said.
The next reason is this. Let us assume that war occurs and that we have to face a substantial enemy attack in the Atlantic. It may be necessary for the Commander in the Atlantic to ask for the deployment or re-deployment of forces in the Pacific. The Pacific is entirely outside the North Atlantic Treaty area, we know, and out of the command. But it may well be—I would not rate it too highly, but it is

a point which cannot be ignored—that an American Supreme Commander would have a more direct and speedy access to an American President than would a British admiral sitting in Whitehall, and that was one of the points we had to consider. I said I did not rate it too highly but it was a point we had to consider. Finally, as regards an American Supreme Commander we got agreement that the Deputy Supreme Commander should be a British admiral.
What are the relations? What is the picture? First of all, there is the Standing Group on which we are equally represented, the Supreme American Commander, the deputy—a British Commander—a British admiral in control of the Eastern Atlantic, command of our coastal waters. After all, I do not think we have come too badly out of these negotiations. As to the rest, I have not very much time to deal with all the points.

Mr. Churchill: We are in Committee. We hope the right hon. Gentleman will take all the time he needs to deal with this very important matter.

Mr. Shinwell: I am extremely obliged to the right hon. Gentleman, for he will see that this is a matter that cannot be disposed of in a few minutes. I have not prepared many notes and I have to follow the line of the debate and therefore, perhaps, I can take a little more time.

Brigadier Head: Would the right hon. Gentleman explain to the Committee what was meant by the definition of "coastal waters"? I, for one, could not understand it and I still do not quite understand.

Mr. Shinwell: I thought that was understood—the Channel and a strip of the coast. I am not quite sure of the technical description. Right round all our coast was always regarded as Home Command. [An HON. MEMBER: "HOW far?"] I said there is a strip. If there is a strip outside coastal waters which juts into the Southern part of the North Sea, the decision as to who should command has not yet been determined, but at any rate it will not be under the control of the American Supreme Command. That is my answer.

Mr. Duncan Sandys: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how wide it is?

Mr. Shinwell: I am sorry, it is quite impossible. I gave the reason why I cannot go into minute detail on these matters. Negotiations are still proceeding about the varying nature of the command and about the precise details of all the commands. It has not been finalised, and indeed that is one of the reasons why I begged Opposition Leaders not to press with this debate today and to give us an opportunity of finalising the arrangements.
I come now to the question put to me of whether the Admiralty will have control of its vessels. I am surprised that question is put. Of course, the Admiralty will have control of its vessels. Certainly there will be no question of handing over control of naval vessels to any other commander in peace time. As to what will happen in war time, that is surely a matter for consultation between the various countries concerned, through their Chiefs of Staff. Surely that is the right thing, and indeed that is exactly what would happen. I need say no more about that.
The right hon. Member for Woodford looked at the White Paper—and he made a little fun about it—and said, "There it is, very grandiose but it is a layer of committees." There is no layer of committees. I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman indulged in such comment. If I may say so, it seemed to me a complete extravagance of language. We have the Military Committee of all the Chiefs of Staff and our Chiefs of Staff have a representative on the Military Representative Committee permanently in Washington, and three Chiefs of Staff constitute the Standing Group. What else is there? Where is the layer of committees?
The hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) asked me a question about merchant shipping. We are not discussing that today but nevertheless I can give him the answer. There will be an Allied shipping control to determine the allocation of merchant vessels. That follows the line taken in the last war, although it may be improved on. It depends on the circumstances. There is a Defence Production Board. We must have some organisation to deal with those matters. But in the military sphere there are few committees, and in order to avoid a multiplicity of committees we appointed a Supreme Commander. I should have thought that that was right

up the street of the right hon. Member for Woodford, but he appears to object to it.
Some reference has been made to the Mediterranean. I am extremely sorry that I am not in a position to give the Committee full information about this matter because this is still the subject of discussion. [Laughter.] This is no laughing matter I assure hon. Members, for the reason I am going to give. I say with great respect to the right hon. Member for Woodford that I hope he has not thrown a spanner into the works.

Mr. Churchill: Thrown what?

Mr. Shinwell: A spanner. No doubt he could afford to throw a few planners into the works but not spanners. No formal announcement has been made about the appointment, and people are disturbed on both sides of the Atlantic. It is a pity. The right hon. Gentleman could have done something other than he did. He could have accepted the offer I made before the last defence debate to come and talk the whole thing over.

Commander Pursey: Be British.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman will recall what I said. I said to him that this matter of defence and the organisation of defence is above politics. I do not detect any politics in it. Of course politics and prejudice can be brought into it. One can make political capital out of it and one can use it as a stick to beat the Government, but defence is not built up in that way. One only creates embarrassment. I know that in his heart the right hon. Gentleman does not want to do that; and who would accuse him of doing that in the sphere of defence?
I offered to discuss the matter with him and to give the Opposition all the information they wanted. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why should you give it to them?"] I can give the reason. The reason is that it has been common form in this House for many a long year for the Government of the day to meet the Opposition and disclose matters, which are not ordinarily disclosed to the public, relating to defence and foreign policy. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"] Never mind the reason; I did not make the traditions of the House of Commons, though I have been here longer than


many hon. Members and, what is more, will be here longer than some hon. Members on the other side. But do not provoke me into interjections.
I wanted honestly to discuss the matter because it would have been helpful to have their constructive views and it would have assisted us in our negotiations. But the right hon. Gentleman was afraid to disarm Opposition criticism. But what does it matter about Opposition criticism? What we want is to do the job effectively. In his remarks he sought to denigrate the British Navy—not traditionally, of course. He did not do that. One would not expect him to do that. But he sought to denigrate it numerically. He talked as if we had nothing at our command. We have a very strong Navy and if anybody tried any tricks they would soon discover that. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about the Suez Canal?"] Somebody is asking about Egypt. Hon. Members opposite are peculiar. In the last election they did not want to spend any money on defence, but now they are asking us to go to war with Egypt. We are not going to war with anybody if we can help it.
We are building up a defence organisation, not in isolation and not, for that matter, only in association with the United States of America or France. We are building up a defence organisation in conjunction with 11 other nations, and we believe that is a formidable achievement in peace-time. I can only hope that feelings between ourselves and the United States will not be strained as a result of this debate and that very shortly we may reach complete finalisation of this command organisation to the advantage of all the countries concerned.

7.11 p.m.

Mr. Churchill: We are obliged to the Minister of Defence for having laid his side of the case so plainly and agreeably before the Committee. I intruded for a long time upon the indulgence of hon. Members in my speech today and I am very glad and interested now to hear the answer made by the Government to it. I hope those who listened to the debate will carefully reflect on all that has been said on both sides, and I am certainly not going to endeavour to renew the arguments which I have already submitted to the Committee.
I must, however, say this: that I think in all the present circumstances one would be running a great deal of risk if one were to accept offers from the Government to impart all kinds of secrets on defence matters to one outside this Chamber. If we were still left in sharp difference on the merits of the course to be adopted and a debate arose here afterwards, one would run a great risk of being accused of giving away confidences which had been imparted, and a number of difficult lines would arise.
As I saw no possibility of our being agreed on the merits of the policy at all, I declined the right hon. Gentleman's offer, which he made to me in confidence, although he did not hesitate to use for public purposes the fact that he had made the offer and that it had been refused. These are not really the times for discussions of that kind. We differ very much on broad questions of principle, even in the military sphere. We wished to put our case. The right hon. Gentleman, with all the advantages of the official knowledge that he and his advisors have, is able to put the alternative before us, and the Committee can judge very correctly and shrewdly.
Personally, I still think that the best method would be to settle these matters between the Admiralty and the American Navy Department, as they were settled in the last war, subject to the guidance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; but other views may have their place. Of this I am quite sure—that there is no new fact which requires the creation of a Supreme American Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic at the present time, and I regret that the Government have found it necessary to take that step. I believe it would have been very easy, had they maintained a proper influence and contact with the United States, to have procured a different solution.
I do not at all complain at the tone of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, except that I thought he devoted 20 minutes to jocular debate, which he does very well and which carries the Committee along with him, but which deprived us of the opportunity we no doubt otherwise would have enjoyed of hearing a masterly, clear-cut, coherent and massive argument on the grave issues which lie before us.
In those circumstances, I feel bound to move a reduction, especially as he said that there was so much division on these matters on our side of the Committee. I should be very glad indeed if I could do it without impoverishing the right hon. Gentleman. I took some advice on the matter and I understand that in a Vote of this size perhaps I ought to move for a reduction of the subhead for salaries by £1,000. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]

But I have relented and I find that I should not be out of the bounds of order if I contented myself with moving to reduce the Vote by £100.

I therefore beg to move, "That Subhead A.1, Salaries, etc., be reduced by £100."

Question put.

The Committee divided: Ayes, 280: Noes, 291.

Original Question again proposed.

Motion by leave, withdrawn.

Orders of the Day — POST OFFICE SERVICES (INCREASED CHARGES)

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £121,431,000, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, for the salaries and expenses of the Post Office, including telegraphs and telephones and a grant in aid.—[Mr. Bowden.]—[£58 million has been voted on account.]

7.28 p.m.

Mr. W. S. Morrison: I desire to raise on this Vote the subject of the increased charges for postal services which were announced to the House by the Postmaster-General on 4th April last. Of these charges, those relating to the telegraphs, he told us, required legislation because they exceed the maximum laid down in the Telegraph Act. As this is Supply, it will not be in

order to discuss the telegraph charges on this occasion; but there is plenty of material in the Post Office, and in the postal and telephone charges, to fill out the few hours that remain to us.
The right hon. Gentleman on that occasion prefaced his statement by saying that he thought it would surprise the House. This anticipation proved to be well founded. I think everybody on both sides of the Chamber was not only surprised but very dismayed to hear that he found it necessary to make those additional charges at this time. We have all got so used to thinking of the Post Office as a Department which year by year makes a useful contribution in aid of the taxpayer, and also as a Department which by the services, nowadays unpaid for, it renders to Government Departments does something which, in the end, relieves taxation. Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman brought forward his little curtain-raiser to the Budget—if I may so call it—it gave us all a somewhat dismal foretaste of what was to come in the main


drama. Far from relieving general taxation, the right hon. Gentleman this year, by this announcement, proposes to increase the burden to the general public by some £8 million a year.
It is to me very strange that the Postmaster-General should have been chosen for this preliminary raid into the pockets of the public. So far as my recollection serves, in the past changes in the postal charges of this order have invariably been announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as part of his revenue proposals. Certainly I remember that, when I became Postmaster-General in 1940 and the price of the ordinary letter was raised from 1½d. to 2½d., the announcement was made by Sir John Simon, as he then was, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and not by myself; and it was defended by him on the only ground upon which it could be defended, namely, that the additional revenue was necessary in time of war to buttress the finances of the nation.
I remember that in 1949, Sir Stafford Cripps—and when I mention that right hon. Gentleman's name perhaps I may be permitted to say how we in this Committee have received with regret the news of his continued illness and fervently wish him a speedy and complete recovery—when there were changes upwards in postal charges, announced them, and not the Postmaster-General. I remember that the right hon. Gentleman who is now Minister of Local Government and Planning, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1945, answering a question as to postal charges with the well used formula "I cannot anticipate my Budget statement." So it is, I think, the invariable custom that if this great revenue Department, the Post Office, increases its charges, that is a revenue matter and a matter for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to decide and to announce against the background of taxation for the year. It is not merely a departmental matter for the Post Office.
The Post Office Act of 1908 does, as I remember, give to the Treasury, not to the Postmaster-General, power to make certain slight extra charges on inland parcels; but charges of this order amounting to £8 million a year, have invariably been Budget matters. Indeed, if one looks at it, this £8 million a year

is more than the Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes to get by the alterations he is making in the controversial field of Entertainments Duty. A tax as important and as heavy as that ought to have been in the Budget.
I speak on this matter with a little knowledge and also, the Committee will believe me, with a great affection for the Post Office. I was privileged to be at its head during the worst phase of the aerial bombardment of this country and I always remember with profound gratitude the loyalty and service of the men and women in the Post Office during that time of trial. That is why I harp on what I consider to be the unfair load placed upon the right hon. Gentleman in justifying charges which, to be understood, must be seen against the general financial burden of the country; to be understood and appreciated it must be presented in the framework of a Budget, and I think it is a little constitutionally indecent that the right hon. Gentleman should have been pushed forward to make this preliminary announcement of what is taxation.
But since the right hon. Gentleman, I suppose in all loyalty to his colleagues, in the statement which he made on 4th April, adhered to the rôle of being first over the top and said that these charges have nothing to do with taxation, I must deal with the matter on that footing, although I believe it to be the wrong footing and not the reality of the situation at all. I must, to meet the right hon. Gentleman, deal with this as though the Post Office were isolated from the general taxation system of the country and were nothing more than a large trading monopoly, and as if these charges were necessitated by ordinary trading vicissitudes.
Taking it on that footing—though I believe it to be an unreal one—the justification the right hon. Gentleman put forward was that his commercial surplus for 1951–52 would, in his own words, fall to a very small figure. I find it difficult to reconcile this statement with the Estimate presented to this Committee in February, before there was any word of these additional charges, which puts the surplus on the Post Office at £8,389,000, which I should have considered was quite a handsome surplus for these days.
I want to ask this larger question on policy in the times through which we are passing: Why should not the right hon.


Gentleman take the risk of his commercial surplus being a small one? If that is the worst he is afraid of, it seems to me that he is in a happier position than most of the traders in the country at the present time. He cannot go bankrupt; he is indeed a revenue Department; he pays into the Exchequer what he receives and he draws on the Exchequer for what he needs. If he can show a surplus on the deal—a surplus, say, of £8 million, as is included in the printed Estimates—he has nothing to fear. Even if, through unforeseen rises in costs, there is a small loss, why, the Post Office has contributed enough to the Exchequer in the past to be able to face such a small calamity with complete composure.
It seems to me to be an odd thing that at a time when everyone is urged to exist on as small a surplus as possible, when, indeed, many people have no surplus at all, when we are being urged to keep down costs, the Post Office should not be content with the common lot of the citizens of this country. The Post Office feel that they must play for safety by ensuring a surplus which is not very small. It almost looks as if the right hon. Gentleman is joining with some zest in what is often described from platforms frequented by hon. Gentlemen opposite as "the mad scramble after profits."
I conclude this point by saying that I think that it is a thoroughly bad example to set to the trading community at the present time. This practice of the Government in raising its charges to show a surplus which is not small is quite out of tune with what other trading concerns in the country are urged to do by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—to cut their costs and to do with as little surplus of revenue over expenditure as they can possibly contrive to manage with.
Passing to the increases themselves, I think that all of them are objectionable. They are not the first increases made in recent times. They come on top of enormous increases made in recent years. The one which I think will inflict the most damage on our trading community is the increase proposed in the inland printed paper rate. This is the last vestige of the penny postage. Succeeding Postmasters-General have clung to it, not only for historical reasons but because of its great utility to the trading community of the country.
Bills, invoices, receipts, printed documents, price lists and a vast variety of other commercial documents are transmitted in this way. These will now cost 1½d. instead of 1d.—a rise of 50 per cent. The fact that the weight limit for 1½d. is raised to four oz. is a mitigation of a very negligible character. One's credit would need to be very good before one could run up a bill weighing four oz.
I have received a number of complaints on this matter from associations of traders, chambers of commerce, manufacturing associations and so on, who have been vocal upon it, but the way in which it hits the ordinary man is worth considering. Of the examples which I have, I will quote one for which I am indebted to the hon. Member for Wembley, South (Mr. Russell). A constituent of his, who describes himself as a manufacturing chemist and only a small firm, says:
In 1950 we despatched 548,743 circulars at printed paper rate representing a postage bill of £2,286 8s. 7d. The proposed new postage of 1½d, means that our costs will be increased by £1,143 plus, of course, the additional postage on thousands of invoices, statements, receipts, orders, price lists, etc.
The rest of the letter I need not quote. It has in it a few remarks uncomplimentary to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, but there is no need to reiterate sentiments which are so universally held.
It makes quite a difference to this man if he has to pay another £1,000 a year, and the effect is that, if he is to survive at all, he has to meet that increased cost, and I prophesy that all, or a certain amount, of this increase will go straight on to the cost of the commodities which he produces. As I said before, at a time of rising costs, unless the need is absolutely imperative, it seems to me to be bad policy to increase these charges because they will pervade the whole commercial community. This is only one isolated example of this further step towards raising the cost of living.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Ness Edwards): Would the right hon. Gentleman advocate the continuance of a subsidy on these services?

Mr. Morrison: No, I am not suggesting that at all. What I am suggesting—I am going into the figures in a moment—is that if the Post Office were properly managed, and if it received from the Government Departments the money that is


due to it for the services which it renders, it would be a solvent organisation. It has a complete monopoly, and there would be no necessity to seek subventions either from the Exchequer or from the hardworking consumers of postal services.

Mr. Harry Wallace: Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the Government should start the cash payments from the Departments?

Mr. Morrison: Not at all. I am well aware of the history of that matter. I am going into it. I think that the present Government should have taken the advice of the Select Committee on Estimates and made some proposition at least to revert to what was the previous method of receipt.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to suggest to the Committee that if there were cash payments it would alter at all the commercial account? Perhaps he will indicate how it works?

Mr. Morrison: I think it would. I am going to deal with that.

Mr. Wallace: I am referring to the Select Committee's Fourth Report. It was agreed in principle, of course, that these cash payments should be restored. I got the impression that the Select Committee agreed that it would not be practicable at the moment to do so.

Mr. Morrison: I think that the right hon. Gentleman should not have waited to get this prod from the Select Committee, and that he ought to have introduced that system before. I shall deal with the practicability of the suggestion in a moment. I have given one example of how it affects the trader, and it is no wonder that these charges should evoke the liveliest protest from commerce in general. The National Chamber of Trade says:
It is just another vicious addition to the increase in rates which is the prevailing disease of this country. One would have thought that the national policy would be to try to reduce prices and so attract more business
The National Union of Manufacturers say:
This has come as a shock to industry and can only mean an increase in overhead costs and ultimately increased costs to the consumer. The Government is ready enough

with advice to manufacturers to keep down costs, but it does not follow it itself.
The right hon. Gentleman said on 4th April, that these charges were necessary, and that the services on which he proposed increases were running at a loss. I think those were his words. When we turn to the Estimates presented to Parliament in the middle of February, before there was any word of these increased charges, I find it difficult to reconcile these estimates with what was said on 4th April. We did not find the February Estimate anticipate a loss on postal and telephone services but actually a surplus on commercial accounts.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does not want to misrepresent me. What I said was that particular services in which I was making the increases were services Tuning at a loss and were subsidised by the others. I think that he should keep to that point.

Mr. Morrison: What the hon. Gentleman is increasing the charge upon in the postal services is the printed paper rate. I take it from his intervention that what he is saying is that, although the postal services as a whole yield a commercial surplus, dealing with these printed papers does not. Surely it is analysing things to a very fine point to take out particular categories of postal traffic and say that this one or that one makes a loss whereas others make a gain. The proper thing is for the Post Office to take the postal services as a whole and ensure that they make a profit. Who is going to distinguish between a packet weighing 4 oz. and one weighing 1½ oz., between a flimsy letter and a heavy one? That is impossible in execution.
I say that the printed paper rate should be borne by the higher rate that is charged for the rest of the postal work of the Post Office. If the right hon. Gentleman's argument were to be carried to a conclusion, it would mean that we would have to strike some average which would yield a surplus of £6 million, or whatever it is, for the whole of the postal services and that if it meant putting the printed packets up it would mean reducing the ordinary 2½d. post. Why should he be content to take the profit on the 2½d. letter and to say that the 1d. letter does not pay? No trader in business is ever allowed to exercise such discrimination


Now that the right hon. Gentleman has descended into the dusty arena of business, he must be content to have a service as a whole that yields a profit.
The Estimates presented in February, before these charges were mooted, show a commercial profit on the postal service of £6,534,000 and on the telephone service of £6,577,000. There is an estimated loss on telegraphs, which is something in the nature of £5 million, as there has been ever since I can remember. An estimated surplus of some £8 million is a good surplus for these days, and it does not need any further enhancement of costs to back it up. If we look at the Financial Statement presented by the Chancellor, we see that the Chancellor confidently expects to receive from the Post Office a tax payment of £5,400,000 to go into revenue, and that is before the right hon. Gentleman has taken the step of making Government Departments pay their bills.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The right hon. Gentleman has got it quite wrong, and he is getting both of us confused. He is mixing up the cash account, the money paid to the Treasury, with the commercial account. There is no similarity between the two. It would be quite wrong to add a payment made by another Department to the Post Office to the money in the commercial account, because it is already there.

Mr. Morrison: I am guilty of no such confusion. My first point was that the estimated surplus on the commercial account for both the postal service and the telephone service before these charges were announced, in February, was of the order of £6 million for each. I made the further point, which is a different point, although it also tends in the same direction, that on the whole series of the right hon. Gentleman's transactions for the year the Chancellor expects him to hand over £5,400,000 to the Treasury. That is in the Financial Statement. If the right hon. Gentleman looks at the Budget Estimates, he will see this item included under "Post Office net receipts."

Mr. Ness Edwards: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman again, but we do want to get this straight. He is again mixing up the surplus in the commercial account with the yield to the Treasury. The surplus in

the commercial account can never be added to the yield to the Treasury.

Mr. Morrison: I should not try to do so. Whichever test the right hon. Gentleman likes, whether we take the estimated surplus of the right hon. Gentleman's own Estimates of February or the Chancellor's estimate of the outturn of the operations of the Post Office for the year, we find the surplus in both cases.
Statements about these charges not being taxation and about their real necessity were contained in replies made by the right hon. Gentleman on 4th April to a number of supplementary questions. I agree that this is not always the best time for a Minister to be clear and precise as to what he is saying, but he has since admitted that two of the answers he gave on that occasion were erroneous. One was when he told us that there had been a rise in wages of 180 per cent. I understand that the figure should have been 80 per cent.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The right hon. Gentleman should not confuse rates with wages.

Mr. Morrison: The right hon. Gentleman said that wages had gone up by 180 per cent., and there followed in the Press a day or two later a statement by an official of the Post Office saying that the right hon. Gentleman had made a slip and that the figure should be 80. All I am anxious to do is to get the truth.

Mr. H. Wallace: The figure is not 80 but something less.

Mr. Morrison: An error of 100 per cent. was quite good enough for me. If it is more than 100 per cent. it an a fortiori argument.
The other slip he made, which is perhaps more relevant, was when he told my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, West (Mr. Assheton) that it would take 2,000 more people to check the Post Office bills of Government Departments. He later corrected that 2,000 to 100, and in the evidence before the Select Committee the figure was put at 75. There is a big difference between 2,000 and 100. I make no complaint about the right hon. Gentleman making a slip or two with figures. It is an easy enough thing to do, and I appreciate his


candour in taking the earliest steps he could to put the matter right. I should like to give him the opportunity to make a further correction.
Does the right hon. Gentleman still adhere to the opinion he then expressed, in face of the arguments I have tried to adduce, between the Estimates, on the one hand, and the statement of the Chancellor on the other, that the postal and telephone services are running at a commercial loss so as to render necessary these increased charges? If not, what is the justification for the charges? Are they not pure taxation, and, if so, why were they not included in the Budget The right hon. Gentleman has accused me of mixing up two different things, but I think he has been bewildered by the complexity of his own accounts in their present form.
Up to April, 1943, which was two months after I ceased to be Postmaster-General, Government Departments paid their bills in cash. The charges were borne on the Votes of the Departments concerned and were met out of general taxation. Since April, 1943, the Post Office has not collected cash. That was an economy supposedly in manpower. But the Post Office has had included in its commercial accounts, estimates of the value of these services. That is to be found in Appendix F of the Estimates. If Members look at that Appendix, they will be astonished to find that the cost of the Post Office services rendered to the Air Ministry are estimated for the year at £4,265,000. I advise the right hon. Gentleman to return as quickly as he can to the practice of getting payments in cash for the services he renders to these Departments. This is not only my advice but the advice of the Select Committee, an all-party Committee, and I understand that it was a unanimous recommendation. The reasons for it are sufficiently obvious.
To defray these Government charges by raising the rates to the consumers of Post Office services is unjust. The whole cost of running the Air Ministry should be borne out of general taxation. It is unjust that a particular citizen whose business involves heavy postal charges should be called upon to pay a bigger slice of this £4 million for the Air Ministry than any other citizen. There may

be the case of a man who is much better off and writes only two letters a week. His contribution to this part of the services to the Air Ministry is infinitely less than in the case I have just mentioned.
The second reason is this: the accounting officer of each Department should be made responsible for expenditure on Post Office services as he is responsible for the other expenditure of his Department. The right hon. Gentleman would find economy in the Departments much more easy to ensure if this were done. If the charges were included in the estimate of each Department, and were subjected to the scrutiny of the Treasury and later of the House, the hands of the accounting officers would be greatly strengthened, and they would be able to prevent wastefulness on Post Office services.

Mr. William Ross: As a member of the Committee that looked into this matter and knowing the reason why we advised a certain course to be taken, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to tell me, quite apart from the effect on the Budget, what would be the effect of a saving on the Post Office surplus? Would it not reduce it?

Mr. Morrison: That is one of the questions I find difficult to answer. One would have to know the size of the figures involved and how much labour and so on was diverted to this service. I could not answer offhand, but if the hon. Gentleman would care to give me a week to work it out, I will give him the best estimate that I can.
My general point is no more than this: if Government Departments had to pay for these things, economy in their use would be better ensured. The call on manpower and the time of the Post Office would be less for these particular things, and the right hon. Gentleman could turn the energies of his Department into more lucrative and remunerative channels of operation.
My next point is that the present method of estimating the size of the Government's bills, if it is accurate enough for the printed Estimates, is surely nearly accurate enough for the Department concerned to pay this bill in cash. Either the estimate given in Appendix F is well-nigh a guess, which I cannot believe, knowing the Post Office as I do, or the method of estimating the charges


involved is sufficiently accurate for the estimate to be presented to Parliament as the best estimate the Post Office can give. I cannot believe that, as people are employed now in making that estimate, further steps to make the Government pay their proper bills would call for much more labour.
My last point is this. The right hon. Gentleman and the Committee are familiar with the proposals of the Bridge-man Committee. Roughly, these were that the Post Office should pay the Treasury a fixed sum every year, and that the balance of its surplus should be put into a fund called the Post Office Fund and applied by the Post Office in improving the services to the public or lowering the rates to the public, or both.
That system was unfortunately abandoned in, I think, 1940 until such time as Parliament should determine that it should be restored. Every well-wisher of the Post Office believes that this is the best system to which to return, and it is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Certainly one should work towards it, and the first step in that direction, in my judgment, is to make the Government Departments pay their proper postal charges. That is a strong argument which reinforces what I have said. What I am asking for is that Government Departments should bear their costs on their own Votes. They should get them defrayed from general taxation and should not ride on the backs of the consumers of the postal services, as has been the case hitherto.

Mr. Douglas Houghton: Would the right hon. Gentleman state the amount which was payable by the Post Office to the Treasury under the recommendations of the Bridgeman Committee; and would he agree that that amount, whatever it is, was a form of taxation on the Post Office user and a contribution towards general revenue?

Mr. Morrison: I think that for one year it was £10 million and another year £7,500,000. I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman, for he enables me to make my point a little clearer. There is nothing wrong in the Post Office being a revenue Department and making a suitable contribution to the revenue, provided it is stated openly in the Budget and approved in the House, but it is a very different

thing to get concealed taxation by raising charges, as I argue unnecessarily, in order to swell the receipts which go to the Exchequer.
After all, the Post Office is, I think, the oldest and most respectable of Government monopolies. Certainly we have seen in recent years a rise of other Government monopolies, over whose finances we have less control than we have over those of the Post Office. There is an ever-present danger—and I think this is my answer to the Hon. Gentleman—that these monopolies may be thwarted from their primary purpose and become engines of concealed taxation. That is what this Committee should always be vigilant against. The consumers are quite powerless in the grasp of a monopoly.
I have spoken rather longer than I meant to do, but I had a number of interjections to reply to. I have not had any time to comment on the Post Office services and to refer to the many complaints which reach one's ears about the services being bad or worse than they used to be. No doubt other hon. Members will deal with that aspect of the subject. I say that these charges are taxation, and that in putting the right hon. Gentleman forward to make these proposals and then to defend them tonight, there is an element of concealment about this method of raising revenue which I deplore. Therefore, I hope we shall hear from him how it is that he is defending this taxation, and why it was that it was not included in the Budget statement.

8.8 p.m.

Mr. Harry Wallace: I hope the right hon Gentleman the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. W. S. Morrison) will forgive me if I do not attempt to deal with all the points he made. He has probably gathered that there are one or two points I want to raise. He has, however, raised an issue which seems to me very important, that the Post Office should be a source of revenue for the Chancellor and the Treasury. My mind turns the other way—namely, that the Post Office services should not be a medium of taxation. The Post Office should have more freedom, and the Postmaster-General more control over the finances and the services.
As the right hon. Gentleman said, considerable surpluses have been handed back by the Post Office to the Treasury. Indeed the figure is astronomical if one takes it for the last 20 or 30 years. Suppose I say that it was nearly £200 million, what could the Post Office have done if it had had control of that sum to develop its services, to revise prices to the consumer, and not to reduce taxes? I agree with the right hon. Member—and I do not think my right hon. Friend will disagree—that the sooner that position is examined and cleared up, the better.
The right hon. Member spoke about the 1908 Act and constitutional indecency. He will know that the Constitution of this country is amended and adapted in the light of present-day needs. There is nothing, therefore, in this point which he made. He went on to talk about monopoly. I gathered from his remarks about the Post Office Fund that he thought it was right, as has been suggested, that the higher charges of the Post Office include a kind of royalty paid by the consumer to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the use of the Post Office services. That is an interesting speculation. I am tempted to think that if the monopoly of the Post Office should pay a rent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this would be a good doctrine to apply also to private monopolies—the Imperial Tobacco Company—and others, for example. It would provide a source of revenue if each one had to make a payment to the community for the right to exercise a monopoly. I do not advocate this proposal, but merely say that it is well worth examination.

Mr. Jennings: The Government take the lot already.

Mr. Wallace: The hon. Member should make up his mind which way he wants it. I am not sure whether he prefers to pay it in the form of Income Tax or to have the Post Office charges put up and then to take it back as surpluses.

Mr. Jennings: I have no option. It is drawn from me.

Mr. Wallace: Look at all the services which the hon. Member has in return for what has been drawn from him, including

the men who fought for him from 1939 to 1945.

Mr. Jennings: I fought for myself.

Mr. Wallace: I say no more about that.
I come now to my next point. I understand that my right hon. Friend finds that his costs are going up and that on several of his services he must increase the charges. What else can he do? The only other thing is for him to go to the Chancellor of the Exchequer with a request to put up the taxes and then to lower the Post Office charges, and then to give it a subsidy because its charges will not cover its costs. That is not an arrangement which the public would like.
The right hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury spoke about the printed matter rate, which has been raised from 1d. to 1½d. He will agree that the general price level has altered considerably since 1939.

Mr. Nabarro: And since 1840.

Mr. Wallace: And since 1840. The right hon. Gentleman wishes to keep the 1840 price in 1951.

The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Hobson): And the wages.

Mr. Wallace: Yes, and I will come to that. But does the right hon. Member imagine that a charge of 1½d. will cover the cost of dealing with this particular traffic? If not, why should not a charge be made which would, in fact, cover it? Apparently, when the Post Office puts up its prices to meet increasing costs, it is wrong. The right hon. Member referred to a firm in Wembley whose postage bill would increase and who thought it was scandalous that Post Office prices should go up. I do not know what profits that concern is making, or whether these, too, are scandalous.

Mr. Collick: It would be a good profit, because they are chemists.

Mr. Wallace: The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out the other day that profits were increasing and were taking a larger part of the nation's income. I am not unduly worried, however, by a case of the kind mentioned by the right hon. Member unless I know all the facts.
I understand that the cost of submarine cable—my right hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong—has gone up by something like 500 per cent. That is wicked—

Mr. Collick: Is that monopoly?

Mr. Nabarro: Devaluation, not monopoly.

Mr. Wallace: Telephone cable has risen by 260 per cent., telephone apparatus by 140 per cent., and exchange equipment by 125 per cent. The cost of the conveyance of mails has gone up, I think, by something like £6 million since 1946.

Mr. Nabarro: I am following the hon. Member's argument with the closest attention. The percentages he is quoting of the increases in the cost of various equipment are valueless unless he tells the House on what year they are based. Is it 1939 or 1920?

Mr. Wallace: If I were to tell the hon. Member that he now pays £2 for something for which formerly he paid £1, he would understand what I was saying.

Mr. Nabarro: What is the year on which the figures are based?

Mr. Wallace: 1939.

Mr. Nabarro: The hon. Member did not say that.

Mr. Follicle: We all understood that.

Mr. Nabarro: It might have been 1840.

Mr. Wallace: It is not 1840. The charge for air transport—I have given the date for that, 1946—has been increased by £1 million. Hon. Members have advocated that the subsidy by the Post Office to the air mail service should be increased.

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: The hon. Member talks about a subsidy, but in fact the Postmaster-General is paying to our air corporations between three and four gold francs per ton kilometre when his own representative at the Cairo conference recommended that five gold francs was a proper rate. Therefore, where is the subsidy?

Mr. Wallace: I did not say a subsidy. I said that I had heard hon. Members advocating higher prices, which would in

effect be a subsidy to the air mail services. There might be a case for that, but those same hon. Members should not criticise the Post Office the next week if its charges for transport had been increased. It is a question of whether the Post Office or the Chancellor of the Exchequer should pay.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I also am trying to follow the hon. Member's argument. Is he arguing that the Post Office is paying too much or too little—an unfair charge or a proper charge—for that air transport?

Mr. Wallace: I am merely arguing that the Post Office has to pay; and if it has to pay, it has to find the money from somewhere. It would be most interesting if my right hon. Friend could give the Committee the cost, for instance, of building and equipping a telephone exchange today as compared with 1939.
I turn now to the question of wages. According to the report of the Select Committee, the Post Office staff has been reduced in number, yet their output is higher. There is before the Postmaster-General a claim for an increase of wages. An offer has been made—

Mr. Ness Edwards: Oh!

Mr. Jennings: Does the Minister not know about it?

Mr. Wallace: An offer has been made. In case my right hon. Friend does not know, I say that it is an increase of 4s. a week, but it is regarded as quite inadequate. I would point out to the Committee that the overall average of wages in the Post Office, of all staffs, is 110s. a week—£5 10s.—and that is pretty low.

Mr. Collick: Basic rate, or earnings?

Mr. Wallace: Not earnings, the wage, and the average for some of the classes is 93s. These figures are not exceptional.
To give another example, the maximum of a postal and telegraph officer in London in 1939 was 108s., and in 1951, 164s., an increase of 52 per cent. So I could go through 52 per cent., 64 per cent., 70 per cent., 57 per cent., 87 per cent., 95 per cent. and in one case 64 per cent., 61 per cent. and so on. I am bound to tell the Committee that that figure, which I think


was a mistake, caused considerable feeling. In the Post Office, as in many branches of the Civil Service, we have long incremental scales. It may be that an officer will be 31, 32, or even 34 years of age before he gets to his maximum. I have heard this arrangement condemned many times. Cannot something be done to put an end to it? I regard it as scandalous that we should have this arrangement.
The rate of pay at 21 years of age is below £5 a week and I could go through all the different scales and give rates of 97s., 94s., 99s. for the higher paid grades, 88s., 83s., 96s. and 81s. for the lower, and here in London, even, at the maximum, 103s. The long incremental scale and the rate at 21 years of age are out-of-date in times like these. We say that youth reaches manhood at 21. When does he get a man's wage? When he is 30? When is he expected to take on manhood's responsibilities? Consider today the difficulty of young people who have to face the problem of establishing a home, with prices what they are, on a wage of less than £5 a week.

Mr. Jennings: I do not want to interrupt him unduly, but would not the hon. Member agree that the cost of living and the policy of this Government that have had the adverse effect on these wages?

Mr. Follick: Nonsense.

Mr. Wallace: That is a fair question and I do not mind it being asked. I do not see what this Government could do to control the price of wool, or cotton. They seem to have great difficulty in controlling the price of meat in the Argentine and in Australia. Let us be honest about this. If the party opposite were in control, they could not stop these prices going up. I agree that some of them sincerely believe they could do better, but I do not believe they would. We know what happened to prices from 1918 to 1939. I know what the party opposite did to wages in the Civil Service, how they steadily reduced them until two-thirds of a man's wage went in rent and the only luxury many of those families got was a piece of bacon on a Sunday.

Mr. Jennings: The hon. Member's party have been in power for the last five or six years. Why do they not remedy these things?

Mr. Wallace: There is one big remedy we have brought about—full employment.
I have referred to the long incremental scales and the low rates at 21 years of age, and I want to ask my right hon. Friend if he does not find the number of resignations occurring in 1948, 1949 and 1950 extraordinary. I know the Manchester Post Office and if I had heard that in those three years there have been 855 resignations I would have been appalled.
The House was surprised when these charges were announced. I want to suggest to my right hon. Friend what I have advocated on a number of occasions. Is it not time that the Post Office put out a yearly report, like the other nationalised undertakings? There is a commercial account I know, but I am asking for the restoration of the old report we used to have from the Post Office.

Mr. Ness Edwards: It may have escaped the notice of my hon. Friend, but the report was published two months ago.

Mr. Wallace: I am bound to confess that it had escaped my knowledge. I am glad it has been restored. I think a day could be set aside for the discussion of that report. Unless the Opposition ask for time to discuss it, as they have asked for this debate, there is no opportunity of discussing the report. There should be such an opportunity; a day should be set aside for the discussion of that report. That ought to be an accepted arrangement.
Those are the two points that I wish to urge. Above all, I say to my right hon. Friend that he is faced with—I do not wish to exaggerate—rather serious discontent in the. Post Office. I hope that he will be able to make an improvement on the offer which has been made. I think that part of the discontent is due to the fact that although the claim was presented in December, it was only the other day that the union received an answer, and that really is too long a period to elapse before getting not a settlement but an answer to a claim.
In the circumstances I feel that my right hon. Friend can do no other than increase these charges, but I hope that further consideration will be given to the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman opposite about the relation between the Post-


master-General and the Treasury or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Postmaster-General and the Post Office should have more freedom, more power and more control over Post Office finances and surpluses. I should prefer to see the surpluses being worked back into the services and the services being made cheaper to the consumer. I do not think that the Post Office should be used as a medium of taxation. Had that not been the case down the years, matters would have been very different. In particular the arrangements in relation to wages in the Post Office would have been up to date instead of being so much out of date as they are at present. In all industry a man of 21 to 25 years of age gets his rate for the job, but not in the Post Office until he is 27 to 32 years old.
My right hon. Friend should devote his attention to the problems which arise in this connection. There is the classification of offices, the differential between the provinces and London. Can my right hon. Friend not do something to see that an attack is made on these long incremental scales? After all, if £1 million or £2 million can be set aside for investment to improve the service in one direction or another, why cannot something be done to tackle these long incremental scales? Something should also be done to advance towards meeting the claim of the women to equal pay for equal work. I do not say that that claim can be wholly met at once; it may take a period. If the Post Office would only tell the staff, "We agree in principle, we will begin to attack these 30-and 40-year old problems—classification, long incremental scales, equal pay for equal work," output and efficiency would be improved because something which matters very much in industry would be obtained—the good will of the organised workers. In the circumstances I shall support my right hon. Friend, because I do not think that he could do anything else than increase these charges.

8.34 p.m.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I find myself in considerable agreement with the latter part of what the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. Wallace) has been saying. It is a very fair criticism of the way in which Post Office affairs are now run that the surpluses which the

Post Office may make from time to time are absorbed into the Treasury and that when the Post Office requires money it cannot get that money back again.
My right hon. Friend who opened the debate stressed that there should be a line of demarcation—whether the Post Office is to have control of its own finances, in which case it should make these pronouncements, as the right hon. Gentleman did the other day, or whether it should be under the Treasury, in which case these pronouncements would be made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as they have been in the past. At the present time we do not know where we are and the situation is one of confusion. The Postmaster-General himself has difficulty in explaining to the Committee the incidence of the accounts. I do not say that the right hon. Gentleman has difficulty in understanding the accounts. I say he has difficulty in explaining them to the Committee.
There is one question which the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East, posed at the beginning of his speech which I would like to follow up. What can the Postmaster do regarding these losses? They have been referred to before—certain telephone accounts, telegraphic accounts and certain accounts of postage, particularly with regard to the remaining 1d. postage, the printed rate. The Postmaster-General can do one of two things, and I am answering the hon. Member who asked the question. He can carry them as a loss and set them off against the profits which he makes on other accounts, such as the 2½d. post; or else he can raise the price of the services which are not profitable so as to make them break even. If he does that he must also reduce the price of the services which are at present giving him a profit and upon which he is carrying the services which are running at a loss. He cannot have it both ways—[Interruption.]—I did not catch what the right hon. Gentleman said.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I was trying to inform the hon. Gentleman that one cannot split halfpennies.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: Certainly I have never tried to split halfpennies, but I dare say that the right hon. Gentleman could toss for them. We are dealing with millions of pounds and we could perfectly well make an adjustment which would


cover the situation as I have put it. My point is that he cannot get his profit on one side of the accounts while he is using the argument that he has to raise prices on other accounts which are showing a loss. He must not act as a tax gatherer but as a commercial undertaking.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I could do that if I charged 1¼d. for inland letters and 2¼d. for the ordinary letter. Will the hon. Member tell us how that can be done?

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I have not the slightest desire to tell the right hon. Gentleman anything, or to teach him his job. I suggest it is for him to find the way. I am merely advocating certain sound principles of business. The right hon. Gentleman is in charge of one of the biggest business organisations in the country. I have not the slightest hesitation in expressing the view that he has any number of exceedingly competent and able people in his Department who could solve even problems such as that.
What is to be the effect of these increases in prices? We have been told by both the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and his predecessors that the basic principle of taxation is, generally speaking, to hit the luxury type of expenditure and not to increase the necessary costs of living. The charges which the right hon. Gentleman is making by the increases he is putting on the postal service appear to be absolutely contrary to that principle. I quite agree that there are liable to be telephone abusers rather than telephone users—people who run up colossal and unnecessary amounts over telephones. But it is not those people whom the right hon. Gentleman is hitting. He is hitting the people who use the telephones in the public boxes.
I suggest that he could avoid increasing the price by a very little technical ingenuity. I am no technician, and I have not the faintest idea how it is to be done, but I am certain that it is not beyond the wit of the telephone engineers to achieve. The idea is to put into the apparatus a time-operating lever which will allow a two-minute or, if preferred, a three-minute call and no more. I commend that suggestion to the right hon. Gentleman.
The other evening I was at Sloane Square standing in the queue outside the

one telephone box there. There was a good lady in that box who stayed there for 20 minutes. During that time no fewer than eight people came and stood in the queue, and then went away in despair. Presumably, the right hon. Gentleman got 2d. out of the lady in the box. Even on his increased charge he would get only 3d. How much did he lose from the people who were frustrated and went away? If a time signal were fitted to limit the call, as it is with a toll call operated from an exchange, or if a time machine were installed to cut the connection on a local call after two minutes, then the person would have to start again. If the lady wanted another call she would have to check her pennies. Probably by then she would have run out of pennies, and would have to leave the box to get more. That would give somebody else a chance, including the right hon. Gentleman, who would get more money.
Generally speaking the type of person who will suffer as a result of the increased charges is not the telephone abuser—

Mr. Ian L. Orr-Ewing: Does my hon. Friend suggest also that there should be a limit on the length of the call made by the private subscriber? Might not the argument apply in the same way if 10 different people wanted to make a connection to one number, when that number was engaged because one subscriber was talking for 20 minutes?

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I do not think that that argument would commend itself to the Postmaster-General, because that would result in a limitation of the number of lines to that number Now, when one gets a blockage on the line, the Postmaster-General comes along and says, "Will you please enlarge your private exchange, increase your number of lines, and then I can take an additional rental from you?" In any event, my technical knowledge, being exceedingly limited, does not enable me to follow my hon. Friend in a design for an instrument which would achieve the object he has in mind.

Mr. Collick: May I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to the fact that there was a written answer in the OFFICIAL REPORT yesterday in reply to


the very question which the hon. Gentleman has now posed? I wonder if he has seen it.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I am grateful to the hon. Member. I have not seen it. I hope that the answer is satisfactory.

Mr. Harrison: Will the hon. Gentleman forgive me for a moment? The answer was given to me.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I cannot help that.

Mr. Harrison: I was about to inform the hon. Gentleman that the answer was most unsatisfactory. I wonder whether his experience is the same as mine. The Minister suggested to me, in that answer, that the abuser of the service is a very rare bird, but it has been my experience that the abuser—the person who takes 20 minutes on a 2d. call—is common, not only in call box but on private lines.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I am glad to have support for my idea which I had hoped was an original one. I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will pursue their line of thought and see that, sooner or later, the Postmaster-General adopts it.
The increases on the printed paper rates are charges which will hit commercial people. Who is going to send out matter under the printed paper rate for fun, or for anything except necessary commercial use with a view to increasing, enlarging and getting business? The increase will also hit the commercial user who sends out bills and receipts. It is a charge which is deliberately calculated to increase the cost of business, and so, again, I think the increased cost of telegrams is a matter for the greatest regret. Telegrams are generally the resort for swift communication of the poorest people. I do not say that business houses and better off people do not also use them; I am not saying that it is exclusively so, but the poorest people who have to communicate swiftly generally do so by telegram.

Mr. Hobson: On a point of order. In view of the fact that the telegrams increase involves legislation, is it strictly in order to develop that argument?

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: This is not a debate on the Motion for the Adjournment.

The Deputy-Chairman: To suggest legislation is out of order in Committee of Supply.

Mr. Joynson-Hicks: I see the point, Sir Charles, and I had not intended to drift out of order. The point which was in my mind has been adequately cleared up.
The increased charges which the Postmaster-General is introducing are charges which are deliberately calculated to increase the cost of business, and I therefore return to the fundamental point that the right hon. Gentleman should either run this show as a business proposition or else as a Government Department. If it is the latter, he must admit that charges of that nature are increases in taxation, and, if he seeks to increase taxation in this way, then it is a matter which should be done openly through the Treasury.
If, on the other hand, he claims that his is a business Department, and these are business necessities, how is it that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is telling us on every possible occasion that private enterprise and business companies are making too great profits and that their profits are increasing time after time and year after year, so that he is justified in putting increased taxation upon them? When the Chancellor says that about private enterprise business why is it that the Post Office, which is the biggest business of all and is protected by monopoly, has to come here to this House and say that it cannot make a profit? The right hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways. If his Department is a business house, let him put his house in order, and let him raise the surplus which he estimates he will have and not come to this Committee and seek increased charges against the community or ask us to give him an additional surplus over and above anything that he requires for commercial use.

8.48 p.m.

Mr. James Johnson: I hope that the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his entertaining experiences in watching ladies in telephone kiosks. May I go back to the beginning of this debate and deal with the charges upon the Post Office? At the beginning of the debate, we had views exchanged between the Postmaster-General and one of his predecessors, but I will not go into that. In that context I want to begin by quoting what the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams), said on 4th


April. I always listen to the hon. Gentleman with edification, and I did so upon this occasion, because, in regard to this question of income or lack of income of the Post Office, he said:
Is it not a fact that over the last five years there has been a very substantial deficit on cash transactions, and that the Treasury has had to supply the right hon. Gentleman and his predecessors with nearly £40 million out of taxation?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th April, 1951; Vol. 486, c. 211.]
That is the position as it is, and I rise to make a comment on the situation as I see it. If I were the Postmaster-General, I would look into the matter, see where I was losing money and whether I would have to charge increases to make up for the lack of income. The Postmaster-General would have to review those quarters making a loss. I always think that the term "making a loss" is something rather funny. I can understand one suffering a loss, but to make something seems to me to add it to what one already has.
I understand that the Post Office is losing something like £2,250,000 on local telephone calls. But when I was at school some 25 years ago, if I went into a telephone kiosk it cost me 2d. to make a call even in those days. It still costs 2d. today, despite the increased cost of overheads, material, labour, and the like. Again, perhaps the Minister can tell us how much his Department is losing, for example, on the parcels post. There has been some comment this evening from hon. Members opposite about charging 1½d. instead of 1d. for the inland printed paper rate. I understand that, here again, the estimated loss is in the vicinity of some £4 million.
To me as a taxpayer it seems hardly fair that one should ask old age pensioners, or, for that matter, anyone else with a small income, to pay 2½d. on a letter in order to subsidise business and commercial houses in this way. I know that the Government subsidise agriculture, and I am not complaining about that. Indeed, other Governments in the past have subsidised the railways to the extent of something like £50 million, and also such industrial activities as clock making. At the same time, I think it hardly fair that the Post Office should be asked to subsidise business and commerce in this fashion.
I am also told that the Post Office is losing something like £90,000 a year on the C.O.D. arrangement, which, according to my arithmetic, works out at about 6½d. a parcel. Does the Committee believe that business and commerce should be bolstered up in this particular way?

Mr. Collick: Is my hon. Friend disputing the fact that at the moment, taking all the Post Office services together, it is not, in fact, running at a loss?

Mr. Johnson: At the beginning of my remarks, I pointed out that it had been stated that within the last few years the Government had paid out something like £40 million on behalf of the Post Office.

Mr. R. V. Grimston: Is not that after Government Departments have received their services free?

Mr. Johnson: That is quite correct. To put myself in his place, if the Postmaster-General is living in that particular financial climate—

Mr. Ross: The Post Office gets this cash from the Treasury, but it also gets a credit from the Treasury for money due to it from Government Departments.

Mr. Johnson: I am being shot at even on my own flank. As a poor taxpayer—and I emphasise the word "poor"—I ask myself, what cost has the Postmaster-General to meet? The hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. H. Wallace), mentioned the enormously increased cost of submarine cables which are up 500 per cent., and telephone apparatus. That has gone up by something like 125 per cent. Of course, one could quote statistics ad lib. in this matter. Cables are up 200 per cent. and kiosk and house installations are up 140 per cent. Again, I have been looking up the figures concerning contracts for the conveyance of parcels. In 1928, it cost the Post Office something like £6 million in contracts to convey their parcels, and I am told that this year it is something over £17 million.
Now these are the harsh economic facts. The Postmaster-General has to face his financial commitments and to cover them in some way. He has to be prudent. He has to have a financial policy to make ends meet. If this were not a State or


government monopoly, what would private enterprise do. In the United States of America the cost of telephone calls has gone up to 8d. We have been told that wage claims are pending. Obviously, these claims must be in the Postmaster-General's mind at the moment. It would be interesting to know to what the proposed claims in the negotiations between the Union of Post Office Workers and the Postmaster-General amount. It would help us greatly to get the whole thing into perspective.
I attended recently a meeting of Post Office workers in the Midlands and I can echo what has been said here about their wages. I was amazed at their wage rates. They are pitiful. We used to be told that the Post Office made a lot of money. In the past, as a Socialist politician, or an alleged Socialist politician, I have said on the platforms that the Post Office made £11 million, £12 million, £13 million profit, and so on. I was always challenged with the words, "Why do you not as a Government pay better wages for workers in that industry?"
In this debate I heard talk of cash accounts, commercial accounts and the like. I am told that many of these figures in the accounts are "notional" figures. The word "notion" intrigued me. To my mind it implied an idea, and therefore notional figures were idealist figures. I look up the dictionary and I find that the word "idealist" does not fit in at all. So I suggest that the word should be "fictitious." To me these figures in the commercial and cash accounts are purely imaginary and fictitious.
These twin systems of finance seem quite incomprehensible and completely contradictory and superficial. I echo what has been said earlier—that Government Departments should pay for work done for them. Now that I have discovered what the accounts are and how they are arrived at—I find that commercial accounts have a surplus of £8 million and that the cash accounts have a deficit of £8 million—it does not make sense. No business house would tolerate it for one moment.
Let us correct these Estimates, and let us have a large comprehensive annual report as we have in the case of the coal industry or any other modern nationalised

industry. Then let us debate that report in the House. Unlike the case with the National Coal Board, we might get more intimate contact with the Post Office, which has more public accountability than some of these large octopi—I will not say monsters—we have about us in our modern State. By all means, let us give the Postmaster-General more power in his own house.
The present system is misleading, not to say bogus. The public are given a certain impression—that the Post Office makes £x million. The workers also get that impression and they make demands, in good faith. These increased charges came as a shock to me and to the taxpayer, but as things are, I support them. I can see no alternative while the present state of affairs continues; and therefore I support the charges under the present system, and support the Postmaster-General in his action.

9.1 p.m.

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: I find myself very largely in agreement with the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), and until his penultimate sentence I thought I should find myself in the same Lobby, if a Division occurred, for he seemed to be totally in agreement with the remarks made by my right hon. Friend in his speech opening the debate.
The gravamen of my charge is this. What has the Postmaster-General done in order to get the Departments to pay for the services, telephone and telegraph, which he supplies? After all, these services were paid for in very serious times: they were paid for in 1940 and in 1941 and in 1942, and the moratorium was not declared until 1943. I imagined, in my mind that before he came to make his very unpleasant pre-view Budget to the House, he would have been rushing round to the Ministers and saying to them, "You must pay me for the services I have provided." I imagined him, with all the Welsh zest we see on the rugby field, charging to the Ministries, perhaps offering a few resignations—which was so much in the fashion at the time—unless he got what he wanted.
I must confess that it was with some surprise that I found him on the wrong side of the fence. Apparently he does not argue that he should be paid for these services, for he seems to be convinced that


the staff needed would be unnecessarily large. The figures ran away with him a little because he first said that the number needed would be 2,000, whereas he subsequently divided that by 20 and said the number would be 100. If 100 extra people are needed to collect this £12 million, so as not to throw an unnecessary burden unfairly on the public, surely that is a worthwhile effort.
I should have thought, too, that he would have taken some notice of the Report of the Select Committee on Estimates who strongly recommended that this action should be taken when the manpower was available. We find the Postmaster-General now compelled, not to use white-collared clerical assistants to settle this account, but to send telephone engineers round to 55,000 telephone boxes to make adjustments at each one of those boxes in order that 3d. may buy what 2d. used to buy. That is a very poor exchange at a time when the technical manpower of the country, and particularly of his Department, is so badly needed: instead of using clerical assistants he is using technical manpower.
The Postmaster-General is not only short of cash but is also woefully short of material. We know about the shortages. Those of us who no doubt have a large constituency correspondence complaining about it know of many cases where people have been in a queue for a private telephone for a very long time and where they still cannot get a telephone. We know the right hon. Gentleman is short of cable, which is very expensive with the present high price of raw material and which will be even more expensive in the future. We know he is short of exchange equipment and of the buildings to house it. Surely, in those circumstances, he had a moral obligation to demand of the various Ministries using his services that they should pay for them, because by making that demand he would have induced them to economise to a very much greater extent than at the moment.
The Comptroller and Auditor-General's Report, 1948–49, states that when this system of cash payments was introduced in 1923 there was a marked drop in the services as applied to the Ministries. Like other hon. Members, I have been studying Appendix F of these Estimates. It really

makes most alarming reading. It is difficult to select any Ministry which has not expanded its needs since 1938 or 1939, but I select the Home Office because I think it is probably representative, and is a Ministry which has not very great additional responsibilities, because even at that time it had to look after air-raid precautions, which were included in the Estimates. Its Estimate for 1939 was £11,000. Its requirements for telephone and telegraph services today amount to £161,600. Surely we must encourage more efficient use of the telephone lines and the telephone equipment throughout Government Departments if we are to make sense of these accounts.

Mr. Collick: That clearly would not be a fair comparison. I do not know what the exact circumstances are, but I cannot imagine that that would be a fair comparison. It is a notional figure.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: Well, we are asked to look at that figure, and I think we must accept it. I found it in the Library. It is an Estimate of a Government Department. However, if we compare the Estimates of other Departments we find the same marked increase. I agree that the value of money has changed. One should perhaps double the figure, and make it £22,000 in 1939: but it is still £161,000 today.
The largest of these figures are those of the Service Ministries. Perhaps the Minister of Defence is exhausted after his day's efforts, I thought he might be here, because if we were to get this cash from the Service Departments for these services, it would make a difference of £8 million—a matter of very great moment. I cannot help wondering whether the strictest economy is being exercised in the Service Departments. No one would deny the Service Departments the communications facilities they need for the defence of the country, but I cannot help wondering whether the strictest economy is used.
I have some memories of the war, and some memories of teleprinter and tie lines between A and B and B and C and C and D. Is operational research checking the volume of traffic on the various Service lines? I remember checks being taken in the war and finding the most fantastic messages being made. When one


came to analyse them one found they were dates for lunch, dates for golf, dates for the cinema, and these were just dates—all being made on the Service tie lines. I cannot help wondering whether today the same tendency still exists, and if it does exist, then that is one of the reasons why we are asked to make these increased charges which fall upon the public.
I also wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has looked at the revenue-earning hours of his long-distance circuits. In many cases, these radio telephone circuits are open only two to three hours a day. What percentage of that time is earning revenue, and what percentage is being taken up by Government Departments for messages for which the right hon. Gentleman receives no cash payments? That is another point I think we should examine, because all sorts of revenue-earning messages are being pushed back or being denied—messages for the Press, for example, and other messages on urgent business matters. Government Departments must use those same long-distance circuits as well, and I should like to know, if the right hon. Gentleman has those figures, exactly what percentage of our long-distance circuits time is now earning revenue.
I wonder, too, whether as a measure of economy he could not introduce the pip system, not only on Government telephones but also on Service telephones; then as the pips sounded people would be more aware that their taxes were running down the telephone line, and perhaps they would shorten their conversation by summarising the points they wanted to cover before making the call.
It is surely unfair that, because the right hon. Gentleman has not convinced his colleagues that they must pay for the services they get, certain sections of the population have got to bear these increased charges. I so much agree with so many hon. Members on both sides of the Committee who say that it seems most unfair that the poorer sections, who rely so much on the telephone box, who have in many instances to queue for hours in order to get into these rather rare telephone boxes—

Mr. Hobson: Mr. Hobson indicated dissent.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: The hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but I will quote him chapter and verse.

Mr. Hobson: The hon. Gentleman says that people have to queue for hours, and I say that is an absurdity.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: I wish it were an absurdity. I can quote him a case.

Mr. Hobson: Where?

Mr. Orr-Ewing: At a Burnt Oak housing estate until very recently, within the last six months, when the cable has been put in, there have been queues outside telephone boxes, and people have complained in writing—I have not checked it, but I must accept their word—that very often at peak periods they queue up to an hour or more before they can telephone.

Mr. Hobson: Nonsense.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: The hon. Gentleman may say "Nonsense." He is refuting the statements of my constituents, and, while I do not want to insult the hon. Gentleman, I prefer to trust those people who have elected me. Is it not unfair that these people should be called upon to subsidise the increased Government Department expenditure?
The Postmaster-General has also had to make certain cuts in development and design work which is going on at Dollis Hill and other places. He told me that the weather service which he had hoped to introduce is now in abeyance. Surely this is the last moment when we as a nation should cut research and development on telephone services. Cable, with its large lead content, with the large amount of copper which it uses, will become rarer and ever more expensive. We must investigate and develop every possible method of carrying more circuits on the existing cable, and I would say that this is a very bad moment for this measure, and a moment we would not have to face if the right hon. Gentleman had collected the cash from the Government Departments.
With this extra £12 million he would be able—and here I sympathise with what was said by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. H. Wallace)—to pay a higher rate to the staff. It is particularly necessary for the engineering staff, for which I have a soft spot, because if they are not paid more highly and given greater increments they will be tempted out of the Post Office and into industry, which is clamouring for their


services, and we cannot afford to lose these men with their training.
At the same time, the right hon. Gentleman would be able to carry on this telephone service and to pay our national Air Corporations a fair price for the mail they carry. I have heard him argue that he is paying a fair price, but in answering a Parliamentary Question he has said that he is paying between 3.13 and 4.17 gold francs per tonne kilometer. In answer to another Parliamentary Question he told us that his representatives went to the Cairo conference and advocated that the international rate should be lowered from six gold francs to five gold francs. If they advocated a rate of five gold francs there, why is the right hon. Gentleman not paying these Corporations that rate? Why is it cut to three or four gold francs? It seems to me most unfair and, if I may say so, hanky-panky, to exploit—using a word which has been generally used over the last 20 years—the monopoly position which the right hon. Gentleman has to force on these Air Corporations a lower rate than the international rate. This makes their accounts look wrong, because they merit a much greater price and should receive between £1 million and £2 million extra from this higher rate.
I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to press for the various Government Departments to pay for the services which they are getting. I hope that he will tell us that he is going to reinstate the system that existed before 1943, because only if that system is reinstated will he be able to pay fair rates to the Post Office personnel, fair rates to the State Corporations and charge fair rates to the public for the services which it requires.

9.16 p.m.

Mr. William Ross: I heartily agree with the remarks of the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) in reference to research. I think that it is rather foolish at this stage that the Post Office should cut down on research, and I say unhesitatingly that, considering the work that has been done and the amount of money that has been, and is being, saved annually for the country by Post Office engineering research that has been done in the past, and in view of the position that is arising

now, it would be a waste rather than a saving of money to cut down on research.
That is about the only thing on which I can agree with the hon. Gentleman. The theme of his speech and of many other speeches has been that if only the Government Departments would pay their £12 million, this question would not arise at all. The position of the Post Office is that it is a revenue Department. All the revenue that is taken in over Post Office counters throughout the country goes into the Treasury, and all the payments of the Post Office go out from the Treasury.
Does it matter at all whether we actually pay into the Treasury in cash or whether what is owed by Government Departments is credited in the Treasury? I know that it is confusing to have two different types of accounts. If the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Gentlemen who have been confusing themselves and the country on this point would read the Fourth Report of the Select Committee on Estimates, on which I served, they would see that we were purely concerned with the strictly accounting aspects of this matter, and went on further to examine this matter purely and simply from the point of view of whether the use by Government Departments of telephone services, etc., was unreasonably high and caused inconvenience to the public.
The point is this. Supposing that we employed these extra 70 people in the Post Office to send out quarterly or half-yearly accounts and other people in the Government Departments to check that there was no abuse of these services, it would mean, if it were successful, that the Government Departments would use less services and pay less, and less would be credited to them. The surplus would go down. I do not say that that would not be a good thing, but that would be the effect in the light of what we are discussing tonight.

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that if they paid cash for the services, the commercial account, which I think was rightly called the paper or fictitious account, and the cash account would more nearly balance? The difference betwen the two accounts is that between £12 million and £22 million. The services to Government Departments are not paid for.

Mr. Ross: The commercial account shows the credit of the Post Office.

Mr. H. Wallace: On page 84 of the Fourth Report of the Select Committee on Estimates, it is stated:
If the Post Office were to say to the Treasury. 'We wish to use up this surplus'"—
that is referring to what they were getting from cash payments—
'by buying more cables and more telephone equipment, in order to give a better service to the public,' what sort of reply would be received from the Treasury?—I imagine that would very largely impinge on capital investment decisions which are taken by the Government. The amount of capital expenditure which the Post Office can make is determined annually, and they must make their purchases within that ceiling

Mr. Ross: That refers to capital expenditure. I wish that instead of referring to that question, Members would refer to the previous questions, because we have had this bleating from the Opposition about using the Post Office surplus to fortify the revenue. The fact is that during the years before the war and up to 1938–39 the Post Office was in duty bound to pay to the Treasury £10¾ million for revenue purposes. Members opposite did nothing about it then, and it was only stopped at the beginning of the war when the Post Office could not continue to do it.

Mr. Assheton: We entirely agree that the Post Office is a trading concern and as such, in making a profit should contribute to the Treasury in exactly the same way as commercial undertakings in making a profit have to pay a tax on their profits. That is the genesis of our argument.

Mr. Ross: That makes nonsense of all the arguments that Members opposite have been putting forward tonight. Members opposite have been speaking as if the Post Office were the only people to ask for increases. I am wondering where they have been during the past few months. The hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. Boothby) spoke of harrying the Government, and we have had Prayer after Prayer in connection with industry asking the President of the Board of Trade to allow them to raise their prices in order to make a profit. It is only when the Post Office do the same thing that Members opposite oppose it. They have not opposed one of these demands for an increase to allow an industry to make a profit.
The background to these increased charges is undoubtedly the cost of living and the increase in costs. The Post Office has not been Insulated from them. When the Committee went into this matter a year ago, the figure given was an increase of 140 per cent. compared with before the war. Reference has been made to wages. Not only have wages increased, but they will still further increase. We have also had an increase in the tax on petrol. The private hauliers immediately raised their prices for road transport. But this also affects the delivery vans of the Post Office.
Members opposite should get their heads out of the clouds or the sand, or wherever they hide themselves. The Post Office bulk-buy their equipment on a five-year contract, but there is a clause which allows contractors to raise their prices if wage rates change or the prices of raw materials go up. They have gone up, and I should like to know by how much. There can be no doubt about these increases in costs. The manufacturers are not subsidising the Post Office but are passing on their charges. It is now a question whether the Post Office should subsidise the manufacturers, which is what the Opposition would like them to do.
There are only three things that can be done. The first is to carry the loss and let the surplus disappear: the second is to effect economies to maintain what surplus there is, and the third is to raise the charges as suggested. To carry the loss may be a good argument from the Socialist point of view, although I do not think it would be logical for the Committee to do that, as it has refused to do it for the railways, which are more fundamental to the country today. When one considers what has happened to the railway men and how long they have had to wait, if people point to the fact that the Post Office is making a profit, I do not think that that suggestion would be attractive to the Post Office workers.
Secondly, the loss would be borne by the general body of taxpayers and not the sections of industry concerned, especially when we remember that those sections should carry that loss themselves. Such a step would be unjustifiable, as it would be giving a subsidy to users of the service, most of whom can well afford to.
carry the burden. Hon. Gentlemen opposite are not very keen on subsidies. The hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Sir W. Darling), is against all subsidies; he emphasised "all" by spelling out the letters in one debate recently. I am sure he would not be prepared to give a subsidy to industry or to any other section of the community.
When the Select Committee on Estimates considered the Post Office's affairs last year, concern was expressed about the amount that the Post Office was allowing for depreciation. It was pointed out then that whereas the depreciation allowances stood at £139 million, the cost of replacements at present-day charges was about £600 million. I am not sure whether those figures are quite accurate, but it is something like that. It was suggested that the Post Office should take far more out of the surplus and put it into depreciation allowances. During the next two years the Treasury will be allowing them to take 25 per cent. of their surplus.
If there is a problem about these depreciation allowances at the present time, and if we allow the surplus to disappear altogether, then the problem is going to be made all the more difficult, because the amount going for those depreciation allowances would just not be there. To let the loss slide and ignore it would be wrong because it would be illogical, it would be subsidising unjustifiably sections of the community at the expense of all, and it would create a problem over depreciation.
There is the question of economy. The Select Committee on Estimates exists for the purpose of effecting economies. Hon. Members should study the whole of the Select Committee's Report regarding the Post Office. They will see that the Committee were more concerned about getting the Post Office to spend more money on the telephone service than in showing them how to effect economies.
When one considers exactly what has been done, one cannot help feeling that these new charges are justified. There has been an increase in business in the Post Office. I know there has been an increase in staff compared with before the war, but let us remember that letters are up by 4 per cent., parcels 30 per cent.,

trunk calls 100 per cent., local calls 35 per cent., and so on. I do not think there is any justification for saying that large-scale economies can be made within the Post Office.
Lastly, I think we get to the point where we have to accept the position of increasing these charges, especially when one considers that such things as local calls escaped the increased telephone charge which was imposed on the private user. I do not think the Opposition will gain very much by parading themselves and pretending to defend the community against a rapacious Post Office or a rapacious Treasury. The actual fact is that when we consider what has been done, these increases are inevitable, much as we may regret them. We hope the Government will be able to stem the outside causes of re-armament, which have caused these increases as well as many others.

9.30 p.m.

Sir William Darling: It was interesting to hear this foreshortened lecture on simplified bookkeeping by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross), and the rest of his speech which he devoted to his own distinguished services on the Estimates Committee, but I should like for a few moments to draw attention to page 79, Appendix F, of the Estimates, which will show how well the hon. Member has done his duty to Scotland. Whatever other economies have been achieved elsewhere, Scotland certainly has its full share of them. It will be observed that although the Estimates for postal counter services are up for Scotland, England and Wales, certain items show the industry of the hon. Member for Kilmarnock.
The Scottish Record Office, for example, which had £170 spent upon its postal services in 1950–51, is down to £100 this year. The Scottish Home Department has managed to get £100 more, by an increase of from £3,200 to £3,300, but the Scottish Land Court, which spent £350 last year is, thanks to the effort of the hon. Member for Kilmarnock, cut down this year to £100. The Department of the Registers of Scotland spent £200 last year; the hon. Member for Kilmarnock says that they may spend the same this year. The National Galleries for Scotland, however,


on page 80 of the Estimate, are shown to have had £50 to spend upon postal services last year. This year, the Estimate is down to £45. In spite of all this, however, as will be seen from page 51, the total postal services for the country are up from £9 to £10 million. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock can at least claim that he has practised a severe economy upon his fellow countrymen.
On referring to the Estimates for the telegraph services we see the Scottish share of the burden which results from the industrious efforts of our parsimonious friend the hon. Member for Kilmarnock, who is the authority upon book-keeping. We learn that the Scottish Land Court, which spent £3 last year, is allowed to spend £20 this year, whilst the Scottish Home Department, which spent £20 during 1950–51, is to be allowed £304 during the coming year. Page 82 shows that in 1950–51, Public Education in Scotland spent nothing whatever upon telegraph services, but that this year—note this extravagance—we are to spend £2. Never was there a more patriotic and parsimonious Scotsman than the hon. Member for Kilmarnock. I draw attention to the fact that the total estimated expenditure on telegraph services is £245,000, yet these small cheeseparing cuts are imposed upon my unfortunate country.
The next item is that of telephone services. Page 83 shows that the Scottish Record Office, which spent £130 last year, is now permitted by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock to spend £190. The hon. Member recovered himself, however, because whereas the Scottish Land Court spent £130 last year, the hon. Member for Kilmarnock now says "You have been overdoing it, gentlemen. It is to be £70 this year." And so we run through this record of endeavours of the hon. Member, for which he claims every possible credit. One item which I criticise is that the National Library for Scotland, compared with the great expenditure which is allowed in England and Wales, following its extravagance last year in spending £50 on telephones, is now being cut down and allowed only £30. The Department for Health for Scotland spent £4,200 last year. This year the Estimate is £3,670. I need not continue further.
Is Scotland to suffer these continuous cuts at the hands of enterprising Scotsmen

who are anxious to ingratiate themselves with English Ministers? The hon. Member for Kilmarnock has made an excellent speech. I wondered why he did not speak about carpets last night. I know now that he was reserving his time to speak about the Post Office. He made a good speech, but he could have done a better service for Scotland had he seen that Scotland got at least a fair share of the Estimates and not a parsimonious limitation as compared with the other two countries.

9.35 p.m.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Ness Edwards): I am sure the speech of the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Sir W. Darling), will have heartened the Committee in more ways than one. They see in his case a clear example where economy is being practised in the use of the postal service, and I hope that when the same economy is practised in Government Departments in other parts of the country we shall have similar jovial protests from other hon. Members.
No one can complain of the tone of the debate. The right hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. W. S. Morrison), who led for the Opposition, and whom we have known a very long time, speaks with integrity. One has learned to respect and to listen with care to what he has to say on any of the many subjects on which he has spoken in his very chequered career. But I was surprised that he was chosen for this one. Last time when the matter was before the House, it was his predecessor—

Mr. H. Wallace: I referred to the restoration of what I described as the Postmaster-General's annual report. I have been to the Vote Office and they do not know the document. I am not in a position to say that the Vote Office are wrong, but I have certainly not seen the Postmaster-General's report.

Mr. Ness Edwards: It is quite three months since hon. Members who have been putting down Questions about the Post Office received a circular asking them to apply to the Vote Office on the usual green form for a copy.
I say I was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman should open the debate tonight. In 1949, when the matter was under discussion, his predecessor, the right


hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) opened for the Opposition.

Mr. W. S. Morrison: I am sorry to contradict the right hon. Gentleman, but my right hon. and gallant Friend was my successor, not my predecessor.

Mr. Ness Edwards: That makes the matter all the more comic because last time he spoke on behalf of the Opposition the right hon. and gallant Gentleman whistled the other way. Today his predecessor comes to the Box and whistles in an opposite direction. Then the Postmaster-General was being criticised for having allowed the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make an announcement about increases in postal charges. Tonight the right hon. Gentleman complains that the Postmaster-General has made an announcement about increases in the postal charges. Which way do the Opposition want it? [HON. MEMBERS: "Both."]
There is no definite precedent in this matter. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the practice is that where Post Office tariffs are being increased for purposes of the Budget, the announcement is made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but where the increases are being made for the purpose of Post Office revenue, the announcement is made by the Postmaster-General. What astonishes me is that the right hon. Gentleman came to the Box, not in a white sheet but as if he had never done it himself. In 1940, it is true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced at Budget time a series of proposals to increase charges in the Post Office, but the right hon. Gentleman was the Postmaster-General and in July, after the Budget was over, he came to the House and obtained an increase in the inland parcel rate.

Mr. Morrison: I do not want to prolong this argument. As I explained in my speech, under the Post Office Act, 1908, there is provision for that to be done, but, if the right hon. Gentleman will consult the Act, he will find that the order is made by the Treasury and not by the Postmaster-General.

Mr. Ness Edwards: That is the mechanics of it, but we are talking now about announcements and of the state-

ment made in the Committee. I am dealing with the charge that I indulged in what was called a "curtain-raiser Budget" for the purpose of easing the Chancellor's position. [HON. MEMBERS: "That is true."] I am dealing with that charge. If Members feel that that is true, they had better listen first to the arguments.
It would have been easy, if this were a revenue matter, if it were something for the Exchequer, to have said to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. "This is your business, not mine," and to have escaped all the lack of popularity attaching to such an announcement. But it had nothing whatever to do with the Exchequer or the Budget. It was due solely to the need for increased revenue in the Post Office. If I could have frozen wages and costs, there would have been no need for any such announcement as that which I made.
Before turning to the general argument, I will deal with one of the points which has been raised. I notice the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing), who has, I take it, also been condemning these increased charges. He has been most assiduous in pressing me to increase charges still further. He has asked me to raise the air-mail rates which we now pay to the Air Corporations. If one is to believe his advocacy tonight, he wishes to increase these rates by about 70 per cent. One cannot indulge in criticisms of the modest increases in charges which I have announced and at the same time advocate an increase of 70 per cent. in a particular charge.

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: I made the point that if the right hon. Gentleman collected from the various Government Departments the money due to him, he would then be in a position to do various things, including the paying of a fair rate to the Air Corporations.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The hon. Gentleman obviously does not know the Post Office accounts, or he would not speak in that way. I had better try to clear up this matter so that we can see where we are.
This has been a matter of mystery to the House for a long time. In 1949 we had a great deal of difficulty about it. There is a difference between the cash account and the commercial account.


The commercial account provides for credit for services to all Departments of £16,520,000 net. There is also included in it provision for depreciation, interest, pension liability and the value of the stocks consumed. The estimated surplus on the commercial account is £8.4 million. I agree that that is bookkeeping.
Let us consider the cash account; there has been some difficulty about this. As my hon. Friend has already explained, in relation to the cash account, the revenues from the Post Office pass weekly to the Exchequer, and expenditure is taken from the Exchequer. The estimated deficit in the cash account for this year is £881,000. This does not include services given by other Departments to the Post Office to the value of £7,176,000, for which no payment is made, nor does it include the £23,500,000 worth of services that the Post Office provides for other Departments without any payment being made. So there is net against the Post Office £16½ million of free service which it pays, or which it makes, over and above the free service made available to it—[HON. MEMBERS: "Estimated."]—Yes, estimated, I am sorry.
How does this work out? This is where I think much confusion has been caused. In 1946–47 the net deficit was £2,820,000, while the commercial account surplus was £24 million. I could go on giving those figures. The estimate for the present year is £900,000 cash deficit and £8.4 million commercial account surplus. What I ask the Committee to do is to rely upon the commercial account picture as giving the genuine picture of the real financial operations of the Post Office. Once we depart from the commercial account picture, we get a false picture of what is taking place in the Post Office.
What is the sum total of the suggestion that the right hon. Gentleman has made to meet the expected diminution, or disappearance, in the commercial account surplus? The right hon. Gentleman has suggested that the Treasury should give a cheque for a certain amount, for this £16½ million, to the other Departments: that those other Departments should hand over £16½ million to the Post Office and that the Post Office should hand it back to the Treasury, and that is regarded as

a contribution to be made for the purpose of meeting the additional difficulties that the Post Office might encounter.

Mr. R. V. Grimston: While the right hon. Gentleman is on the accounts—and we want to understand them—I should like to ask for information. Will he explain this figure in the Budget estimate of receipts of £5,400,000? I should like to know how that ties up with this difficulty?

Mr. Ness Edwards: That is the figure of the amount of new cash yield which is expected from the increases announced before the Budget was announced. That is the reason for it, and that clears up the confusion which I thought was in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Harmar Nicholls: So the announcement made on Thursday was in fact part of the Budget?

Mr. Ness Edwards: No. The announcement made on Thursday was not part of the Budget. But the Chancellor was entitled to ask me, "Am I going to have to meet a greater burden in the cash account in the next year than I have met in the last year? What is the burden I have to meet?" I fix my tariff and I tell him what the position is today on the cash account. But let us keep on this question of the commercial account. Some of my hon. Friends—

Mr. Jennings: That is obviously part of the Budget.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Some of my hon. Friends spoke about the necessity for maintaining the commercial account surplus. It is the existence of this commercial account surplus which is causing so much worry and misunderstanding in the minds of many hon. Members. It has been made quite clear that the Post Office on its commercial account ought to have a surplus in order that it should provide to the revenue an amount of money in lieu of taxation which the ordinary industrial and commercial undertaking has to bear. It ought to provide an amount in lieu of the taxation of its vehicles. It ought to provide an amount which would cover all those liabilities of which it is relieved but which the ordinary commercial undertaking has imposed upon it.

Mr. Jennings: That applies to every nationalised industry.

Mr. Ness Edwards: In the Post Office it does not apply. That is the difference. The Post Office does not in fact make a contribution in its commercial accounts. Under the old Bridgeman doctrine, the Post Office surplus ought to be large enough to provide a sum of money in the commercial account to provide for those liabilities of which it has been relieved; and its contribution to the Treasury should be an amount roughly equivalent to the total of those liabilities of which it has been relieved. Hence it is essential, if the Post Office is to carry out its obligation as an ordinary commercial undertaking, that it must retain a surplus in its commercial account.
Let me come to the point about the diminution of the anticipated surplus to £8,400,000. Indication has already been given of the way in which all the costs against the Post Office have gone up. I will give further indications. There is no single item of equipment purchased by the Post Office from any department of industry, or any private employer, which has not gone up by more than three and, in some cases, four times the amount of the increase in Post Office charges. I am sure that the Committee will realise that we cannot insulate the Post Office against the increased costs that are taking place all around it. The costs of all the materials which it buys, and upon which it depends, have increased by far in excess of any of the increases in the charges which we propose.
I will give one example. There has been complaint about the kiosks and the 2d. call. It gives me no pleasure to put up these prices. I had hoped when I went to the Post Office to have been able to secure a downward trend, but private enterprise has thwarted that. If private enterprise had kept its prices down—

Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: If the Government had kept the taxes down.

Mr. Ness Edwards: If industry had behaved as well as the employees in the trade unions in the Post Office, who have shown a remarkable amount of restraint, the position would have been different. Post Office wages have gone up by only 8G per cent. since the war. That compares with any of the items on which we spend money. Some have increased by 200 per cent. There has been an increase

of 300 per cent. for mail bags and 487 per cent. for string. Of all the items on which the Post Office depends, labour stands out as the one sector of our expenditure which has made a substantial contribution in our attempts to keep down the costs of the service.

Mr. Sidney Marshall: Why have mail bags gone up?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I have only a few minutes left. It will be realised in all parts of the Committee that we must find the extra revenue. That will be accepted. We must meet these costs. This Committee would not thank the Government if we allowed the Post Office to be run at a commercial loss. It is our business to keep the Post Office standing on its own feet and paying its own way. That is our objective in increasing these charges.
When I looked round for sources of new revenue, I had to look at the parts of the service which were making a loss, and I had to consider from where we could obtain increased revenue. Reference has been made to the printed paper rate. On the postal side increased revenue can be raised by one of two means, in particular. We could ask the old age pensioner to pay 3d. postage for his letter, or we could ask the pools people to pay 1½d. postage for their pools. When I am faced with that alternative, I say that, as it is the inland printed paper rate which is now being run at a loss of one halfpenny per item, it ought to carry this additional burden, rather than the cost of that burden being placed upon the 2½d. rate for ordinary letters.
Let me take the telephone service. The telephone charge has stood still at 2d. since 1924, and, if I might say so with all respect, it has been an example to private enterprise on how to keep prices steady. Today, the cost of a telephone kiosk has gone up to such a degree that we are losing so much money on that service that only by charging 3d. can we hope to make the service balance itself and pay for itself. We ought not to ask any other section of the telephone subscribers to subsidise the telephone kiosks. Why should not the telephone kiosk user pay for the cost of its use, rather than place the burden on some other section? The same sort of principle applies throughout these charges which I have imposed.
Here is the position, as I see it. The Committee ought to realise that the Post Office cannot be insulated against the rising prices of the materials which it has to use. Secondly, we must get sufficient revenue by raising the charges to enable the Post Office to stand on its own feet and pay its own way. Thirdly, if we do not want to raise the rates, if we want a cheap postal service at the expense of cheap postmen, we shall soon be in the position of having no postmen at all. The next thing we have to decide is whether those who are most capable of bearing these burdens should be the people who bear them, and I am satisfied that the way in which these charges have been imposed is the right way, that they have been made in the right places and that they are amply justified by the circumstances.

Mr. W. S. Morrison: I beg to move, "That Subhead A.1, Salaries, etc., be reduced by £100."

Question put.

The Committee divided—

Mr. Gerald Williams(seated and covered): On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Chairman. I heard you call "Lock the doors" when the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Works was in this Chamber and I have just seen him come out of the Lobby. Will you call another Division, or what are you prepared to do?

The Deputy-Chairman (Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrew): Were the doors not locked on my order? Will the Serjeant at Arms find out?
THE SERJEANT AT ARMS (BRIGADIER SIR CHARLES HOWARD) said that the Messenger reported to him that Mr. Stokes pushed him out of the way when he was locking the door.

The Deputy-Chairman: The Division will be called again.

Mr. Churchill (seated and covered): On a point of order. Would it be possible for any hon. Member to make sure the Division had to be taken over again merely by thrusting his way past the ushers?

The Deputy-Chairman: My information is that in this case the right hon. Gentleman thrust his way past the ushers, but he is not here and I cannot disallow

his vote without finding out whether that is true or not.

Mr. R. V. Grimston (seated and covered): Further to that point of order. May I say that I and a number of my hon. Friends saw the incident happen?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer(seated and covered): On a point of order—

The Deputy-Chairman: May I answer one thing at a time? If the right hon. Gentleman were here I would ask him, but he is not here. I see the right hon. Gentleman entering the Chamber. On a point of order which was raised during the Division it was stated that the right hon. Gentleman forced his way past the Messenger. If that is the case I shall have his vote disallowed. Would he confirm whether that is the case or otherwise?

Mr. Stokes (seated and covered): Mr. Chairman, I understand that so long as the door is open I may go through it. The door was open and I went through.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer (seated and covered): On a point of order—

The Deputy-Chairman: Order. I propose to allow the vote tonight, but I shall have the matter inquired into tomorrow. If we are going to push through doors then it will be quite impossible to carry on, and I shall report the matter to Mr. Speaker.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer (seated and covered): On a point of order. What time elapses between the time when you say "Lock the Doors" and the time when the doors have to be looked?

The Deputy-Chairman: It is a reasonable time. After four minutes after the second call I give the order "Lock the Doors," and the Messenger locks the doors as quickly as he can. It cannot be done at once, but it is done in a reasonable time.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer (seated and covered): On a point of order. I bumped into the right hon. Gentleman behind the Despatch Box as you were saying "Lock the doors."

The Deputy-Chairman: I think we have settled the point. I shall have to inquire into it.

The figures for the Division were: Ayes, 286; Noes. 294.

Division No. 76.]
AYES
[7.18 p.m.


Aitken, W. T.
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord Malcolm
Keeling, E. H.


Alport, C. J. M.
Drayson, G. B.
Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge)


Amery, Julian (Preston. N.)
Dugdale, Maj. Sir Thomas (Richmond)
Kingsmill, Lt.-Col. W. H.


Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Lambert, Hon. G.


Arbuthnot, John
Dunglass, Lord
Lancaster, Col. C. G.


Ashton, H. (Chelmsford)
Duthie, W. S.
Langford-Holt, J.


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W)
Eccles, D. M.
Law, Rt. Hon. R. K.


Astor, Hon. M. L.
Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Leather, E. H. C.


Baker, P. A. D.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Erroll, F. J.
Lennox-Boyd, A. T.


Baldwin, A. E.
Fisher, Nigel
Lindsay, Martin


Banks, Col. C.
Fletcher, Walter (Bury)
Linstead, H. N.


Baxter, A. B.
Fort, R.
Llewellyn, D.


Bell, R. M.
Foster, John
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (King's Norton)


Bennett, Sir Peter (Edgbaston)
Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
Lloyd, Maj. Guy (Renfrew, E.)


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)
Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe &amp; Lonsdale)
Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)


Bennett, William (Woodside)
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell
Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.


Bevins, J. R. (Liverpool, Toxteth)
Gage, C. H.
Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S. W.)


Birch, Nigel
Galbraith, Cmdr. T. D. (Pollok)
Low, A. R. W.


Black, C. W.
Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)


Blackburn, A. R.
Gammans, L. D.
Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)


Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C. (Wells)
Garner-Evans, E. H. (Denbigh)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Bossom, A. C.
Gales, Maj. E. E.
Lyttelton, Rt. Hon O.


Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)
Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.
McAdden, S. J.


Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.
Gridley, Sir Arnold
McCallum, Major D.


Boyle, Sir Edward
Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)
McCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S.


Braine, B. R.
Grimston, Robert (Westbury)
Macdonald, Sir Peter (I, of Wight)


Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. Gurney
Harden, J. R. E.
McKibbin, A.


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.
Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge)
McKie, J. H. (Galloway)


Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.)
Maclay, Hon John


Browne, Jack (Govan)
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Maclean, Fitzroy


Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfield)
MacLeod, lain (Enfield, W)


Bullock, Capt. M.
Harvie-Watt, Sir G. S.
MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Hay, John
Macmillan, Rt. Hon Harold (Bromley)


Burden, Squadron Leader F. A.
Head, Brig. A. H.
Macpherson, Major Niall (Dumfries)


Butcher, H. W.
Heald, Lionel
Maitland, Comdr. J. W.


Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Heath, Edward
Manningham-Buller, R. E.


Carr, Robert (Mitcham)
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Marlowe, A. A. H.


Channon, H.
Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Marples, A. E.


Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S.
Higgs, J. M. C.
Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)


Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)
Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Marshall, Sidney (Sutton)


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)
Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
Maude, Angus (Ealing, S.)


Clyde, J. L.
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Maude, John (Exeter)


Colegate, A.
Hirst, Geoffrey
Maudling, R.


Conant, Maj. R. J. E.
Hollis, M. C.
Medlicott, Brig. F.


Cooper, Sun. Ldr. Albert (Ilford, S.)
Holmes, Sir Stanley (Harwich)
Mellor, Sir John


Cooper-Key, E. M.
Hope, Lord John
Molson, A. H. E.


Corbett, Lt.-Col. Uvedale (Ludlow)
Hopkinson, H. L. D'A.
Moore, Lt.-Col Sir Thomas


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Hornsby-Smith, Miss P.
Morris, Hopkin (Carmarthen)


Cranborne, Viscount
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon Florence
Morrison, John (Salisbury)


Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Howard, Greville (St. Ives)
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.


Crouch, R. F.
Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Nabarro, G.


Crowder, Capt. John (Finchley)
Hudson, Rt. Hon. Robert (Southport)
Nicholls, Harmar


Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)
Nicholson, G.


Cundiff, F. W.
Hulbert, Wing Cmdr. N. J.
Nield, Basil (Chester)


Cuthbert, W. N.
Hurd, A. R.
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.


Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Hutchison, Lt. Com. Clark (E'b'rgh W.)
Nugent, G. R. H.


Davidson, Viscountess
Hutchison, Colonel James (Glasgow)
Nutting, Anthony


Davies, Nigel (Epping)
Hylton-Foster, H. B.
Oaksholt, H. D.


de Chair, Somerset
Jeffreys, General Sir George
Odey, G. W.


De la Bère, R.
Jennings, R.
O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh


Deedes, W. F.
Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)
Ormsby-Gore, Hon W. D.


Digby, S. W.
Jones, A. (Hall Green)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Dodds-Parker, A. O.
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N)


Donner, P.W.
Kaberry, D.
Orr-Ewing, Ian L. (Weston-super-Mare)




Osborne, C.
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)
Tilney, John


Peake, Rt. Hon G.
Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)
Touche, G. C.


Perkins, W. R. D.
Snadden, W. McN
Turner, H. F. L.


Peto, Brig. C. H. M.
Soames, Capt. C.
Turton, R. H.


Pickthorn, K.
Spearman, A. C. M.
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Pitman, I. J.
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)
Vane, W. M. F.


Powell, J. Enoch
Spens, Sir Patrick (Kensington, S.)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Prescott, S.
Stanley, Capt. Hon. R. (N. Fylde)
Vosper, O. F.


Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
Stevens, G. P.
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Prior-Palmer, Brig. O.
Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W)
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (Marylebone)


Profumo, J. D.
Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)
Walker-Smith, D. C.


Rayner, Brig R.
Stoddart-Scott, Col M.
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Redmayne, M.
Storey, S.
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)


Remnant, Hon. P.
Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Renton, D. L. M.
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
Watkinson, H.


Roberts, Major Peter (Heeley)
Studholme, H. G.
Webbe, Sir Harold


Robinson, Roland (Blackpool, S)
Summers, G. S.
Wheatley, Major M. J. (Poole)


Robson-Brown, W.
Sutcliffe, H.
White, Baker (Canterbury)


Roper, Sir Harold
Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne)
Williams, Charles (Torquay)


Ropner, Col. L.
Taylor, William (Bradford, N)
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.
Teeling, W.
Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)


Salter, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Teevan, T. L.
Wills, G.


Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.
Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Savory, Prof. D. L.
Thompson, Kenneth Pugh (Walton)
Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl


Scott, Donald
Thompson, R. H. M. (Croydon, W)
Wood, Hon. R.


Shepherd, William
Thorneycroft, Peter (Monmouth)
York, C.


Smiles, Lt.-Col Sir Walter
Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.



Smith, E. Martin (Grantham)
Thorp, Brig. R. A. F.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:




Mr. Drewe and Brigadier Mackeson




NOES


Acland, Sir Richard
Cullen, Mrs. A.
Hamilton, W. W.


Albu, A. H.
Daines, P.
Hardman, D. R.


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Hardy, E. A.


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Hargreaves, A.


Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell)
Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.)
Harrison, J.


Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven)
Davies, Harold (Leek)
Hastings, S.


Awbery, S. S.
Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)
Hayman, F. H.


Ayles, W. H.
de Freitas, Geoffrey
Henderson, Rt. Hon. A (Rowley Regis)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Deer, G.
Herbison, Miss M.


Baird, J.
Delargy, H. J.
Hewitson, Capt. M.


Balfour, A.
Diamond, J.
Hobson, C. R.


Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.
Dodds, N. N.
Holman, P.


Bartley, P.
Donnelly, D.
Holmes, Horace (Hemsworth)


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Driberg, T. E. N.
Houghton, D.


Benn, Wedgwood
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)
Hoy, J.


Benson, G.
Dye S.
Hubbard, T.


Beswick, F.
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)


Bevan, Rt. hon. A (Ebbw Vale)
Edelman, M.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)


Bing, G. H. C.
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)


Blenkinsop, A.
Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
Hughes, Moelwyn (Islington, N.)


Blyton, W. R.
Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
Hynd, H. (Accrington)


Boardman, H.
Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)


Booth, A.
Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)
Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)


Bottomley, A. G.
Ewart, R.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.


Bowden, H. W.
Fairhurst, F.
Janner, B.


Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)
Fernyhough, E.
Jay, D. P. T.


Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Field, Capt. W. J.
Jeger, George (Goole)


Brook, Dryden (Halifax)
Finch, H. J.
Jeger, Dr. Santo (St. Pancras, S.)


Brooks, T. J. (Normantor)
Fletcher, Erie (Islington, E.)
Jenkins, R. H.


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Follick, M.
Johnson, James (Rugby)


Brown, George (Belper)
Foot, M. M.
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)


Brown, Thomas (Ince)
Forman, J. C.
Jones, David (Hartlepool)


Burke, W. A.
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S)


Burton, Miss E.
Freeman, John (Watford)
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S)
Freeman, Peter (Newport)
Jones, William Elwyn (Conway)


Callaghan, L. J.
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Keenan, W.


Carmichael, J.
Ganley, Mrs. C. S.
Kenyon, C.


Castle, Mrs. B. A.
Gibson, C. W.
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.


Champion, A. J.
Gilzean, A.
King, Dr. H. M.


Chetwynd, G. R.
Glanville, James (Consett)
Kinghorn, Sqn. Ldr. E.


Clunie, J.
Gooch, E. G.
Kinley, J.


Cocks, F. S.
Gordon-Walker, Rt. Hon P. C.
Lang, Gordon


Coldrick, W.
Greenwood, Anthony (Rossendale)
Lee, Frederick (Newton)


Collick, P.
Grenfell, D. R.
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)


Collindridge, F.
Grey, C. F.
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)


Cook, T. F.
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)


Cooper, John (Deptford)
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda (Peckham)
Griffiths, William (Exchange)
Lewis, John (Bolton, W.)


Cove, W. G.
Gunter, R. J.
Lindgren, G. S.


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Hale, Joseph (Rochdale)
Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.


Crawley, A.
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Logan, D. G.


Crosland, C. A. R.
Hall, John (Gateshead, W.)
Longden, Fred (Small Heath)


Crossman, R. H. S.
Hall, Rt-Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
McAllister, G.







MacColl, J. E.
Paton, J.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


McGhee, H. G.
Pearson, A.
Taylor, Robert (Morpeth)


McGovern, J.
Peart, T. F.
Thomas, David (Aberdare)


McInnes, J.
Poole, C.
Thomas, George (Cardiff)


Mack, J. D.
Popplewell, E.
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


McKay, John (Wallsend)
Porter, G.
Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)


Mackay, R. W. G. (Reading, N)
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)
Thurtle, Ernest


McLeavy, F.
Proctor, W. T.
Timmons, J.


MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Pryde, D. J.
Tomlinson, Rt. Hon G.


McNeil, Rt. Hon. H.
Pursey, Cmdr. H.
Tomney, F.


MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Rankin, J.
Turner-Samuels, M.


Mainwaring, W. H.
Rees, Mrs. D.
Usborne, H.


Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Reeves, J.
Vernon, W. F.


Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Reid, Thomas (Swindon)
Viant, S. P.


Mann, Mrs. Jean
Reid, William (Camlachie)
Wallace, H. W.


Manuel, A. C.
Rhodes, H.
Watkins, T. E.


Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Richards, R.
Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford. C.)


Mathers, Rt, Hon. G.
Robens, A.
Weitzman, D.


Mellish, R. J.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Messer, F.
Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)
Wells, William (Walsall)


Middleton, Mrs. L.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
West, D. G.


Mitchison, G. R.
Rogers, George (Kensington, N)
Wheatley, Rt. Hon. John (Edinb'gh, E.)


Moeran, E. W.
Ross, William (Kilmarnock)
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Monslow, W.
Royle, C.
While, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)


Moody, A. S.
Shackleton, E. A. A.
Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.


Morgan, Dr. H. B.
Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley
Wigg, G.


Morley, R.
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)
Shurmer, P. L. E.
Willey, Frederick(Sunderland)


Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S)
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)
Willey, Octavius (Cleveland)


Mort, D. L.
Simmons, C. J.
Williams, David (Neath)


Moyle, A.
Slater, J.
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Abertillery)


Mulley, F. W.
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)


Murray, J. D.
Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S)
Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'lly)


Nally, W.
Snow, J. W.
Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)


Neal, Harold (Bolsover)
Sorensen, R. W.
Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Huyton)


Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C)


Oldfield, W. H.
Sparks, J. A.
Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)


Oliver, G. H.
Steele, T.
Wise, F. J.


Orbach, M.
Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Padley, W. E.
Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.
Woods, Rev. G. S.


Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Dearne V'lly)
Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.
Yates, V. F.


Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)
Younger, Hon. K.


Pannell, T. C.
Stross, Dr. Barnett



Pargiter, G. A.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. Edith
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Parker, J.
Sylvester, G. O.
Mr. Hannan and Mr. Wilkins.

Division No. 77.]
AYES
[10.0 p.m.


Aitken, W. T.
Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
McCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S.


Alport, C. J. M.
Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe &amp; Lonsdale)
Macdonald, A. J. F. (Roxburgh)


Amery, Julian (Preston, N)
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwel
Macdonald, Sir Peter (I of Wight)


Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverlon)
Gage, C. H.
McKibbin, A.


Arbuthnot, John
Galbraith, Cmdr T. D. (Pollok)
McKie, J. H. (Galloway)


Ashton, H. (Chelmsford)
Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)
Maclay, Hon. John


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)
Gammans, L. D.
Maclean, Fitzroy


Astor, Hon. M. L.
Garner-Evans, E. H. (Denbigh)
MacLeod, Iain (Enfield, W)


Baker, P. A. D.
Gates, Maj. E. E.
MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
George, Lady Megan Lloyd
Macmillan, Rt. Hon Harold (Bromley)


Baldwin, A. E.
Glyn, Sir Ralph
Macpherson, N. (Dumfries)


Banks, Col. C.
Gomme-Duncan, Col A.
Maitland, Comdr. J. W.


Baxter, A. B.
Gridley, Sir Arnold
Manningham-Buller, R. E.


Bell, R. M.
Grimond, J.
Marlowe, A. A. H.


Bennett, Sir Peter (Edgbaston)
Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)
Marples, A. E.


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)
Grimston, Robert (Westbury)
Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)


Bennett, William (Woodside)
Harden, J. R. E.
Marshall, Sidney (Sutton)


Bevins, J. R. (Liverpool, Toxteth)
Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge)
Maude, Angus (Ealing, S.)


Birch, Nigel
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.)
Maude, John (Exeter)


Black, C. W.
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Maudling, R.


Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C. (Wells)
Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfield)
Medlicott, Brig. F.


Bossom, A. C.
Harvie-Watt, Sir G. S.
Mellor, Sir John


Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)
Hay, John
Molson, A. H. E.


Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.
Head, Brig. A. H.
Moore, Lt.-Col. Sir Thomas


Boyle, Sir Edward
Heald, Lionel
Morris, Hopkin (Carmarthen)


Braine, B.
Heath, Edward
Morrison, John (Salisbury)


Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. Gurney
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.
Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.


Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Higgs, J. M. C.
Nabarro, G.


Browne, Jack (Govan)
Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Nicholls, Harmar


Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
Nicholson, G.


Bullock, Capt. M.
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Nield, Basil (Chester)


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Hirst, Geoffrey
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.


Burden, Squadron Leader F. A.
Hollis, M. C.
Nugent, G. R. H.


Butcher, H. W.
Holmes, Sir Stanley (Harwich)
Nutting, Anthony


Butler, Rt. Hon. R.A. (Saffron Walden)
Hope, Lord John
Oakshott, H. D.


Carr, Robert (Mitcham)
Hopkinson, H. L. D'A.
Odey, G. W.


Channon, H.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss P.
O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh


Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S.
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.


Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)
Howard, Greville (St. Ives)
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N)


Clyde, J. L.
Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Orr-Ewing, Ian L. (Weston-super-Mare)


Colegate, A.
Hudson, Rt. Hon. Robert (Southport)
Osborne, C.


Conant, Maj. R. J. E.
Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)
Peake, Rt. Hon O.


Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert (Ilford, S.)
Hulbert, Wing Cmdr. N. J.
Perkins, W. R. D.


Cooper-Key, E. M.
Hurd, A. R.
Peto, Brig. C. H. M.


Corbett, Lt.-Col. Uvedale (Ludlow)
Hutchinson, Geoffrey (Ilford, N.)
Pickthorn, K.


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Hutchison, Lt.-Com. Clark (E'b'rgh W.)
Pitman, I. J.


Cranborne, Viscount
Hutchison, Colonel James (Glasgow)
Powell, J. Enoch


Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.
Hylton-Foster, H. B.
Prescott, S.


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Jeffreys, General Sir George
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)


Crouch, R. F.
Jennings, R.
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O.


Crowder, Capt. John (Finchley)
Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)
Profumo, J. D.


Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Jones, A. (Hall Green)
Rayner, Brig. R.


Cundift, F. W.
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
Redmayne, M.


Cuthbert, W. N.
Kaberry, D.
Remnant, Hon. P.


Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Keeling, E. H.
Renton, D. L. M.


Davidson, Viscountess
Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge)
Roberts, Major Peter (Heeley)


Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (M'ntg'mery)
Kingsmill, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Robinson, Roland (Blackpool, S)


Davies, Nigel (Epping)
Lambert, Hon. G.
Robson-Brown, W.


de Chair, Somerset
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Roper, Sir Harold


De la Bère, R.
Langford-Holt, J.
Ropner, Col. L.


Deedes, W. F.
Law, Rt. Hon. R. K.
Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.


Digby, S. W.
Leather, E. H. C.
Salter, Rt. Hon Sir Arthur


Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.



Dormer, P. W.
Lennox-Boyd, A. T.
Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord M.
Lindsay, Martin
Savory, Prof. D. L.



Linstead, H. N.
Scott, Donald


Drayson, G. B.
Llewellyn, D.
Shepherd, William


Dugdale, Maj. Sir Thomas (Richmond)
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (King's Norton)
Smiles, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter


Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Lloyd, Maj. Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Smith, E. Martin (Grantham)


Dunglass, Lord
Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)


Duthie, W. S.
Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.
Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)


Eccles, D. M.
Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S.W.)
Snadden, W. McN


Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Low, A. R. W.
Soames, Capt. C.


Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Spearman, A. C. M.


Erroll, F. J.
Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)


Fisher, Nigel
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Spens, Sir Patrick (Kensington, S.)


Fletcher, Walter (Bury)
Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.
Stanley, Capt Hon Richard (N. Fylde)


Fort, R.
McAdden, S. J.
Stevens, G. P.


Foster, John
McCallum, Major D.
Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)







Stewart, Henderson (File E)
Thornton-Kemsley, Col C. N.
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Stoddart-Scott, Col M.
Thorp, Brig. R. A. F.
Watkinson, H.


Storey, S.
Tilney, John
Webbe, Sir Harold


Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)
Touche, G. C.
Wheatley, Major M. J. (Poole)


Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
Turner, H. F. L.
White, Baker (Canterbury)


Studholme, H. G.
Turton, R. H.
Williams. Charles (Torquay)


Summers, G. S.
Tweedsmuir, Lady
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


Sutcliffe, H.
Vane, W. M. F.
Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)


Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
Wills, G.


Taylor, William (Bradford N)
Vosper, D. F.
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Teeling, W.
Wade, D. W.
Winterton, Rt. Hon Earl


Teevan, T. L.
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W)
Wood, Hon R.


Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (Marylebone)
York, C.


Thompson, Kenneth Pugh (Walton)
Walker-Smith, D. C.



Thompson, R. H. M. (Croydon, W)
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Thorneycroft, Peter (Monmouth)
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)
Mr. Drewe and Brigadier Mackeson.




NOES


Acland, Sir Richard
Dodds, N. N.
Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)


Albu, A. H.
Donnelly, D.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Driberg, T. E. N.
Janner, B.


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)
Jay, D. P. T.


Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell)
Dye, S.
Jeger, George (Goole)


Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven)
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Jeger, Dr. Santo (St. Pancras, S.)


Awbery, S. S.
Edelman, M.
Jenkins, R. H.


Ayles, W. H.
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Johnson, James (Rugby)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)


Baird, J.
Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
Jones, David (Hartlepool)


Balfour, A.
Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)


Barnes, Rt. Hon A. J.
Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)


Bartley, P.
Ewart, R.
Jones, William Elwyn (Conway)


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Fairhurst, F.
Keenan, W.


Benn, Wedgwood
Fernyhough, E.
Kenyon, C.


Benson, G.
Field, Capt. W. J.
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.


Beswick, F.
Finch, H. J.
King, Dr. H. M.


Bevan, Rt. Hon A. (Ebbw Vale)
Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)
Kinghorn, Son Ldr. E.


Bing, G. H. C.
Follick, M.
Kinley, J.


Blenkinsop, A.
Foot, M. M.
Lang, Gordon


Blyton, W. R.
Forman, J. C.
Lee, Frederick (Newton)


Boardman, H.
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)


Booth, A.
Freeman, John (Watford)
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)


Bottomley, A. G.
Freeman, Peter (Newport)
Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)


Bowden, H. W.
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)


Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)
Ganley, Mrs. C. S.
Lewis, John (Bolton, W)


Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Gibson, C. W.
Lindgren, G. S.


Brook, Dryden (Halifax)
Gilzean, A.
Lipton, Lt.-Col M.


Brooks, T. J. (Normanton)
Glanville, James (Consert)
Logan, D. G.


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Gooch. E. G.
Longden, Fred (Small Heath)


Brown, George (Belper)
Gordon-Walker, Rt Hon P. C.
McAllister, G.


Brown, Thomas (Ince)
Greenwood, Anthony (Rossendale)
MacColl, J. E.


Burke, W. A.
Grenfell, D. R.
McGhee, H. G.


Burton, Miss E.
Grey, C. F.
McGovern, J.


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
McInnes, J.


Callaghan, L. J.
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Mack, J. D.


Carmichael, J.
Griffiths, William (Exchange)
McKay, John (Wallsend)


Castle, Mrs. B. A.
Gunter, R. J.
Mackay, R. W. G. (Reading. N.)


Champion, A. J.
Hale, Joseph (Rochdale)
McLeavy, F.


Chetwynd, G. R.
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)'


Clunie, J.
Hall, John (Gateshead, W.)
McNeil, Rt. Hon. H.


Cooks, F. S.
Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Coins Valley)
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)


Coldrick, W.
Hamilton, W. W.
Mainwaring, W. H.


Collick, P.
Hannan, W.
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Collindridge, F.
Hardman, D. R.
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Cook, T. F.
Hardy, E. A.
Mann, Mrs. Jean


Cooper, Geoffrey (Middlesbrough, W.)
Hargreaves, A.
Manuel, A. C.


Cooper, John (Deptford)
Harrison, J.
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.


Corbet, Mrs. Freda (Peckham)
Hastings, S.
Mathers, Rt. Hon. G.


Cove, W. G.
Hayman, F. H.
Mellish, R. J.


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)
Messer, F.


Crawley, A.
Herbison, Miss M.
Middleton, Mrs. L.


Crosland, C. A. R.
Hewitson, Capt. M.
Mitchison, G. R.


Crossman, R. H. S.
Hobson, C. R.
Moeran, E. W.


Cullen, Mrs. A.
Holman, P.
Monslow, W.


Dairies, P.
Holmes, Horace (Hemsworth)
Moody, A. S.


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Houghton, D.
Morgan, Dr. H. B.


Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Hoy, J.
Morley, R.


Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.)
Hubbard, T.
Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
Morrison, Rt. Hon H. (Lewisham, S.)


Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Mort, D. L.


de Freitas, Geoffrey
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Moyle, A.


Deer, G.
Hughes, Moelwyn (Islington, N.)
Mulley, F. W.


Delargy, H. J.
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Mulvey, A.


Diamond, J.
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Murray, J. T.







Nally, W.
Royle, C.
Vernon, W. F.


Neat, Harold (Bolsover)
Shackleton, E. A. A.
Viant, S. P.


Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.
Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley
Wallace, H. W.


Oldfield, W. H.
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
Watkins, T. E.


Oliver, G. H.
Shurmer, P. L. E.
Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford, C.)


Orbach, M.
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)
Weitzman, D.


Padley, W. E.
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Walls, Percy (Faversham)


Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Dearne V'lly)
Simmons, C. J.
Wells, William (Walsall)


Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)
Slater, J.
West, D. G.


Pannell, T. C.
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Wheatley, Rt. Hon. John (Edinb'gh, E.)


Pargiter, G. A.
Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S.)
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Parker, J.
Snow, J. W.
White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)


Paton, J.
Sorensen, R. W.
Whiteley, Rt. Hon W.


Peart, T. F.
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Wigg, G.


Poole, C.
Steele, T.
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Popplewell, E.
Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)
Wilkins, W. A.


Porter, G.
Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.
Willey, Frederick (Sunderland)


Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)
Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.
Willey, Octavius (Cleveland)


Proctor, W. T.
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)
Williams, David (Neath)


Pryde, D. J.
Stross, Dr. Barnett
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Abertillery)


Pursey, Cmdr. H.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. Edith
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)


Rankin, J.
Sylvester, G. O.
Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'lly)


Rees, Mrs. D.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)


Reeves, J.
Taylor, Robert (Morpeth)
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Reid, Thomas (Swindon)
Thomas, David (Aberdare)
Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.)


Reid, William (Camlachie)
Thomas, George (Cardiff)
Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)


Rhodes, H.
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W)
Wise, F. J.


Richards, R.
Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon A.


Robens, A.
Thurtle, Ernest
Woods, Rev. G. S.


Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)
Timmons, J.
Yates, V. F.


Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)
Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.
Younger, Hon. K.


Robinson, Kenneth (St. Panoras, N.)
Tomney, F.



Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)
Turner-Samuels, M.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Ross, William (Kilmarnock)
Usborne, H.
Mr. Pearson and Mr. Sparks.

Original Question again proposed.

It being after Ten o'Clock, and objection being taken to further Proceeding, The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress: to sit again Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — STATUTORY INSTRUMENT No. 413 (MR. SPEAKER'S RULING)

The following Motion stood on the Order Paper in the name of Squadron Leader BURDEN:

That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that the Order, dated 12th March, 1951, entitled the Utility Apparel (Maximum Prices and Charges) (Amendment No. 2) Order, 1951 (S.I. 1951, No. 413), a copy of which was laid before this House on 13th March, be annulled.

Mr. Speaker: There is a question about the Prayer which is to be moved by the hon. and gallant Member for Gillingham (Squadron Leader Burden). Actually, I am afraid I must rule that this Order is not in conformity with the Rules that I have laid down. It adds a new Third Schedule to No. 216, and it revokes No. 296, which had already added two Schedules to No. 216. Therefore, it revokes two Schedules and adds one. The two Schedules have been law some time. It is quite impossible to add one Schedule

—a child to a parent who is already dead and whose children are already dead. Under my Rulings of about three weeks ago I must say that I think this Order should be laid in proper form. Therefore, for the moment, no Prayer can possibly arise.

Mr. David Renton: Arising out of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. If the Government immediately accept your Ruling and declare so—

Hon. Members: They must.

Mr. Speaker: The Government have got to accept my Ruling. I gave a quite definite Ruling. The Order is not in order. The matter remains there.

Mr. Renton: Should there not be some indication from the Government that your Ruling is accepted?

Mr. Speaker: No, not necessarily. That is an unfair point, because this is a very complicated matter. We gave it some considerable consideration, and I read my Ruling upon it—not on a small point but on the general principles which, I hope, will be following and considered, and which are not a small matter at all.

Sir Ian Fraser: Having regard to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, do not the regulations and all the offences and all the provisions under the Order become outside the law and therefore of no validity whatsoever?

Mr. Speaker: Two of the Schedules have been law for some time. I do not think that that arises at the moment. I am not quite sure.

Sir I. Fraser: With respect, Mr. Speaker, if there was something to pray against there must have been something there. You have now ruled that it is not there, and therefore it is invalid.

Mr. Speaker: There are two schedules already there. This is a third schedule to be added, but it cannot be added to the two already there. I admit it is complicated.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: With great respect, might I point out that this Prayer tonight was put down because the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments drew the special attention of the House to the absence of the proper period that should have elapsed between the laying of the Order and its coming into operation. That was the real reason why the Prayer was put down for tonight.

Mr. Speaker: Perhaps there has been added another real reason.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede) rose—

Mr. Churchill: What do you mean by that? [Interruption.] With great respect, Sir, would you kindly elucidate that remark which you were good enough to make, that there might have been another reason for it? What is meant or implied by that?

Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman does not appear to understand the English language. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) gave me one reason and I gave another reason why this Order was out of order. It is no reflection on the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire at all.

Mr. McAllister: On a point of order. May I say that hon. Members on this side of the House are getting a little tired of the insolence and bad manners of right hon. Gentlemen opposite? [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: I was not in the Chair just recently, but I understand that the House has got somewhat excited. I did watch from another place. May I there-

fore plead for a little more peace, as I presume that we shall now not proceed with this Prayer but will go on to the Adjournment.

Mr. Ede: When the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) rose to his point of order I was about to say, in reply to what was said by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Renton), that it is not a question of the Government accepting your Ruling, but that obviously if Mr. Speaker gives a Ruling every Member of the House accepts it, irrespective of whether he is in office or out of office. I shall consult with my right hon. Friend who is the Minister in charge of this Department and see that steps are taken to comply with the Ruling you have given, and I have no doubt that a statement will be made to the House as to the course that will be adopted. I hope that possibly some representations may be made to you, not to vary your Ruling, but in order that the matter may be quite clearly elucidated.

Mr. Speaker: May I say in answer to the right hon. Gentleman that I came back to the Chair tonight because this was a very complicated matter. I have given it my earnest consideration and I gave a Ruling in consequence. I thought it was better to be done by me than by Mr. Deputy-Speaker.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Might I ask you, Sir, whether it is not the fact that the irregularity in the drawing of this Order would never have had attention drawn to it had not the Opposition put down this Prayer tonight?

Mr. Speaker: That, of course, is not within my knowledge. It probably is quite correct, but that was not the reason why I said this Order was out of order.

Squadron Leader Burden: May I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for your Ruling, and give notice that when this Order has been laid in accordance with the Statutory Instruments provisions, I shall consider raising the matter again.

Mr. Renton: Arising out of the further consideration which the Home Secretary has said he is giving to this matter, and out of the remarks of the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Sir I. Fraser), may I point out—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We ought not to discuss this Order any longer, seeing that it is now out of order and therefore is not before the House. This might be a matter for business next Thursday, but not now.

Orders of the Day — YOUNG SOLDIERS, MALAYA (TRAINING)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Popplewell.]

10.25 p.m.

Air Commodore Harvey: I propose tonight to direct my remarks to the age and training of soldiers serving in Malaya. On 9th April, I wrote to the Secretary of State for War informing him that I had been successful in the ballot for the adjournment debate and I hoped that he would reply to the debate. So far I have had no reply or acknowledgement from the right hon. Gentleman. I am not complaining unduly, but an hon. Member, a few moments ago, referred to manners on this side of the House, and I thought that the Secretary of State for War would at least have had the courtesy to reply to my letter. I have no doubt that the Under-Secretary of State, with his usual ability, will give us what, I hope, will be a better answer than we should have got from his right hon. Friend.
I believe that I am right in saying that hon. Members on both sides of the House are gravely concerned about the existing arrangements for training soldiers out in Malaya, mostly National Service men. Parents are anxious, as we all know from the number of letters which we receive from constituents and others in the country, who know that we interest ourselves in these matters.
We have been informed by the Secretary of State for War that the minimum age for soldiers serving in Korea is 19 years. Elsewhere, which includes Malaya, it is 18 years three months. The Secretary of State for War said in the House on 6th March last,
I think it is a question of training rather than of age."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 226.]
Personally, I think that in a time of so-called peace, 18 years three months is too young. Let us consider the training aspect of these young men who are sent

out to fight at that age. I quite agree that to fight in Korea is a most difficult job of warfare. I once spent a winter in Manchuria and I know what the weather conditions can be like. I have often thought of these young men struggling there in that campaign.
But the war in Malaya—and it is a war—is an equally difficult one. It may be even more difficult in some respects than the war in Korea. The Secretary of State for War went out to Malaya with the Colonial Secretary and saw the conditions. I had the honour of going out there with a Parliamentary delegation, including my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Lennox-Boyd), and we saw the conditions. I think that all of us who have been there know only too well how difficult it is. The country consists largely of jungle through which one cannot push one's way. It is a very difficult climate and one is bitten by leeches and mosquitoes and the conditions generally are extremely difficult.
When these young men are ambushed, there is practically no opportunity whatever to retaliate. Usually there are about 20 soldiers on patrol, and they may be ambushed by anything up to 100 bandits who fire from cuttings in the jungle, and by the time one looks for them they are gone. I want to quote two letters which I have had from constituents. One is from a lady who has a son now serving in Malaya. This is a passage from her letter:
My boy was with the 1st Battalion of the Worcestershires in Johore, and the last letter he wrote was on 10th February. He was then up in the jungle swamps, sleeping on his rifle and 36 rounds of ammunition on the hard ground, with not even a blanket. He was only 18 years of age when he went out, a care-free, happy boy. I received a photograph of him in January. He looks a serious, grown man.
He says their guns are old and worn. They only have half enough to eat and it is badly cooked. No wireless, no letters; with only tents to sleep in, and bitten to death by mosquitoes. One boy in the company shot himself. He could not stand it. Others, he says, are nervous wrecks.
I make allowance for a mother writing that letter and probably reading into her son's letters, but it gives some idea of what parents are thinking and believing.
I also have a letter here written by an officer to the mother of a soldier who was killed. It is a charming letter condoling with her. I will not read it all, because


it is private, but the officer, who was second-in-command, said:
The patrol never had a chance of retaliation, although I feel this will be little consolation to you in your very great loss.
That shows that these men do not get a chance to fight back and defend themselves as happens in open war.
I ask the War Office and the Government to take these matters into consideration. The Malayan campaign is every bit as difficult as the Korean war. At the moment these men receive 10 weeks' basic training in this country, followed by six weeks' continued training—16 weeks from the time they are recruited until they leave for Malaya. I believe there may be a week or two thrown in. Taking into account embarkation leave, weekend leaves, 48-hour passes and other duties that have to be carried out, there is precious little training time. But the point is that these men ought to carry out training on the spot, in a secure area in Malaya itself, where they can be taught the real conditions of jungle warfare and do so before they go on active operations.
We are told by the Government that these men get approximately four weeks' training when they arrive in Malaya. That has already been mentioned, and I do not want to go over old ground, but soldiers have been known to get only two weeks' training. I should be well satisfied if we had a definite assurance that they would get not less than six weeks' training in Malaya. I do not think that is enough, but I recognise the difficulties and what the Government have to do in this matter.
The Secretary of State has said that men can do their training with the units to which they are posted. That is not at all satisfactory. Soldiers join their regiment or battalion in Malaya and it may be called out suddenly to chase bandits or undertake active operations, and these recruits or National Service men with very little training find themselves in with the others having to go and fight.
What is required is a special area for training. I believe there are parts of Singapore island which could be used. No doubt it would cost more money and more time. We have one million men in our Forces today, and when the Malayan campaign started nearly three years ago we had nothing like that number of men.

Yet they are still getting this meagre amount of training.
These suggestions may not be ideal ones, but the responsibility is that of the Government. I can assure right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite that there is one thing for which they are loathed by the people of this country—for the way they are sending these boys of 18 years and three months out to Malaya. My advice to them is to review this matter, if they have not done so already, and tell the country these young soldiers will get at least six weeks' training on the spot. If they do not do so, they will be hated more than they are at the moment.

10.34 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport: I shall keep the House only for a few moments. I should like the Under-Secretary, when he replies, not to give the platitudinous answer which I think he and the Secretary of State have given before, that these boys give a good account of themselves and that American officers pay a high tribute to their work. Of course, they will give a good account of themselves. We know they do. They will fight and die as their fathers did before them. But that is not the point.
We do not consider—and I know I am not alone in this—that these boys have been properly trained. We consider that 18 and 19 is too young. To give a simple illustration, let us take the case of boxing. I have seen inexperienced boys being put into the ring against seasoned and older opponents. The result is that these boys are knocked cold in the second or third round. The audience pay tribute to the courage of the unfortunate boy, of course, but the point is that the boy should never have been put into the ring against a seasoned opponent in the first place. I consider it is exactly the same thing with Malaya and Korea. These boys should not even be there in the first place if they are insufficiently trained.
I do not think it is possible to train infantry troops in six or eight months to fire their weapons properly and also in how to make tactical use of the ground. These boys should have more training. They should go through battle schools for longer periods when they get out to a theatre of war. I ask the Minister—and I do so, I think, on behalf of all parties—to let these wretched boys grow up and get a bit more training.

10.36 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I should not like this debate to conclude without making it clear that the point of view strongly and vehemently expressed has strong support from this side of the House. I have a letter from a mother of a soldier who was called up in August. He is an only son and was on the high seas in December, being killed in action in Malaya. I also have a letter from a brother of a soldier in my constituency who was killed in Korea. These letters come from far too many parts of the country to be ignored. I do not know what period of training is supposed to be necessary before a soldier is sent into battle.

Mr. Nabarro: Two years.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: An American soldier has four months' training in Korea before being sent into battle, and at the other end of the scale a South Korean conscript is sent into action after only one month's training in the army. I hope that we shall see an end to this sort of massacre of our people without training. The War Office should review the attitude it has taken in relation to this question of training.

10.38 p.m.

Mr. George Ward: I wish to intervene for only two minutes, as so many parents of men in the Worcester Regiment live in my constituency. There are, as the House knows, two aspects of this matter. The first deals with the past, the five men who have already been killed. We want to satisfy ourselves that these men could not have escaped their fate had they had better training. In pursuance of this, I asked the Secretary of State on what date the five men of the 1st Battalion the Worcestershire Regiment who were killed on 22nd February, arrived in Malaya; and what training they received between the date of their arrival and the date on which they first went into action against the enemy. The Secretary of State for War answered:
I have called for this information and will write to the hon. Member."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 265.]
That was on 20th March, but I have not yet had that information, and I hope he will let me have it without any more delay.
The next points I should like to raise deal with the future. We want to ensure that similar incidents can, so far as humanly possible, be avoided. There are two needs: first, that these men not only have adequate training before sailing abroad, but also that they have adequate training in jungle warfare on the spot before they go into action; secondly, that the minimum age limit of 18 years three months should be raised to 19 years, as in the case of troops for Korea. If in Korea, why not in Malaya? We consider it right to oppose the Communist terrorists in Malaya, and we make no protest about that; but the Government carry a very heavy responsibility towards these young men who go out on our behalf, and they should have the very best equipment and training that can be given. We rely on the Government to see that these matters are put right.

10.41 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Michael Stewart): In replying on this extremely serious subject, I will come straight to the point because of the time left to me, and summarise the regulations as they are at present. A man may not be despatched to Malaya until he has reached the age of 18 years and three months. In fact, if we take the National Service man, he may not enter the Army until he is 18 years and 3 months of age, and 18 weeks' service has to be added to that because regulations provide that he must have had 16 weeks' training and 18 weeks' service; that allows for leave, and other things. So, there must be 16 weeks' training, and on to that there must be added, to the age of 18 years and 3 months, a voyage of about one month, during which he receives further training.

Air Commodore Harvey: On a troopship—how can the hon. Gentleman count that?

Mr. Stewart: The hon. and gallant Gentleman questions that statement, but I can assure him that those directly responsible for these men have made most particular requests that this troopship training should continue in accordance with regulations. Then, on arrival in the Far East, there is one month's intensive training in jungle warfare, so that the soldier will be more than 18 years


9 months, as a minimum, before he is engaged in any combatant duties. Of course, as a Regular soldier, a man can join at a somewhat earlier age, but he cannot be engaged in operations until he is something over the age of 18 years 6 months. I say this in order to summarise the present regulations; the ruling that a man must have at least 16 weeks' training is universally and rigidly adhered to.
Now, what would be the effect of raising the age? A very large proportion of the men in the Army, both National Service and Regular, are in the younger age groups. It follows, with regard to National Service men, because of the age which Parliament has laid down, and the nation has accepted, that they must be in that category. The actual age composition of the Army would be lower than it is if there had been a greater increase in Regular recruiting in recent years because of the number of men who join the Army before the compulsory age for National Service. The bulk of the Regulars are quite young men.
It follows that, if we were to raise the age at which a man can be sent out to the Malayan theatre, it would give us a large number of soldiers in the Army of whom one would be obliged to say that the theatres in which they might be used would be extremely limited. It would further mean that, when a unit went overseas, there would always be a certain number of men taken away from it. One would add to the difficulty and complexity of proper training in this country. If we did that, we should be defeating the ends which hon. Members have in mind, because in this matter training is very much more important than age. I think that is generally accepted.
We ought to notice this, too. I do not think a regulation regarding age could properly be confined to Malaya. It ought to be extended to Eritrea where we have to engage, in turn, against bandits. It is also right to say that it ought to be extended to a number of areas in the Middle Eastern Command. The effect of all that would be a concentration of large numbers of the youngest soldiers in a very limited number of theatres. I am extremely doubtful whether that would be in the interests of the young men themselves. It would not be at all wise, I think, greatly

to increase the numbers of very young men in an army of occupation such as we have in Germany at the present time.
I am forced to the conclusion, therefore, that while we have the present age of National Service and the present age at which young men may join the Regular Army, the age at which we send them to Malaya follows, whether we like it or not, inescapably from that. The only way of avoiding that would be to alter the age of National Service and the age at which a man may join the Regular Army, which I cannot discuss as it would involve legislation and be out of order.
Here we have something which Parliament and the nation have accepted. Indeed, far more important I judge than this question of age is the vital question, "Are these men's lives endangered because they have not received sufficient training when they are sent on these operations?" That is the question on which everything turns. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey), who raised this topic, quoted two letters. In one there was the phrase that the young man referred to in that letter did not get a chance. I think the hon. and gallant Gentleman will agree that it is bound to happen in operations of war that a young man runs into danger where he is attacked by an enemy in such a fashion that he has no chance to retaliate. One could not conclude that the man who suffered that mischance had not been properly trained. That is a disaster which might befall any soldier of any age and however well-trained.
The other letter contained very serious allegations and I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will furnish me with sufficient details to be able to pursue an inquiry into these allegations. But I must say, in fairness to all responsible, that I cannot accept the circumstances of a suicide among the troops in Malaya without a very thorough investigation to see whether that report was correct. I have at present no evidence to lead me to suppose such an event has occurred. The hon. and gallant Gentleman will agree that we ought not to accept it without an inquiry.

Air Commodore Harvey: I will certainly ask my constituent if she has any objection to supplying the name. I do not think she will, in which case the


hon. Gentleman will be armed to inquire into it fully.

Mr. Stewart: I shall be very glad to do so and perhaps, therefore, it will be better for me not to pursue that particular case further. But regarding training, it is suggested that these men receive very little training. They get, in this country, six weeks' basic training at a group training centre, followed by 10 weeks' continuation training with the unit in this country, followed by the month's training on the troopship, followed by the month's intensive jungle training in Malaya. Those are minimum figures.

Air Commodore Harvey: How long in Malaya?

Mr. Stewart: One month's intensive jungle training. Those are minimum figures. For example, if I may now refer to the tragic case in which the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. G. Ward) has an interest even greater than that which we all naturally feel in this matter, I would say this. Of the five soldiers to whom he referred, two were Regular soldiers and had been in Malaya since June of the previous year. Of the three National Service men, two had been there since November and one since December. All of them had received at least one month's intensive jungle training and in the case of two of them there was an additional period of three weeks. I cannot accept the view that after this period of training a man is not in a position properly to look after himself on operations. If I did I should be going against the very wide range of opinions which my right hon. Friend and myself have been very careful to collect in this matter.

Air Commodore Harvey: I am sure the hon. Member does not want to mislead the House. He has given the impression that when they arrive in Malaya there is a month's intensive training. He must know that young men going out to the Orient for the first time are afflicted with all sorts of local complaints—"Singapore tummy" and so on—and they have to acclimatise themselves. I wish the hon. Gentleman would give the real facts and not give this impression which we all know not to be correct.

Mr. Stewart: I will not accept the idea that every young man who goes out there

suffers to that extent. There is this problem of health, but it is by no means universal or as general as the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggests.
We have considered whether this period of training ought to be extended. If it could be made possible, I will consider the suggestion that we should extend that period from a month to six weeks, but I can go no further at the present time. One hon. Member urged me not to give platitudinous answers that these young men are giving a good account of themselves. That was a comment of my right hon. Friend and it was made because the hon. and gallant Member himself used a form of words which suggested that they did not give a good account of themselves. It was proper that my right hon. Friend should deny that suggestion.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport: The hon. Gentleman is completely misleading the House. I do not consider these statements to be correct.

Mr. Stewart: The hon. and gallant Member asked how we could expect these young men to give a good account of themselves? Once he had said that, it was obvious that my right hon. Friend had to deny the apparent imputation. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not mean what those words seemed to say, I readily accept that; but as he had said them, it was necessary for a denial to be made.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport: Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport rose—

Mr. Stewart: I have not time to give way. My hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) spoke of the massacre of these young men. Every one of these casualties is a tragic and serious incident, but I think we ought not to use words like that. The actual number of casualties between May, 1948, and the end of March of this year is 119 killed or died of wounds and 181 wounded.
The final point I would make is this. Neither in the case of the men of the Worcesters nor in any other of this list of cases has there been anything in the setting in which the tragedies occurred where one could say with any approach to proof or even probability that these men were killed or wounded because they had not been sufficiently trained to be able to give an account of themselves.


The evidence and the facts are against the contention that we are sending these men out improperly trained. The more one examines the episode in which the young men of the Worcesters were involved, the more clear it becomes that it could not be said that their misfortune was due to lack of training. So it is with every incident one examines. So it is with every officer who has been in the theatre and whose opinion one takes. I will look and see whether we could make

an extension on the lines suggested, but apart from that the House will, I hope—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'Clock, and the Debate having continued for half an hour, MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Five Minutes to Eleven o'Clock.